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Weekly Case Digests – August 23, 2021 – August 27, 2021

By: Derek Hawkins//August 27, 2021//

Weekly Case Digests – August 23, 2021 – August 27, 2021

By: Derek Hawkins//August 27, 2021//

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7th Circuit Digests

7th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: Victor Robinson v. Jolinda Waterman, et al.,

Case No.: 20-1370

Officials: BAUER, KANNE, and WOOD, Circuit Judges.

Focus: Prisoner – Deliberate Indifference

Victor Robinson, a Wisconsin inmate, was given medication belonging to a different inmate, fell ill, and passed out, suffering a concussion in the process. He brought this deliberate‐indifference suit against the prison officials who he believed were responsible for the mix up with the medication. When Robinson failed to respond to defendants’ motion for summary judgment or dispute their version of the events, the district court entered summary judgment against him. Because no reasonable jury could conclude that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to a serious medical risk, we affirm.

Affirmed

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7th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: United States of America v. Jeffrey Esposito

Case No.: 20-1124

Officials: FLAUM, HAMILTON, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.

Focus: Sentencing Guidelines

Jeffrey Esposito, convicted of multiple counts of sexually exploiting a child as well as of possessing child pornography, was sentenced to 200 years in prison. He appeals, arguing that the district erred when, rather than first determining his total punishment, sentences were imposed on each individual count and then added together. Because the district court did not err when sentencing Esposito, we affirm.

Affirmed

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WI Court of Appeals Digests

WI Court of Appeals – District I

Case Name: State of Wisconsin v. M.D.M.,

Case No.: 2017AP138; 2017AP139

Officials: Brash, P.J., Dugan and Donald, JJ.

Focus: Statutory Interpretation – Competency Evaluations and Hearings  

The State appeals from orders of the circuit court denying the State’s “Motion[s] to Resume Suspended Cases” in Milwaukee County Circuit Court Case Nos. 14JV588 and 14JV588B (the 2014 cases) where the State had filed petitions charging M.D.M. with a total of four counts of delinquency. The legal question on appeal concerns competency procedures under WIS. STAT. § 938.30(5)(d) (2019-20). After competency evaluations and hearings occurred, the circuit court found M.D.M. not competent, but likely to become competent in each case. The court suspended the proceedings and ordered competency restoration services in both cases.

Recommended for Publication

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WI Court of Appeals – District I

Case Name: Dr. Arthur Delahoussaye, et al., v. Economy Premier Assurance Company, et al.,

Case No.: 2019AP1284

Officials: Brash, P.J., Dugan and White, JJ.

Focus: Summary Judgment – Issue of Material Fact

Dr. Arthur Delahoussaye and Melissa Delahoussaye appeal the circuit court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of Economy Premier Assurance Company and Frederick Boelter, III (collectively, “Boelter”). They argue that the circuit court improperly granted summary judgment dismissing this case because there are disputed issues of material fact with regard to their negligence action against Boelter. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

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WI Court of Appeals – District I

Case Name: State of Wisconsin v. Lamont Donnell Sholar

Case No.: 2019AP1715-CR

Officials: Dugan, White and Graham, JJ.

Focus: Postconviction Relief – Newly Discovered Evidence

Lamont Donnell Sholar appeals from two orders denying his motions for postconviction relief and his judgment of conviction for one count of armed robbery by use of force as a party to a crime, contrary to WIS. STAT. §§ 943.32(1)(a) and (2), 939.50(3)(c), 939.05 (2019-20), and one count of burglary “while unarmed, but armed himself with a dangerous weapon while in the burglarized enclosure,” contrary to WIS. STAT. §§ 943.10(2)(b), 939.50(3)(e), 939.05. Sholar argues that under Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018), the police searched his cell site location information (CSLI) in violation of the Fourth Amendment because the police obtained the data by subpoena and not a warrant. Additionally, Sholar argues that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct regarding his co-actor’s plea agreement, that his co-actor’s reduced prison sentence constitutes newly discovered evidence, and that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel. We reject all arguments and affirm.

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WI Court of Appeals – District III

Case Name: Amy L. Fuss, et al., v. Jay L. Fuss, et al.,

Case No.: 2019AP2273

Officials: Stark, P.J., Hruz and Seidl, JJ.

