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Weekly Case Digests – July 5, 2021 – July 9, 2021

By: Rick Benedict//August 20, 2021//

Weekly Case Digests – July 5, 2021 – July 9, 2021

By: Rick Benedict//August 20, 2021//

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7th Circuit Digests

7th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: United States of America v. Michael Jarigese

Case No.: 20-1485

Officials: ROVNER, HAMILTON, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.

Focus: Sentencing Guidelines – Supervised Release

A jury convicted Michael Jarigese of nine counts of wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343 and 1346, and one count of bribery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(2). The district court sentenced him to forty-one months’ imprisonment and three years of supervised release. He challenges both his conviction and his sentence. We affirm.

Affirmed

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7th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: Percy Taylor v. Joseph Ways, et al.,

Case No.: 20-1410; 20-1411

Officials: FLAUM, KANNE, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.

Focus: Interlocutory Appeal – Qualified Immunity

Plaintiff Percy Taylor was fired from his job as a police officer with the Cook County Sheriff’s Office. Taylor contends it was because of his race. He has sued the Sheriff’s Office under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and defendants Joseph Ways, Zelda Whittler, and Gregory Ernst under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violating the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Defendants maintain that Taylor was terminated for having fired pellets with an air rifle at his neighbor in March 2011, a charge that Taylor denies.

Defendant Ernst was the lead investigator assigned to Taylor’s case. Taylor offers evidence that Ernst engineered his firing based on racial animosity. Taylor also asserts that defendants Ways and Whittler, who are or were senior officials in the Sheriff’s Office, are liable because they both reviewed Ernst’s final report of his investigation and endorsed his recommendation that Taylor be fired.

The district court denied the individual defendants’ motions for summary judgment based on the defense of qualified immunity, and they have brought these interlocutory appeals of those denials. As we explain below, the district court correctly denied qualified immunity to Ernst. The district court erred, however, in denying qualified immunity to Ways and Whittler. We therefore affirm in No. 20-1411 and reverse in No. 20-1410, and remand the case to the district court, where Taylor’s Title VII claim remains pending.

Affirmed

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7th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: James O. Ademiju v. United States of America

Case No.: 19-2588

Officials: KANNE, BRENNAN, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.

Focus: Equitable Tolling

James Ademiju, a Nigerian citizen, seeks to vacate his conviction for healthcare fraud. He concedes that he filed his motion outside the one-year limitations period but argues that the statute of limitations should be equitably tolled due to various extenuating circumstances. We conclude that Ademiju has not met the high standard for equitable tolling, and we therefore affirm the district court.

Affirmed

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7th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: Cody Christopherson v. American Strategic Insurance Corporation

Case No.: 20-2831

Officials: RIPPLE, HAMILTON, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.

Focus: Insurance Claim – Policy Limits

Plaintiff Cody Christopherson has appealed from a grant of summary judgment in favor of his home insurance company, defendant American Strategic Insurance Corporation, known as ASI. We affirm. In the summer of 2018, two trees fell on plaintiff’s home, three months apart, resulting in its total destruction. The undisputed facts show that the insurer paid all sums owed to plaintiff, including the policy limits for total destruction of his home and all other claims that he submitted with documentation for costs actually incurred.

Affirmed

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7th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: KR Enterprises, Inc., v. Zerteck Inc., et al.,

Case No.: 20-2069; 20-2155

Officials: EASTERBROOK, KANNE, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.

Focus: Prejudgment Interest

In 2016, a manufacturer of recreational vehicles delivered 21 new RVs to a group of affiliated dealers. Those dealers did not pay before the manufacturer went out of business. The dealers kept the RVs but have refused to pay the manufacturer’s secured creditor, which brought this suit to collect the accounts receivable. After the secured creditor assigned its rights to the owner of the manufacturer, the district court held a bench trial and found that the secured creditor’s assignee was entitled to payment of the purchase prices, minus some setoffs for warranty and rebate claims that the manufacturer had owed to the dealers on earlier RV sales. See KR Enterprises, Inc. v. Zerteck, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 3d 825 (N.D. Ind. 2020).

