Weekly Case Digests – August 30, 2021 – September 3, 2021

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7^th Circuit Digests

7^th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: United States of America v. Jacques S. Gholston

Case No.: 20-2168

Officials: EASTERBROOK, WOOD, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.

Focus: Motion to Suppress Evidence Denied – 4^th Amendment Violation

Officer Erik Cowick pulled over Jacques Gholston just after midnight on April 29, 2018, for turning without signaling. Because Cowick suspected that Gholston was a drug dealer, he called for a trained dog to perform a drug sniff at the scene. As Cowick was finishing the routine procedures required for a minor traffic violation, the dog arrived and alerted officers to the presence of methamphetamine.

The discovery of the drugs led in time to federal charges for possession of five or more grams of methamphetamine with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B). In response, Gholston filed a pretrial motion to suppress the evidence of the meth seized as a result of the dog sniff. He contended that Cowick unreasonably delayed the stop in order to allow the “K9” officer to arrive and perform an inspection. The district court denied the motion. Gholston then pleaded guilty, reserving his right to challenge the ruling on the motion to suppress. We conclude that the district court committed no reversible error in finding that Cowick did not unlawfully prolong the stop and thus did not violate Gholston’s Fourth Amendment rights. We therefore affirm.

Affirmed

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7^th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: United States of America v. Andrew McHaney

Case No.: 20-1690

Officials: ROVNER, HAMILTON, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.

Focus: Statutory Interpretation – Hobbs Act

Andrew McHaney is not the first defendant to try to persuade this court that Hobbs Act robbery is not a crime of violence as defined under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). And despite our growing, unequivocal precedent to the contrary, we suspect he will not be the last, as defendants who are subject to the § 924(c) enhancement face significantly increased sentences. Unless the Supreme Court instructs otherwise, however, these attempts will be in vain. This court has declared several times that Hobbs Act robbery meets the definition of a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) and thus is a qualifying predicate crime under the statute. We see no cause to alter that precedent.

Affirmed

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7^th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: United States of America v. Olaitan Fowowe

Case No.: 20-3197

Officials: SYKES, Chief Judge, and FLAUM and EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judges.

Focus: Sentencing Guidelines – First Step Act

In 2009, defendant-appellant Olaitan Fowowe was sentenced for a conviction for conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine. The following year, Congress passed the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372, which prospectively reduced the amount and kind of punishment for crack cocaine convictions like Fowowe’s. Fowowe—sentenced well before the Fair Sentencing Act’s August 3, 2010 enactment—was ineligible for reduced sentencing under the Fair Sentencing Act.

Despite this initial ineligibility, eight years later, the First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194, created an avenue for people, like Fowowe, sentenced before August 3, 2010, to seek retroactive application of the Fair Sentencing Act. Section 404(b) of the First Step Act authorizes—but does not require—district courts to reduce the punishment for a crack offense that occurred prior to August 3, 2010, with the Fair Sentencing Act’s shorter sentences.

In federal district court, Fowowe requested a reduced prison sentence under § 404(b) of the First Step Act to no avail. On appeal, Fowowe now argues the district court’s evaluation of his request was deficient because the court failed to apply a Seventh Circuit decision that post-dated his initial sentencing by more than eleven years. To address Fowowe’s argument, we must resolve a legal issue of first impression in this Circuit: Does § 404(b) authorize or require a district court to apply a judicial decision issued after the defendant was initially sentenced? This question is one narrow issue within a broader, emerging circuit split on the parameters of district court § 404(b) motion evaluation. We hold that § 404(b) authorizes but does not require district courts to apply an intervening judicial decision in evaluating First Step Act motions. Given this, we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to recalculate Fowowe’s sentencing range. We now affirm.

Affirmed

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7^th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: Debra Eaton v. J.H. Findorff & Son, Inc.,

Case No.: 20-1731

Officials: EASTERBROOK, ROVNER, and WOOD, Circuit Judges.

Focus: Title VII Violation – Retaliation Claim

Debra Eaton brought a Title VII claim against J.H. Findorff & Son, Inc. (“Findorff”), asserting that the company twice refused to hire her in retaliation for an earlier sex discrimination charge that she had leveled against the company. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Findorff and we affirm.