Focus: Unlawful Seizure – Reasonable Suspicion

Kimberly Johnston, pro se, appeals an order dismissing her claims against Amy Fuss and Kenny Delebreau. The core issues on appeal, as best as we can discern them, are as follows: (1) whether Johnston’s property was unlawfully or unreasonably seized and disposed of under the constructive trust; (2) whether Johnston was forced to litigate a case to which she was not a party; (3) whether Johnston was evicted in violation of her rights to equal protection and due process; and (4) whether the circuit court harassed and retaliated against her. We address each issue in turn.  We affirm.

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WI Court of Appeals – District III

Case Name: Shannen Elizabeth Richard v. Mark Joseph Rasmussen

Case No.: 2020AP332

Officials: Stark, P.J., Hruz and Seidl, JJ.

Focus: Divorce – Maintenance

Shannen Richard appeals a judgment of divorce and a subsequent order addressing her motion to clarify the circuit court’s decision regarding maintenance. Shannen argues the court erred when it adopted the proposed divorce judgment submitted by her former husband, Mark Rasmussen, which applied a 22.5% discount for possible future tax liability to the values of the parties’ retirement accounts. Shannen contends that, contrary to Mark’s assertion, she never stipulated to the application of a 22.5% tax discount, and the record does not support applying a discount in that amount. Shannen also argues the court erred by denying her a long-term maintenance award and instead ordering Mark to pay the entirety of the health insurance premiums for the parties’ two teenage daughters in lieu of maintenance.

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WI Court of Appeals – District III

Case Name: Koehne Chevrolet-Buick-GMC, Inc., v. Bayland Buildings, Inc.,

Case No.: 2020AP336

Officials: Stark, P.J., Hruz and Seidl, JJ.

Focus: Summary Judgment – Issue of Material Fact

Koehne Chevrolet-Buick-GMC, Inc., appeals a summary judgment granted in favor of Bayland Buildings, Inc., on Koehne’s breach of contract and breach of warranty claims. We conclude there are genuine issues of material fact that preclude summary judgment on those claims. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings

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WI Court of Appeals – District II

Case Name: Linda Albert v. Michael Albert

Case No.: 2019AP2435

Officials: Neubauer, C.J., Gundrum and Davis, JJ.

Focus: Divorce – Motion for Reconsideration Denied  

Michael Albert appeals from a judgment of divorce and an order denying his motion for reconsideration. He raises issues relating to expert testimony, a marital property agreement (MPA), the division and valuation of property, and attorney’s fees. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

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WI Court of Appeals – District II

Case Name: State of Wisconsin v. Daniel J. Rejholec

Case No.: 2020AP56-CR

Officials: Reilly, P.J., Gundrum and Davis, JJ.

Focus: Motion to Suppress Denied – Miranda Warnings

Daniel J. Rejholec was informed of and waived his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), prior to his custodial interrogation. Rejholec repeatedly denied the accusations of his interrogator for the first half of his interrogation. One hour and seven minutes into the interrogation, the interrogator told Rejholec that he would be unable to testify at trial if he obtained a lawyer: “You’re not going to get a chance to tell your story. So the jury is never going to hear your side of the story.” The interrogator repeated this misrepresentation a few minutes later, telling Rejholec, “I’m trying to give you an opportunity to tell your side of the story before it’s too late to be able to do that.” Rejholec thereafter gave incriminating statements.

Rejholec moved to suppress his statements on both Miranda and State ex rel. Goodchild v. Burke, 27 Wis. 2d 244, 133 N.W.2d 753 (1965), grounds. An accused’s rights during a custodial interrogation can be violated in one of two ways: (1) the government fails to give or inadequately informs an accused of the warnings and advisements required by Miranda before or during a custodial interrogation, and the accused fails to waive his or her rights (a Miranda waiver challenge); or (2) the government utilizes improper pressures against the accused, causing his or her statements to be involuntary (a Goodchild statement challenge). See State v. Santiago, 206 Wis. 2d 3, 12, 18, 556 N.W.2d 687 (1996); State v. Jiles, 2003 WI 66, ¶¶25-26, 262 Wis. 2d 457, 663 N.W.2d 798. The circuit court found Rejholec’s statements voluntary but did not address his waiver.

Rejholec appeals from his judgment of conviction for repeated sexual assault of the same child, pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 948.025(1)(e) (2019- 20), and from the circuit court’s order denying his motion for postconviction relief. We reverse. We agree that Rejholec’s statement (Goodchild challenge) was voluntary, but we conclude that Rejholec’s waiver (Miranda challenge) became invalid when his interrogator misrepresented his right to silence, his right to counsel, and his right to testify at trial. Accordingly, we remand with directions that the circuit court grant Rejholec’s suppression motion.