The defendant dealers have appealed, arguing they owe nothing for the RVs they received, at least not to this plaintiff. The secured creditor’s assignee has cross-appealed, arguing that the setoffs should not have been allowed and that it is entitled to prejudgment interest. We affirm in all respects.

Affirmed

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7th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: Luis Villavicencio-Serna v. Leonta Jackson

Case No.: 19-2385

Officials: WOOD, HAMILTON, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.

Focus: Sufficiency of Evidence

On March 22, 2009, a jury found Luis Villavicencio‐Serna guilty of first‐degree murder of Armando Huerta Jr. Scant physical evidence linked him to the charge. The conviction instead was largely based on testimony from three of his friends, all of whom later recanted.

Villavicencio‐Serna exhausted his state‐court appeals and then sought a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Throughout these proceedings, he consistently has challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction. He emphasizes the lack of physical evidence connecting him to the murder, and he suggests that several factors— inconsistencies between the testimonies of his three friends, their subsequent recantations, and the interrogation tactics used by the police—reveal that the police pressured his friends to implicate him. Finally, he offers an alternative theory that links another group to the murder. In the face of these arguments, the Illinois Appellate Court upheld his conviction. The district court, applying the double‐layered deference re‐ quired by section 2254(d), concluded that the state court’s decision was not unreasonable, and so it refused to issue the writ. See Villavicencio‐Serna v. Melvin, No. 17 C 5442, 2019 WL 2548688 (N.D. Ill. June 19, 2019).

Although we sympathize with the district court’s observation that “the lack of any physical evidence in this case is troubling,” we too conclude that Villavicencio‐Serna has not shown enough to entitle him to issuance of the writ. We therefore affirm.

Affirmed

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7th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: Justin Castelino v. Rose-Hulman Institute of Technology

Case No.: 19-1905

Officials: ROVNER, BRENNAN, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.

Focus: Summary Judgment – Sanctions

Justin Castelino was suspended from Rose-Hulman Institute of Technology for a semester for academic misconduct. When he applied to return the following spring, Rose-Hulman denied his requests for readmission and also informed him that he would not be permitted to reapply in the future. Castelino then sued Rose-Hulman, alleging that his suspension violated the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (“ADA”), and also asserting claims against Rose-Hulman for breach of contract, defamation, false advertising, invasion of privacy, and malice. The district court entered summary judgment for Rose-Hulman on all counts and also granted Rose-Hulman’s motion for sanctions based on Castelino’s failure to comply with a scheduling order. Castelino appeals, but we affirm.

Affirmed

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7th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: United States of America v. Edward Woodfork

Case No.: 20-3415

Officials: WOOD, BRENNAN, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.

Focus: Probable Cause – Warrantless Search – Suppression of Evidence

In 2018, a state police officer sought and obtained a warrant to search Defendant Edward Woodfork’s home based on the officer’s orchestration of several controlled-buy drug transactions involving Woodfork. Upon executing the warrant, officers discovered methamphetamine and a firearm at Woodfork’s suspected residence. Based on this evidence, a federal grand jury indicted Woodfork for possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute and possession of a firearm by a felon.

Woodfork maintains that the officer made material misstatements or omissions in seeking the warrant in violation of Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), and that probable cause to issue the search warrant was lacking in the first instance. Accordingly, Woodfork moved the district court to quash the search warrant and to suppress the resulting evidence. When the district court denied the motion, Woodfork pled guilty to both charges but preserved his ability to appeal the district court’s denial of his suppression motion. We affirm the district court’s denial of the motion to quash and to suppress.

Affirmed

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7th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: United States of America v. Eural Black

Case No.: 20-2314

Officials: RIPPLE, HAMILTON, and KIRSCH, Circuit Judges.