Affirmed

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7^th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: Marque Bowers v. Thomas J. Dart, et al.,

Case No.: 20-1516

Officials: RIPPLE, KANNE, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.

Focus: Prisoner – ADA and Rehabilitation Act Violation

Cook County inmate Marque Bowers filed this federal civil rights lawsuit after other inmates at‐ tacked him in 2012. Bowers alleged that Cook County, the Cook County Sheriff, and other Cook County Jail employees failed to protect him, instituted an observation policy that caused the attack, and later discriminated against him because of a resulting disability. The district court dismissed most of Bowers’s claims before trial and, after a jury returned a verdict in the Sheriff’s favor on the remaining claims, denied Bowers’s post‐trial motions. Bowers now appeals from each of the district court’s determinations. We affirm.

Affirmed

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7^th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: Design Basics, LLC, et al., v. Kersteins Homes & Designs, Inc., et al.,

Case No.: 18-3202; 19-3118; 20-1515

Officials: KANNE, SCUDDER, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.

Focus: Copyright Infringement

Copyright law protects individual expression while encouraging creativity and maintaining the public interest in spreading ideas. In recent years, however, a cottage industry of opportunistic copyright holders—earning the derisive moniker “intellectual property trolls”—has emerged, in which a troll enforces copyrights not to protect expression, but to extract payments through litigation. Design Basics, LLC fits that bill. The firm, which holds copyright in several thousand single-family home floor plans, has brought over 100 infringement suits against home builders in recent years. But many defendants—the targets of the settlement extraction scheme—are starting to push back. This case is a good example.

We have affirmed dismissal of Design Basics’s lawsuits twice in recent years. See Design Basics LLC v. Signature Construction, Inc., 994 F.3d 879 (7th Cir. 2021); Design Basics, LLC v. Lexington Homes, Inc., 858 F.3d 1093 (7th Cir. 2017). We do so again today. In dismissing Design Basics’s copyright infringement suit against the Kerstiens family’s home building business, the district court recognized that the firm has a thin copyright in its plans because they consist largely of standard features found in homes across America. We agree and affirm.

Affirmed

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7^th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: Lawrence Krivak v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc.,

Case No.: 20-1276

Officials: SYKES, Chief Judge, and EASTERBROOK and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.

Focus: Court Error – Abuse of Discretion

After Lawrence Krivak fell and injured himself in a Home Depot parking lot, he sued the store but failed time and again to prosecute his case. Krivak’s counsel missed many court conferences and seemed to pay little attention to court rules and case deadlines. Along the way, counsel’s delinquency drew a scolding and sanction from the magistrate judge and, in time, led to the district court giving one clear and final warning—miss no more conferences or face dismissal of your case. When Krivak’s counsel no-showed another time, the district court stuck to its word and dismissed the case. Krivak twice sought relief from the judgment, but here too his counsel continued to miss deadlines, thus limiting the scope of what we can review on appeal. The only challenge properly before us is to the district court’s refusal to reopen the case, and because we see no abuse of discretion, we affirm that judgment.

Affirmed

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7^th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: Robert S. Farnik, et al., v. City of Chicago, et al.,

Case No.: 19-2104

Officials: BRENNAN, SCUDDER, and KIRSCH, Circuit Judges.

Focus: Jury Instructions

Robert Farnik was arrested in 2013 for alleged animal cruelty after Chicago Police were contacted about a sickly dog making desperate sounds in Farnik’s backyard. Following the arrest, Farnik produced veterinary records for the dog, which he had adopted as a stray and cared for, and his state criminal charge was dismissed. Farnik and his wife, Andzelika Jastrzebska, then sued the City of Chicago and Chicago Police Officer Marian Horan under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging wrongful arrest and excessive force along with various state law claims. The case eventually proceeded to trial, and the jury returned a verdict for the defendants on all counts. The district court denied Farnik’s motion for a mistrial during the trial and later denied a post-trial motion for a new trial. Farnik asks us to reconsider those denials and seeks a new trial because, he asserts, the district court made various legal errors related to the handling of voir dire, trial scheduling, closing arguments, and jury instructions. Because the district court did not err in any of these respects or by denying his mid-and post-trial motions, we affirm.