We begin with a brief statement of facts, relate the pertinent portions of Rejholec’s custodial interrogation and suppression hearing, set forth our standard of review, address interrogation law, and analyze Rejholec’s Goodchild and Miranda challenges.

Recommended for Publication

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WI Court of Appeals – District II

Case Name: Sheboygan County v. M.J.M.,

Case No.: 2020AP1744

Officials: REILLY, P.J.

Focus: Involuntary Commitment – Extension

M.J.M. appeals from an order of the circuit court extending his involuntary commitment. He argues that Sheboygan County (the County) failed to establish that he is dangerous pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(a), (am). We conclude that the evidence supports the circuit court’s conclusion that M.J.M. is mentally ill, a proper subject for treatment, and would be a proper subject for commitment if treatment were withdrawn. See § 51.20(1)(a), (am). We affirm.

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WI Court of Appeals – District II

Case Name: State of Wisconsin v. E.R.W.,

Case No.: 2020AP1778; 2020AP1779; 2020AP1780

Officials: DAVIS, J.

Focus: Plea Withdrawal – CHIPS

In this consolidated appeal, “Eileen” appeals from: (1) WIS. STAT. ch. 48 dispositional orders finding her children “Erika,” “April,” and “Mark” in need of protection or services (CHIPS); and (2) an order denying her post-disposition motion to withdraw her no-contest pleas in the CHIPS actions. Eileen seeks review of the latter order on the grounds that the CHIPS petition does not reflect a sufficient factual basis for her pleas.

It is undisputed that the dispositional orders have expired and that our resolution of the plea withdrawal issue will have no practical effect on the closed CHIPS cases. We hold that, accordingly, the appeals of April’s and Mark’s cases are moot, as there are no lasting collateral consequences stemming from their orders. See Marathon County v. D.K., 2020 WI 8, ¶¶19, 23-25, 390 Wis. 2d 50, 937 N.W.2d 901. We further hold that the appeal of Erika’s case is not moot: because her dispositional order placed her outside the home, her CHIPS adjudication may form the partial basis for an involuntary termination of parental rights (TPR) action against Eileen. See id., ¶25. Thus, a real and lasting collateral consequence exists with respect to that order.

On the merits of the appeal as to Erika, the facts in the CHIPS petition show that, on a regular basis and over a number of years, Eileen neglected to provide sufficient food for Erika. Thus, there is a factual basis for the CHIPS allegation that Eileen neglected, refused, or was unable, for reasons other than poverty, to provide necessities for Erika, so as to seriously endanger Erika’s physical health. See WIS. STAT. § 48.13(10). Accordingly, we affirm.

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WI Court of Appeals – District IV

Case Name: State of Wisconsin v. Travanti D. Schmidt

Case No.: 2018AP2128-CR

Officials: Kloppenburg, Graham, and Nashold, JJ.

Focus: Sufficiency of Evidence and Jury Instructions

Travanti Schmidt appeals a judgment of conviction for one count of assault by a prisoner. He also appeals the circuit court order denying his motion for postconviction relief. Schmidt raises three issues on appeal. First, he argues that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his conviction. Second, he contends that the charging documents and jury instructions were duplicitous because they failed to specify which of two correctional officers was the target of the charged assault. Third, Schmidt argues that his trial counsel was ineffective by not objecting to the jury instructions on the basis that they violated Schmidt’s right to a unanimous verdict. We reject all of Schmidt’s arguments and affirm.

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WI Supreme Court Digests

WI Supreme Court

Case Name: Southport Commons, LLC, v. Wisconsin Department of Transportation

Case No.: 2021 WI 52

Focus: Time-barred – Notice of Claim

The petitioner, Southport Commons, LLC (Southport), seeks review of a published court of appeals decision that affirmed the circuit court’s grant of the Department of Transportation’s (DOT) motion for judgment on the pleadings. Southport asserts that the court of appeals erred in determining that its notice of claim pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 88.87(2)(c) (2017-18) was not timely filed.