Focus: Sentence Modification – Extraordinary and Compelling Reasons

Appellant Eural Black is serving a forty-year sentence in federal prison for firearm, robbery, and drug offenses that he committed as a Chicago police officer. He moved the district court for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3852(c)(1)(A) based on his prostate cancer and the COVID-19 pandemic. The district court denied Black’s motion. It concluded that Black had not shown “extraordinary and compelling reasons,” as defined by the Sentencing Commission’s policy statements, to modify his sentence. The court also said that even if Black had made that showing, the sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) weighed against release because Black had served only one-third of his lengthy sentence for such serious crimes.

After the district court denied Black’s motion, we decided United States v. Gunn, 980 F.3d 1178 (7th Cir. 2020), which held that the “extraordinary and compelling reasons” issue was, in the wake of the First Step Act of 2018, no longer governed by the Sentencing Commission’s policy statements that the district court had relied upon here. The district court’s alternative rationale—that the § 3553(a) factors weighed against release—is not a persuasive basis for treating the legal error as harmless. Two unusual features of this case persuade us that the district court needs to take a fresh look at how those factors apply to Black. We vacate the denial and remand for reassessment of both steps of the compassionate-release decision.

Vacated and remanded

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7th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: United States of America v. Lola Chang, et al.,

Case No.: 19-3500; 20-1111

Officials: MANION, ROVNER, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.

Focus: Abuse of Discretion – Hearsay Evidence

After sliding off the road on a snowy night, Lola Chang and Ey Lao were arrested after a police officer, originally approaching the car to check on their safety, grew suspicious and a search eventually turned up evidence of drugs and weapons. Chang and Lao both contend that the search violated their Fourth Amendment rights. Lao also challenged the district court’s ruling prohibiting the introduction of Chang’s later hearsay statement claiming possession of and responsibility for all of the illegal items in the car. Although the defendants are correct that the officer’s hunch alone was not sufficient justification for the seizure, other factors provided the reasonable suspicion necessary. Moreover, we have found no abuse of the district court’s discretion in barring the hearsay evidence.

Affirmed

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WI Court of Appeals Digests

WI Court of Appeals – District I

Case Name: State of Wisconsin v. Mark Anthony Culpepper

Case No.: 2019AP9-CR

Officials: Brash, P.J., Dugan and Donald, JJ.

Focus: Postconviction Motion Denied – Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Mark Anthony Culpepper appeals a judgment convicting him of one count of first-degree reckless homicide and one count of attempted first-degree reckless homicide, both as a party to a crime and while armed with a dangerous weapon. He also appeals orders denying his postconviction motion and motion for reconsideration. Culpepper argues that (1) his trial counsel ineffectively represented him by failing to call two alibi witnesses to testify on his behalf during trial; (2) his trial counsel ineffectively represented him by failing to call an expert witness to testify about the unreliability of eyewitness identifications; (3) his trial counsel ineffectively represented him by failing to call an expert witness to testify about cell phone signal technology; (4) the circuit court erred in allowing the State’s expert testimony about cell phones under Daubert v. Merrell-Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993); and (5) he was entitled to a postconviction motion hearing. Upon review, we affirm.

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WI Court of Appeals – District II

Case Name: State of Wisconsin v. Darin E. Haizel

Case No.: 2019AP2324-CR

Officials: Neubauer, C.J., Reilly, P.J., and Davis, J.

Focus: Sentence Modification – Double Jeopardy

Darin E. Haizel appeals from a circuit court order denying his motion for sentence modification. He also appeals from the order denying his motion for reconsideration. Haizel contends that the circuit court violated constitutional double jeopardy protections when it removed the possibility of a risk reduction sentence (RRS) from one of his terms of confinement. Haizel also contends that the Department of Corrections’ (DOC) refusal to reduce Haizel’s security classification status to minimum custody due to his sentence structure constitutes a new factor justifying sentence modification. Upon review, we affirm.