Affirmed

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WI Court of Appeals Digests

WI Court of Appeals – District I

Case Name: Clayton Lennon Daniel Sims v. Esther Sims

Case No.: 2019AP1501

Officials: Brash, P.J., Donald and White, JJ.

Focus: Abuse of Discretion –Divorce – Child Placement

Clayton Lennon Daniel Sims appeals the judgment of divorce awarding sole custody and primary placement of the child he shares with Esther Johnson to Johnson. As framed by Sims, the sole issue on appeal is whether Sims successfully completed a certified batterer’s intervention program that would satisfy the requirements of WIS. STAT. § 767.41(2)(d)1.a. (2019-20). We affirm on a different basis: the circuit court’s remarks reflect that the presumption against joint or sole custody was not rebutted by a preponderance of evidence that it was in the best interest of the child for Sims to be awarded joint or sole legal custody, pursuant to § 767.41(2)(d)1.b. See Mercado v. GE Money Bank, 2009 WI App 73, ¶2, 318 Wis. 2d 216, 768 N.W.2d 53 (explaining that this court can affirm a circuit court’s decision on other grounds). As such, the circuit court properly exercised its discretion when it awarded custody of the child to Johnson.

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WI Court of Appeals – District III

Case Name: State of Wisconsin v. Jeromy M. Mathews

Case No.: 2019AP2319-CR

Officials: Stark, P.J., Hruz and Seidl, JJ.

Focus: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Jeromy Mathews appeals a judgment of conviction for repeated sexual assault of a child and an order denying his postconviction motion. Mathews argues he is entitled to a new trial because the prosecutor engaged in misconduct, he received constitutionally ineffective assistance from his trial counsel, and the victim was incredible as a matter of law. We reject Mathews’ arguments and affirm.

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WI Court of Appeals – District III

Case Name: State of Wisconsin v. James M. Burke

Case No.: 2020AP465-CR

Officials: Stark, P.J., Hruz and Seidl, JJ.

Focus: Abuse of Discretion – Expert Testimony

James Burke appeals a judgment of conviction, entered upon a jury’s verdict, for physical abuse of a child by intentionally causing bodily harm. Burke argues he is entitled to a new trial because the circuit court erroneously prohibited his expert witness from testifying regarding the professional understanding of the nature of memory and research on false allegations by children. We conclude the court did not erroneously exercise its discretion when it concluded the proposed expert testimony would not assist the jury. Accordingly, we affirm.

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WI Court of Appeals – District III

Case Name: Dianna C. Sunday, et al., v. McMillian-Warner Mutual Insurance Company

Case No.: 2020AP941

Officials: Stark, P.J., Hruz and Seidl, JJ.

Focus: Insurance Claim – Duty to Defend

Dianna and Kenneth Sunday (collectively “the Sundays”) appeal from a judgment declaring that McMillan-Warner Mutual Insurance Company and Mt. Morris Mutual Insurance Company had no duty to defend or indemnify Nicholas Sempf Nyren (“Nicholas”) due to exclusions in the applicable homeowners’ policies for bodily injuries resulting from the criminal acts of an insured. We affirm.

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WI Supreme Court Digests

WI Supreme Court

Case Name: State of Wisconsin v. Jordan Alexander Lickes

Case No.: 2021 WI 60

Focus: Sentencing Guidelines – Probation

Jordan Lickes seeks review of the court of appeals decision, which reversed the Green County Circuit Court’s order expunging three of Lickes’s convictions. Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 973.015(1m)(a) (2017-18), for individuals under the age of 25 at the time of an offense, a court “may order at the time of sentencing that [the individual’s] record be expunged upon successful completion of the sentence[.]” If the individual is placed on probation, § 973.015(1m)(b) provides that he “has successfully completed the sentence if . . . [he] has satisfied the conditions of probation,” among other things.