Wisconsin Stat. § 88.87(2)(c) provides that a property owner damaged by the construction or maintenance of a highway or railroad grade must file a notice of claim “within 3 years after the alleged damage occurred” as a prerequisite to filing a lawsuit. Southport contends that its notice of claim, filed within three years of when the damage was discovered, is sufficient. Alternatively, Southport asserts that the damage to its land occurred continuously over time and that the actual time the damage occurred in this case was undetermined and requires remand to the circuit court for fact finding.

DOT disagrees, arguing that “occurred” is not synonymous with “discovered” and that under a plain reading of the statute, Southport’s notice of claim was not timely filed. It further contends that Southport did not raise its alternative argument in the circuit court or court of appeals, and as a result this court should not consider it.

We conclude that “occurred” in the context of Wis. Stat. § 88.87(2)(c) does not mean “discovered.” The notice of claim period in § 88.87(2)(c) begins to run when the damage happens or takes place. Further, we conclude that Southport failed to meaningfully develop in the circuit court or court of appeals an argument that the damage to its property occurred gradually over a period of years. Instead, it argued only that the notice of claim requirement is triggered by discovery. As a consequence, Southport did not raise a genuine issue of material fact as to the date of damage, and the circuit court properly granted DOT’s motion for judgment on the pleadings.

Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals.

Affirmed

Concur:

Dissent: ROGGENSACK, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which ZIEGLER, C.J., and REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., joined.
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WI Supreme Court

Case Name: Kemper Independence Insurance Company v. Ismet Islami

Case No.: 2021 WI 53

Focus: Insurance Claim – Coverage

Ismet Islami seeks review of the court of appeals decision affirming the Waukesha County Circuit Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Kemper Independence Insurance Company (Kemper) denying coverage to Ismet for the loss of her home. Ydbi Islami, from whom Ismet is legally separated, intentionally set fire to the home. All parties stipulated that Ydbi concealed facts from Kemper about his involvement in the fire with the intent to deceive, and Kemper relied upon Ydbi’s concealment and fraud to its detriment. The circuit court ruled the “concealment or fraud” condition in Kemper’s insurance policy covering the home (“the Policy”) barred coverage for Ismet’s claims. The court of appeals agreed that the Policy did not provide coverage as a result of Ydbi’s conduct and affirmed the circuit court’s decision.

Ismet raises three arguments. First, Ismet contends that, given her legal separation from Ydbi, Ydbi is not her spouse and therefore not an “insured” for purposes of the Policy. Second, Ismet argues the Policy’s “concealment or fraud” condition is ambiguous, conflicts with the Policy’s “intentional loss” exclusion, and therefore does not bar coverage. Third, Ismet asserts she is an innocent insured and the victim of domestic abuse, thereby requiring Kemper to provide coverage under Wis. Stat. § 631.95(2)(f)’s domestic abuse exception to a property insurer’s intentional act exclusion.

We hold: (1) Ydbi is an insured under the terms of the Policy, both under the plain language of the insurance contract and because Wisconsin’s marriage laws recognize Ydbi as Ismet’s spouse; (2) the Policy’s “concealment or fraud” condition precludes coverage for Ismet——a conclusion unaffected by the Policy’s “intentional loss” exclusion; and (3) Wis. Stat. § 631.95(2)(f) does not apply because the record lacks any evidence showing Ydbi’s arson constituted “domestic abuse” against Ismet, as statutorily defined. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals.

Affirmed

Concur:

Dissent: KAROFSKY, J., filed a dissenting opinion in which ANN WALSH BRADLEY and DALLET, JJ., joined.

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WI Supreme Court

Case Name: Southwest Airlines Co., et al., v. State of Wisconsin Department of Revenue

Case No.: 2021 WI 54

Focus: Property Tax Assessment – Hub Facility Exemption

The petitioners, Southwest Airlines and AirTran Airways (collectively, Southwest), seek review of an unpublished opinion of the court of appeals affirming the circuit court’s determination that Southwest does not qualify for the “hub facility” property tax exemption. Specifically, Southwest contends that under a “strict but reasonable” interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 70.11(42)(a)2.a. (2017-18), it is entitled to the exemption for both the 2013 and 2014 tax assessments.

The hub facility provision exempts from property taxes all property of an air carrier company if the air carrier company “operated at least 45 common carrier departing flights each weekday in the prior year” from a facility at a Wisconsin airport. Southwest argues that it is entitled to the exemption despite admitting that it did not operate at least 45 departing flights on each and every weekday of the subject years.