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WI Court of Appeals – District III

Case Name: State of Wisconsin v. Timothy J. Trimble

Case No.: 2019AP2406-CR

Officials: Stark, P.J., Hruz and Seidl, JJ.

Focus: Postconviction Motion Denied – Sentence Modification

Timothy Trimble, pro se, appeals an order denying his motion to “correct and modify” his sentence. The legal basis for Trimble’s argument that the circuit court erred by denying his motion is difficult to discern. Ultimately, however, we conclude Trimble has failed to show that the court erred in any way. We therefore affirm.

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WI Court of Appeals – District III

Case Name: Daniel P. Anderson v. Labor and Industry Review Commission, et al.,

Case No.: 2020AP27

Officials: Stark, P.J., Hruz and Seidl, JJ.

Focus: LIRC Review – Refusal to Rehire

Daniel Anderson sustained injuries while working for Northridge Chevrolet GEO (Northridge) as a parts advisor. He appeals an order affirming a decision of the Labor and Industry Review Commission (LIRC) that determined Northridge had not violated WIS. STAT. § 102.35(3) (2019-20) by refusing to rehire Anderson without reasonable cause following Anderson’s recovery.

We conclude Northridge is not liable to Anderson under the penalty provisions of WIS. STAT. § 102.35(3) for its refusal to rehire him in his previous position as a parts advisor. There is sufficient evidence supporting LIRC’s determination that Northridge had reasonable cause for refusing to rehire him in that position, including business necessity and the medical limitations ultimately placed upon Anderson following his recovery.

We also reject Anderson’s assertion that he is entitled to lost wages under WIS. STAT. § 102.35(3) because Northridge did not rehire him for an available sales position. We conclude that when an employee’s § 102.35(3) claim is predicated upon an employer’s allegedly unreasonable refusal to rehire the employee to fill a different position than the one the employee previously occupied, the employee must demonstrate that he or she made the employer aware, in some fashion, of his or her willingness to accept other work. Because Anderson failed to communicate any such willingness to Northridge, he has failed to make a prima facie case for liability under § 102.35(3). Accordingly, we affirm.

Recommended for Publication

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WI Court of Appeals – District III

Case Name: State of Wisconsin v. Bryant Taylor Ellis

Case No.: 2020AP115-CR

Officials: Stark, P.J., Hruz and Seidl, JJ.

Focus: Court Error – Plea Colloquy

Bryant Ellis challenges the denial of his postsentencing motion for plea withdrawal. Ellis claims: (1) the circuit court failed to conduct an adequate plea colloquy; (2) his plea was not knowing, intelligent and voluntary; and (3) his trial attorneys were ineffective for not investigating and advising him about a potential presentencing motion for plea withdrawal based on his presentencing psychological evaluation. We reject Ellis’s arguments and affirm.

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WI Court of Appeals – District II

Case Name: State of Wisconsin v. Chrystul D. Kizer

Case No.: 2020AP192-CR

Officials: Reilly, P.J., Gundrum and Davis, JJ.

Focus: Statutory Interpretation – Coercion – Affirmative Defense

Charged with numerous felonies, including first-degree intentional homicide, Chrystul D. Kizer sought interlocutory appeal from an order of the circuit court that effectively prevents her from introducing evidence of the affirmative defense of WIS. STAT. § 939.46(1m), related to victims of human trafficking and child sex trafficking. We granted leave to appeal the order, and because we conclude the circuit court erred in its interpretation of § 939.46(1m), we reverse.

Recommended for Publication

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WI Court of Appeals – District I

Case Name: State of Wisconsin v. Willie M. McBride

Case No.: 2020AP385-CR; 2020AP386-CR

Officials: Brash, P.J., Dugan and White, JJ.