Lickes raises two principal issues. First, Lickes contends that the phrase “conditions of probation” under Wis. Stat. § 973.015(1m)(b) does not refer to the conditions set by the Department of Corrections (DOC) but only those conditions ordered by the sentencing court. According to Lickes, he did not need to satisfy DOC’s conditions of probation in order for the circuit court to expunge all three of his convictions. Second, Lickes argues that, even if the phrase “conditions of probation” includes conditions set by DOC, circuit courts nonetheless have discretion to determine that an individual “satisfied [his] conditions of probation” despite having violated one or more conditions.

We hold: (1) the phrase “conditions of probation” in Wis. Stat. § 973.015(1m)(b) means conditions set by both DOC and the sentencing court; and (2) the statute does not give circuit courts discretionary authority to declare an individual has “satisfied [his] conditions of probation” if the record demonstrates an individual has violated one or more “conditions of probation,” including DOC-imposed conditions. The circuit court erred in expunging Lickes’s three convictions because he failed to satisfy DOC’s “conditions of probation” for all three convictions. We affirm the decision of the court of appeals.

Affirmed

Concur:

Dissent: ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., filed a dissenting opinion in which DALLET, J., joined.
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WI Supreme Court

Case Name: State of Wisconsin v. Jacob Richard Beyer

Case No.: 2021 WI 59

Focus: Certification Question – Guilty-plea-waiver Rule

This case is before us on certification from the court of appeals pursuant to Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.61 (2019-20). The certified issue is: “whether the guilty-plea-waiver rule applies when a defendant pleads not guilty to an offense, but stipulates to the inculpatory facts supporting each element of the offense, and explicitly agrees to a finding of guilt at a hearing before the circuit court at which no witness testifies.”

We conclude that the occurrence in the circuit court, while not a guilty plea made in the customary mode, also was not a court trial. We further conclude that, while parties may stipulate to facts for purposes of a criminal trial, trials based on stipulated facts and a stipulated finding of guilt are not permissible in Wisconsin. Finally, we conclude that Beyer cannot be held to the stipulation he entered in circuit court because he entered it relying on a procedure that we conclude is invalid. Therefore, this matter is remanded to the circuit court so that Beyer can choose whether to enter a plea or proceed to trial. Accordingly, we reverse and remand to the circuit court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Reversed and remanded

Concur:

Dissent:
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WI Supreme Court

Case Name: State of Wisconsin v. Adam W. Vice

Case No.: 2021 WI 63

Focus: Motion to Suppress Denied – Poly-graph Interview

This case is about a post-polygraph interview. We are tasked with deciding whether the circuit court erred when it granted Adam Vice’s motion to suppress, concluding that the statements he made during a post-polygraph interview were involuntary. The court of appeals affirmed the decision of the circuit court, and now the State seeks review.

We conclude that the statements Vice made during his post-polygraph interview are admissible because: (1) the interview was discrete from the polygraph examination; and (2) the statements were not the product of police coercion, and therefore were voluntary. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of appeals.

Reversed and remanded

Concur: HAGEDORN, J., filed a concurring opinion.

Dissent:
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WI Supreme Court

Case Name: State of Wisconsin v. Alan M. Johnson

Case No.: 2021 WI 61

Focus: Jury Instructions

In the middle of the night, Alan M. Johnson snuck into the home of his brother-in-law (K.M.) seeking evidence of child pornography. Johnson brought a gun. After searching K.M.’s computer for more than two hours, K.M. appeared in the doorway and saw Johnson. K.M. shut the door, as Johnson described it, and then burst through the door and attacked. The ensuing altercation left K.M. dead; he was shot five times. A jury found Johnson guilty of first-degree reckless homicide. Johnson appealed his conviction, and the court of appeals ruled in his favor and ordered a new trial.

Three issues are presented for our review. First, did the circuit court err in failing to instruct the jury on perfect self-defense? Second, did the circuit court err in failing to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of second-degree reckless homicide? And finally, did the circuit court err in precluding Johnson from offering evidence regarding what he found on K.M.’s computer the night of K.M.’s death? The court of appeals ruled in Johnson’s favor on all three questions.

We agree the circuit court erred in failing to instruct the jury on perfect self-defense and second-degree reckless homicide. When determining whether these instructions should be provided, the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant, and the instruction must be provided if evidence is presented from which a reasonable jury could find in the defendant’s favor on the instructed elements. The evidence presented at trial was sufficient to satisfy this low evidentiary bar. We affirm the decision of the court of appeals on these grounds and remand for a new trial.