Nevertheless, Southwest advances that under a “strict but reasonable” reading of the statute, it should be given an allowance for holidays and days with bad weather when it did not operate 45 departing flights. It further asserts that it is entitled to the hub facility exemption if it operated an average of over 45 flights each weekday in the subject year.

We conclude that Southwest is not entitled to the hub facility exemption for either the 2013 or 2014 property tax assessment. The plain language of the statute requires that an air carrier company operate 45 departing flights on each weekday without exception, and Southwest admittedly did not meet this requirement. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals.

Affirmed

Concur:

Dissent:

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WI Supreme Court

Case Name: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Christopher S. Petros

Case No.: 2021 WI 55

Focus: Attorney Disciplinary Proceeding

We review the report of the referee, Reserve Judge William M. Gabler, Sr., recommending that this court revoke Attorney Christopher S. Petros’ license to practice law in Wisconsin, require him to pay $5,000 in restitution to the father of a former client, and require him to pay the full costs of this disciplinary proceeding, which total $3,910.22 as of February 3, 2021. Because no appeal has been filed in this matter, our review proceeds pursuant to Supreme Court Rule (SCR) 22.17(2).

Attorney’s license revoked

Concur:

Dissent:

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WI Supreme Court

Case Name: Eau Claire County Department of Human Services v. S.E.,

Case No.: 2021 WI 56

Focus: CHIPS – Due Process Violation

If a circuit court determines a child is in need of protection or services (CHIPS) due to a parent’s neglect, refusal, or inability (for reasons other than poverty) to provide necessary care to the extent that the physical health of the child is seriously endangered, the circuit court may order the child removed from the parental home. Wis. Stat. §§ 48.13, 48.345 (2017-18). Wisconsin law declares that “instability and impermanence in family relationships are contrary to the welfare of children” and recognizes “the importance of eliminating the need for children to wait unreasonable periods of time for their parents to correct the conditions that prevent their safe return to the family.” Wis. Stat. § 48.01(1)(a) (emphases added). Toward that end, Wisconsin law allows the filing of a petition to terminate parental rights if the child has remained in out-of-home care for at least six months. Wis. Stat. § 48.415(2)(a)3.

In 2018, the legislature amended Wis. Stat. § 48.415(2)(a)3, a portion of the continuing CHIPS ground for the involuntary termination of parental rights. This statutory amendment occurred during the pendency of Sophie’s court proceedings involving her child, Tyler, who was removed from Sophie’s home and adjudged CHIPS in 2016. Sophie’s CHIPS case commenced under the 2016 version of the statute, and two months after the 2018 statutory amendment, the Eau Claire Department of Human Services (the Department) filed a petition to terminate Sophie’s parental rights. The amended version of § 48.415(2)(a)3, among other things, eliminated consideration by the factfinder of the likelihood the parent would meet the conditions for return of the child to the parent’s home if the child had already been placed outside the parent’s home for at least “15 of the most recent 22 months.” Sophie challenged the applicability of the amended version of § 48.415(2)(a)3 during her TPR proceedings. The circuit court decided the new version applied. The court of appeals agreed with the circuit court.

Sophie raises two issues: (1) whether as a matter of statutory construction, the “15 out of 22 months” timeframe began to run only after Sophie received written notice of the amended version of Wis. Stat. § 48.415(2)(a)3 (2017-18); and (2) whether starting the “15 out of 22 months” timeframe in 2016 when Sophie received the initial CHIPS order with written notice referencing the prior version of § 48.415(2)(a)3 (2015-16) violates her due process rights.

We hold: (1) the “15 out of 22 months” timeframe, as codified in the 2018 amended version of Wis. Stat. § 48.415(2)(a)3 (2017-18), began to run when Sophie received written notice accompanying the initial 2016 CHIPS order; and (2) starting the “15 out of 22 months” timeframe in 2016 does not violate Sophie’s due process rights. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals.

Affirmed

Concur:

Dissent: DALLET, J., filed a dissenting opinion in which ANN WALSH BRADLEY and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined.