Focus: Plea Withdrawal – Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Willie M. McBride appeals his judgments of conviction entered after he pled guilty to several charges under a global plea agreement for two separate cases. He also appeals the order denying his postconviction motion. McBride argues that he is entitled to withdraw his pleas because one of his cases should have been dismissed due to a violation of his right to a speedy trial. He further asserts that plea withdrawal is warranted because his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request separate sentencing hearings for the two cases and for not requesting a presentence investigation (PSI) report.

Additionally, McBride argues that the trial court relied on improper factors in sentencing him in both cases at the same time, and he is seeking sentence modification. He also contends that the court erroneously exercised its sentencing discretion in not making McBride eligible for the Challenge Incarceration Program (CIP). Furthermore, McBride asserts that he is entitled to sentence credit for the time he was incarcerated on a third case for which he was acquitted.

The postconviction court denied McBride’s postconviction motion in its entirety, without a hearing, stating that all of his claims were without merit. We agree and, therefore, affirm.

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WI Court of Appeals – District I

Case Name: State of Wisconsin v. Emmanuel Sanchez

Case No.: 2020AP387-CR

Officials: Dugan, Graham and Donald, JJ.

Focus: Jury Instructions

Emmanuel Sanchez appeals his judgment of conviction for first-degree intentional homicide and knowingly violating a domestic abuse injunction. Sanchez argues that the trial court erred in denying his request that the jury be given an instruction on second-degree reckless homicide. Assuming without deciding if the trial court erred in not giving the requested instruction, we conclude that any such error was harmless, and we affirm.

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WI Court of Appeals – District III

Case Name: State of Wisconsin v. Thomas D. Kent

Case No.: 2020AP708-CR

Officials: Stark, P.J., Hruz and Seidl, JJ.

Focus: Postconviction Motion Denied – Right to Counsel

Thomas Kent appeals from a multi-count criminal judgment of conviction and an order denying his postconviction motion. Kent contends he is entitled to a new trial because the circuit court allowed him to proceed pro se when the record does not show that he was competent to represent himself. We conclude, however, that the record supports the court’s determination that Kent was competent to represent himself. Accordingly, we affirm.

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WI Court of Appeals – District II

Case Name: Wisconsin Property Tax Consultants, Inc., et al., v. Wisconsin Department of Revenue

Case No.: 2020AP485

Officials: Neubauer, C.J., Reilly, P.J., and Davis, J.

Focus: Abuse of Discretion – Primary Jurisdiction Doctrine

In 2017, the legislature enacted a new personal property tax exemption for “[m]achinery, tools, and patterns.” WIS. STAT. § 70.111(27) (2017-18); 2017 Wis. Act 59, § 997J. Wisconsin Manufacturers and Commerce, Inc. (WMC), a business trade association, asked the Wisconsin Department of Revenue (DOR) to offer its interpretation of § 70.111(27) based upon hypothetical facts, arguing that DOR’s application of § 70.111(27) violated statutory rulemaking procedures. WMC, unhappy with DOR’s interpretation, filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration that DOR’s interpretation of § 70.111(27) is invalid. The circuit court, pursuant to the primary jurisdiction doctrine, dismissed WMC’s action deferring to the principle of administrative review and the expertise of the Wisconsin Tax Appeals Commission (TAC). We affirm as the circuit court’s dismissal adheres to the legislature’s statutory process of administrative review.

Recommended for Publication

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WI Supreme Court Digests

WI Supreme Court

Case Name: State of Wisconsin v. Heather Jan VanBeek

Case No.: 2021 WI 51

Focus: Certification – 4th Amendment Violation – Reasonable Suspicion and Seizures

This case is before us on certification from the court of appeals pursuant to Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.61 (2019-20). The court of appeals certified the following question: “whether a consensual encounter becomes an unconstitutional seizure under the Fourth Amendment when an officer requests and takes an individual’s driver’s license to the officer’s squad car without reasonable suspicion.” Accordingly, we review the Circuit Court of Sheboygan County’s judgment of conviction of Heather VanBeek for possession of methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia. VanBeek’s conviction arose from a search of her vehicle that she contends violated her right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