However, we conclude the circuit court properly exercised its discretion in precluding Johnson from testifying regarding what he found on K.M.’s computer that night. The circuit court concluded this other-acts evidence was not relevant, and even if it was, the probative value of the evidence would be substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. While another court might see it differently, this was a permissible and reasonable conclusion, particularly since Johnson was permitted to testify regarding why he was at K.M.’s house and that he “found” what he was looking for. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of appeals on this ground.

Affirmed in part. Reversed in part.

Concur:

Dissent: ZIEGLER, C.J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which ROGGENSACK, J., joined, and in which KAROFSKY, J., joined ¶¶1-3, 5-23, and 30- 48.
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WI Supreme Court

Case Name: State of Wisconsin v. Dawn M. Prado

Case No.: 2021 WI 64

Focus: Suppression of Evidence – Good Faith Exception

Both the State of Wisconsin and Dawn Prado seek review of a published decision of the court of appeals, which determined that Wisconsin’s incapacitated driver provision contained within the implied consent statute, Wis. Stat. § 343.305 (2017-18) is unconstitutional. However, the court of appeals additionally determined that under the facts of this case, the application of the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule allows for the admission of the blood test evidence Prado sought to suppress.

The State asks us to review the court of appeals’ determination that the incapacitated driver provision is unconstitutional. Prado requests review of the court of appeals’ application of the good faith exception and its conclusion that the evidence need not be suppressed despite the constitutional violation. We conclude that the incapacitated driver provision is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt. The provision’s “deemed” consent authorizes warrantless searches that do not fulfill any recognized exception to the warrant requirement and thus the provision violates the Fourth Amendment’s proscription of unreasonable searches.

However, we further conclude that under the facts of this case, law enforcement drew Prado’s blood in reasonable reliance on a statute that had not been determined to be unconstitutional. Consequently, the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies and the evidence resulting from the draw of Prado’s blood need not be suppressed. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals.

Affirmed

Concur: ROGGENSACK, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which ZIEGLER, C.J., joined.

Dissent:
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WI Supreme Court

Case Name: State of Wisconsin v. Anthony M. Schmidt

Case No.: 2021 WI 65

Focus: Plea & Sentencing – Plea Withdrawal

This case is before the court on bypass pursuant to Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.60 (2019-20). Anthony Schmidt brought this action challenging the Walworth County circuit court’s judgment imposing a child pornography surcharge for 14 images of child pornography, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 973.042(2), and order denying Schmidt’s postconviction motion seeking to withdraw his guilty plea or, in the alternative, have the circuit court vacate the child pornography surcharges for the eight images of child pornography that formed the basis of Schmidt’s read-in charges of possession of child pornography.

Schmidt was charged with 14 counts of possession of child pornography and one count of failing to register for the sex offender registry. As part of a plea agreement, Schmidt pled guilty to six counts of possession of child pornography, and the State dismissed and read in the remaining charges. The circuit court accepted this plea agreement and convicted Schmidt of the six counts of possession of child pornography. At sentencing, the circuit court sentenced Schmidt to 30 years, consisting of 15 years of initial confinement and 15 years of extended supervision. The circuit court also imposed a $500 child pornography surcharge, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 973.042(2), for each of the 14 images of child pornography for which Schmidt was charged.

After sentencing, Schmidt filed a postconviction motion seeking to have the circuit court (1) allow him to withdraw his guilty plea, (2) vacate the child pornography surcharges imposed for the eight images of child pornography that formed the basis of Schmidt’s read-in charges of possession of child pornography, and (3) grant a hearing on both issues. Schmidt argued that he should be permitted to withdraw his plea because the circuit court failed to adequately inform him during the plea colloquy about the child pornography surcharge, which he alleged was a punishment attaching to his conviction. In the alternative, he argued that the circuit court could not impose a child pornography surcharge for images of child pornography that form the basis of read-in charges of possession of child pornography. The circuit court denied Schmidt’s postconviction motion without a hearing, determining that it did not need to inform Schmidt of the child pornography surcharge during the plea colloquy, and that it could order the child pornography surcharge for the images of child pornography that formed the basis of read-in charges of possession of child pornography. We agree.