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WI Supreme Court

Case Name: City of Mayville v. State of Wisconsin Department of Administration

Case No.: 2021 WI 57

Focus: Statutory Interpretation – Cooperative Plan

We review a published decision of the court of appeals affirming the order of the Circuit Court for Dodge County that reversed the Department of Administration’s (the “Department”) approval of a cooperative plan (the “Plan”) between the Village of Kekoskee (the “Village”) and the Town of Williamstown (the “Town”) and remanded the matter back to the Department. The circuit court determined that the cooperative plan statute, Wis. Stat. § 66.0307 (2017-18), did not permit municipalities to use cooperative plans to “absorb an entire Town into a Village.” The court of appeals affirmed on modified grounds concluding that the Plan “changed” the City of Mayville’s (“Mayville”) boundary line such that Mayville was required to be a party to the Plan.

We conclude first that Mayville has standing to seek judicial review of the Plan. Next, we conclude that the “Village of Williamstown Detachment Area” set forth in the Plan changes Mayville’s boundary line. Because the Plan changed Mayville’s boundary line, Wis. Stat. § 66.0307(2) required that Mayville be a party to the Plan. Mayville was not a party to the Plan, therefore, we conclude that the Department erroneously interpreted § 66.0307(2) in approving the Plan. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals, which remanded the Plan to the circuit court to remand to the Department.

Affirmed

Concur:

Dissent:

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WI Supreme Court

Case Name: Sara Lindsey James, et al., v. Janel Heinrich, et al.,

Case No.: 2021 WI 58

Focus: Statutory Authority – Emergency Order

Exercising our original jurisdiction under Article VII, Section 3(2) of the Wisconsin Constitution, we consolidate and review three cases challenging the authority of Janel Heinrich, in her capacity as a local health officer of Public Health of Madison and Dane County (PHMDC), to issue an emergency order closing all schools in Dane County for in-person instruction in grades 3-12. Citing Wis. Stat. § 252.03 (2017-18) as authority, Heinrich issued Emergency Order #9 (“the Order”) in an effort to decrease the spread of a novel strain of coronavirus, COVID-19. The Petitioners contend that the Order exceeds Heinrich’s statutory authority under § 252.03 and violates their fundamental right to the free exercise of religion under Article I, Section 18 of the Wisconsin Constitution, as well as parents’ fundamental right to direct the upbringing and education of their children under Article I, Section 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution.

In response, Heinrich asserts that local health officers have the statutory authority under Wis. Stat. § 252.03 to issue school-closure orders. Further, she argues that the Order is constitutional under the United States Supreme Court’s ruling in Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905), and that, even if Jacobson does not apply, the Order does not violate the Wisconsin Constitution.

We agree with the Petitioners and hold: (1) local health officers do not have the statutory power to close schools under Wis. Stat. § 252.03; and (2) Heinrich’s Order infringes the Petitioners’ fundamental right to the free exercise of religion guaranteed under Article I, Section 18 of the Wisconsin Constitution, which Jacobson cannot override. Accordingly, those portions of the Order restricting or prohibiting in-person instruction are unlawful, unenforceable, and are hereby vacated.

Rights declared; order vacated

Concur: HAGEDORN, J., filed a concurring opinion.

Dissent: DALLET, J., filed a dissenting opinion in which ANN WALSH BRADLEY and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined.

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Supreme Court Digests

United States Supreme Court

Case Name: Jose Santos Sanchez, et ux., v. Alejandro N. Mayorkas

Case No.: 20-315

Focus: Immigration – Temporary Protected Status

Petitioner Jose Santos Sanchez entered this country unlawfully from El Salvador. Years later, because of unsafe living conditions in that country, the Government granted him Temporary Protected Status (TPS), entitling him to stay and work in the United States for as long as those conditions persist. Sanchez now wishes to become a lawful permanent resident (LPR) of the United States. The question here is whether the conferral of TPS enables him to obtain LPR status despite his unlawful entry. We hold that it does not.

Affirmed

Dissenting:

Concurring:

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United States Supreme Court

Case Name: Charles Borden, Jr., United States

Case No.: 19-5410

Focus: Statutory Interpretation – Armed Career Criminal Act – Violent Felony

The Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U. S. C. §924(e), mandates a 15-year minimum sentence for persons found guilty of illegally possessing a gun who have three or more prior convictions for a “violent felony.” The question here is whether a criminal offense can count as a “violent felony” if it requires only a mens rea of recklessness—a less culpable mental state than purpose or knowledge. We hold that a reckless offense cannot so qualify.

Reversed and remanded

Dissenting: KAVANAUGH, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which ROBERTS, C. J., ALITO, and BARRETT, JJ., joined.

Concurring: THOMAS, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.

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