On the certified question, we conclude that the answer depends on the totality of circumstances surrounding an encounter. Further, while VanBeek was not seized when Officer Oetzel took her driver’s license to run a records check, VanBeek was seized when Oetzel returned to her vehicle, withheld her driver’s license and continued to question her and her passenger in order to hold her until a drug-sniff dog, i.e., the K9 unit, that he had requested arrived. Finally, we conclude that the seizure was unlawful because, based on the totality of circumstances, Oetzel did not have reasonable suspicion that VanBeek was engaged in criminal activity at the time he seized her. Accordingly, we reverse the circuit court’s judgment of conviction and remand with instruction to grant VanBeek’s motion to suppress.

Reversed and cause remanded

Concur: DALLET, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which ANN WALSH BRADLEY and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined.

Dissent: ZIEGLER, C.J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY and HAGEDORN, JJ., joined.

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WI Supreme Court

Case Name: State of Wisconsin v. James Timothy Genous

Case No.: 2021 WI 50

Focus: Unlawful-stop Claim – Reasonable Suspicion

The question in this case is whether a vehicle stop was supported by reasonable suspicion of drug activity. Examining the totality of the circumstances, we hold the stop was lawful and reverse the court of appeals.

Reversed and cause remanded

Concur:

Dissent: DALLET, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which ANN WALSH BRADLEY and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined.

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WI Supreme Court

Case Name: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. John Hotvedt

Case No.: 2021 WI 49

Focus: Attorney Reinstatement Proceeding

We review a report filed by Referee Kim M. Peterson, recommending this court reinstate John Hotvedt’s license to practice law in Wisconsin. After careful review of the matter, we agree that Attorney Hotvedt’s license should be reinstated. We also conclude that Attorney Hotvedt should be required to pay the full costs of this reinstatement proceeding, which are $4,867.82 as of May 5, 2021.

Reinstatement granted

Concur:

Dissent:

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WI Supreme Court

Case Name: State of Wisconsin ex rel. Ronald L. Collison v. City of Milwaukee Board of Review

Case No.: 2021 WI 48

Focus: Property Assessment

The petitioner, Ronald Collison, seeks review of an unpublished per curiam decision of the court of appeals affirming the City of Milwaukee Board of Review’s (Board) determination that his property was properly assessed at a value of $31,800. Collison argues that because the property is contaminated he cannot sell it, and that accordingly the assessed value should be zero dollars. Specifically, Collison contends that the assessor erred by basing the assessment on the property’s income-generating potential as a parking lot without reducing the value to account for the contamination that is present. He further argues that the City of Milwaukee Environmental Contamination Standards (CMECS) conflict with Wis. Stat. § 70.32 (2017-18).

We conclude that by utilizing the income approach to value the property according to its highest and best use as a parking lot, the assessor properly considered the impairment of the value of the property due to contamination in arriving at a valuation pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 70.32(1m). Further, we decline to address Collison’s challenge to the CMECS because the assessor did not rely on the CMECS in the assessment of Collison’s property. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals.

Affirmed

Concur:

Dissent: ROGGENSACK, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which ZIEGLER, C.J., and REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., joined.

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Supreme Court Digests

United States Supreme Court

Case Name: United States v. Joshua James Cooley

Case No.: 19-1414

Focus: Sovereign Authority – Detain and Search Non-Indians

The question presented is whether an Indian tribe’s police officer has authority to detain temporarily and to search a non-Indian on a public right-of-way that runs through an Indian reservation. The search and detention, we assume, took place based on a potential violation of state or federal law prior to the suspect’s transport to the proper nontribal authorities for prosecution.