We conclude that the child pornography surcharge is not punitive, so the circuit court did not need to inform Schmidt of the child pornography surcharge during the plea colloquy. Consequently, the circuit court did not err when it denied Schmidt’s postconviction motion to withdraw his guilty plea. We also conclude that the child pornography surcharge applies to images of child pornography that form the basis of read-in charges of sexual exploitation of a child or possession of child pornography, so long as those images of child pornography are connected to and brought into relation with the convicted individual’s offense of sexual exploitation of a child or possession of child pornography. Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court’s judgment imposing the child pornography surcharge for 14 images of child pornography, and the order that denied plea withdrawal.

Affirmed

Concur: ROGGENSACK, J., filed a concurrence, in which REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., joined. HAGEDORN, J., filed an opinion concurring in part, and dissenting in part, in which ANN WALSH BRADLEY and DALLET, JJ., joined.

Dissent: HAGEDORN, J., filed an opinion concurring in part, and dissenting in part, in which ANN WALSH BRADLEY and DALLET, JJ., joined.
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Supreme Court Digests

United States Supreme Court

Case Name: Tarahrick Terry v. United States

Case No.: 20-5904

Focus: Statutory Interpretation – First Step Act – Mandatory Minimum Penalty 

In 1986, Congress established mandatory-minimum penalties for cocaine offenses. If the quantity of cocaine involved in an offense exceeded a minimum threshold, then courts were required to impose a heightened sentence. Congress set the quantity thresholds far lower for crack offenses than for powder offenses. But it has since narrowed the gap by increasing the thresholds for crack offenses more than fivefold. The First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. 115–391, 132 Stat. 5194, makes those changes retroactive and gives certain crack offenders an opportunity to receive a reduced sentence. The question here is whether crack offenders who did not trigger a mandatory minimum qualify. They do not.

Affirmed

Dissenting:

Concurring: SOTOMAYOR, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.
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United States Supreme Court

Case Name: Gregory Greer, et al., v. United States

Case No.: 19-8709; 20-444

Focus: Plea & Sentencing – Jury Instructions

Federal law prohibits the possession of firearms by certain categories of individuals, including by those who have been convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year in prison. See 18 U. S. C. §§922(g), 924(a)(2). In Rehaif v. United States, 588 U. S. ___ (2019), this Court clarified the mens rea requirement for firearms-possession offenses, including the felon-in-possession offense. In felon-in-possession cases after Rehaif, the Government must prove not only that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm, but also that he knew he was a felon when he possessed the firearm. See id., at ___ (slip op., at 11). As many courts have recognized and as common sense suggests, individuals who are convicted felons ordinarily know that they are convicted felons. That simple point turns out to be important in the two cases before us. Before this Court decided Rehaif, Gregory Greer and Michael Gary were separately convicted of felon-in-possession offenses.

Greer’s case arose when police officers began talking to him in a hotel hallway. The officers suspected that Greer was involved in a prostitution ring. Greer ran from the officers and led them on a chase down a stairwell. The officers found a gun discarded in the stairwell and caught Greer shortly thereafter. Greer was wearing an empty holster clipped inside his waistband. At the time of the incident, Greer was a convicted felon. The Federal Government charged him in federal court with being a felon in possession of a firearm, and the case went to trial. Greer’s defense was that he had never possessed the gun that the police found in the stairwell. Greer did not request—and the District Court did not give—a jury instruction requiring the jury to find that Greer knew he was a felon when he possessed the firearm. The jury found Greer guilty.

Gary’s case arose out of two separate encounters with police. Both times, officers found Gary with a firearm. At the time of the incidents, Gary was a convicted felon. The Federal Government charged him in federal court with two counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm. Gary pled guilty. During the plea colloquy, the District Court did not advise Gary that, if he went to trial, a jury would have to find that he knew he was a felon when he possessed the firearms.

After Greer’s trial and Gary’s plea, this Court decided Rehaif. Based on Rehaif, both Greer and Gary raised new mens rea arguments on appeal. Greer argued that he was entitled to a new trial because the District Court failed to instruct the jury that he had to know he was a felon. Gary similarly argued that his guilty plea must be vacated because the District Court failed to advise him during the plea colloquy that, if he went to trial, a jury would have to find that he knew he was a felon. The Eleventh Circuit rejected Greer’s argument, 798 Fed. Appx. 483 (2020), while the Fourth Circuit agreed with Gary’s argument, 954 F. 3d 194 (2020). We granted certiorari in both cases. See 592 U. S. ___ (2021).

Affirmed in part. Reversed in part.

Dissenting: SOTOMAYOR, J., filed an opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in part

Concurring: SOTOMAYOR, J., filed an opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in part
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United States Supreme Court

Case Name: Sharonell Fulton, et al., v. City of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, et al.,

Case No.: 19-123

Focus: 1^st Amendment Violation

Catholic Social Services is a foster care agency in Philadelphia. The City stopped referring children to CSS upon discovering that the agency would not certify same-sex couples to be foster parents due to its religious beliefs about marriage. The City will renew its foster care contract with CSS only if the agency agrees to certify same-sex couples. The question presented is whether the actions of Philadelphia violate the First Amendment.

Reversed and remanded

Dissenting:

Concurring: BARRETT, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which KAVANAUGH, J., joined, and in which BREYER, J., joined as to all but the first paragraph. ALITO, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which THOMAS and GORSUCH, JJ., joined. GORSUCH, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which THOMAS and ALITO, JJ., joined.
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United States Supreme Court

Case Name: Nestle USA, Inc., v. John Doe I, et al.,

Case No.: 19-416; 19-453

Focus: Alien Tort Statute – Jurisdiction

The Alien Tort Statute (ATS) gives federal courts jurisdiction to hear certain civil actions filed by aliens. 28 U. S. C. §1350. Although this jurisdictional statute does not create a cause of action, our precedents have stated that courts may exercise common-law authority under this statute to create private rights of action in very limited circumstances. See, e.g., Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U. S. 692, 724 (2004); Hernández v. Mesa, 589 U. S. ___, ___, ___ (2020) (slip op., at 6, 14). Respondents here seek a judicially created cause of action to recover damages from American corporations that allegedly aided and abetted slavery abroad. Although respondents’ injuries occurred entirely overseas, the Ninth Circuit held that respondents could sue in federal court because the defendant corporations allegedly made “major operational decisions” in the United States. The Ninth Circuit erred by allowing this suit to proceed.

Reversed and remanded

Dissenting: ALITO, J., filed a dissenting opinion.

Concurring: GORSUCH, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which ALITO, J., joined as to Part I, and in which KAVANAUGH, J., joined as to Part II. SOTOMAYOR, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which BREYER and KAGAN, JJ., joined.
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United States Supreme Court

Case Name: California, et al., v. Texas, et al.,

Case No.: 19-840; 19-1019

Focus: Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act – Constitutionality – Standing to Sue

As originally enacted in 2010, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act required most Americans to obtain minimum essential health insurance coverage. The Act also imposed a monetary penalty, scaled according to income, upon individuals who failed to do so. In 2017, Congress effectively nullified the penalty by setting its amount at $0. See Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. 115–97, §11081, 131 Stat. 2092 (codified in 26 U. S. C. §5000A(c)). Texas and 17 other States brought this lawsuit against the United States and federal officials. They were later joined by two individuals (Neill Hurley and John Nantz). The plaintiffs claim that without the penalty the Act’s minimum essential coverage requirement is unconstitutional. Specifically, they say neither the Commerce Clause nor the Tax Clause (nor any other enumerated power) grants Congress the power to enact it. See U. S. Const., Art. I, §8. They also argue that the minimum essential coverage requirement is not severable from the rest of the Act. Hence, they believe the Act as a whole is invalid. We do not reach these questions of the Act’s validity, however, for Texas and the other plaintiffs in this suit lack the standing necessary to raise them.

Vacated and remanded

Dissenting: ALITO, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which GORSUCH, J., joined.

Concurring: THOMAS, J., filed a concurring opinion.
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