We have previously noted that a tribe retains inherent sovereign authority to address “conduct [that] threatens or has some direct effect on . . . the health or welfare of the tribe.” Montana v. United States, 450 U. S. 544, 566 (1981); see also Strate v. A–1 Contractors, 520 U. S. 438, 456, n. 11 (1997). We believe this statement of law governs here. And we hold the tribal officer possesses the authority at issue.

Vacated and remanded

Dissenting:

Concurring: ALITO, J., filed a concurring opinion.

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United States Supreme Court

Case Name: Merrick B. Garland v. Ming Dai, et al.,

Case No.: 19-1155; 19-1156

Focus: Immigration – Asylum

The question comes to us in cases involving Cesar Alcaraz-Enriquez and Ming Dai. Mr. Alcaraz-Enriquez is a Mexican national. Authorities detained him when he attempted to enter this country illegally. In proceedings before an immigration judge (IJ), Mr. Alcaraz-Enriquez sought to avoid being returned to Mexico on the ground that his life or freedom would be threatened there. See 8 U. S. C. §1231(b)(3)(A). But Congress has said this form of relief from removal is unavailable if, among other things, “the Attorney General decides that . . . the alien, having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime[,] is a danger to the community of the United States.” §1231(b)(3)(B)(ii). This proviso posed a problem for Mr. Alcaraz-Enriquez because, during a previous illegal entry, he pleaded nolo contendere to “inflict[ing] corporal injury [on a] spouse [or] cohabitant” under California law and received a 2-year sentence. Cal. Penal Code Ann. §273.5(A) (West 2014).

The key question thus became whether Mr. Alcaraz Enriquez’s California conviction amounted to “a particularly serious crime.” The parties appear to agree that the answer to that question turns on which version of events one accepts: The version found in a probation report issued at the time of Mr. Alcaraz-Enriquez’s conviction, or the version he testified to years later as part of his removal proceeding. The IJ received and considered both.

The Ninth Circuit has long applied a special rule in immigration disputes. The rule provides that, in the absence of an explicit adverse credibility determination by an immigration judge or the Board of Immigration Appeals, a reviewing court must treat a petitioning alien’s testimony as credible and true. At least 12 members of the Ninth Circuit have objected to this judge-made rule, and we granted certiorari to decide whether it can be squared with the terms of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 66 Stat. 163, as amended, 8 U. S. C. §1101 et seq.

The Ninth Circuit’s deemed-true-or-credible rule cannot be reconciled with the INA’s terms. Instead, immigration cases like these should proceed as follows. First, the factfinder—here the IJ—makes findings of fact, including determinations as to the credibility of particular witness testimony. The BIA then reviews those findings, applying a presumption of credibility if the IJ did not make an explicit adverse credibility determination. Finally, the court of appeals must accept the agency’s findings of fact as “conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.”

Nor can we affirm the Ninth Circuit’s judgments on alternative grounds. The Ninth Circuit failed to consider that the BIA may have implicitly rebutted the presumption of credibility. The Ninth Circuit also erroneously allowed credibility to operate as a trump card, foreclosing the possibility that even credible testimony may be outweighed by other more persuasive evidence or be insufficient to satisfy the burden of proof. Accordingly, the judgments of the Court of Appeals are vacated, and these cases are remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Vacated and remanded

Dissenting:

Concurring:

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United States Supreme Court

Case Name: Nathan Van Buren v. United States

Case No.: 19-783

Focus:  Statutory Interpretation – Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986 – Exceeds Authorized Access

Nathan Van Buren, a former police sergeant, ran a license-plate search in a law enforcement computer database in exchange for money. Van Buren’s conduct plainly flouted his department’s policy, which authorized him to obtain database information only for law enforcement purposes. We must decide whether Van Buren also violated the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986 (CFAA), which makes it illegal “to access a computer with authorization and to use such access to obtain or alter information in the computer that the accessor is not entitled so to obtain or alter.”

He did not. This provision covers those who obtain information from particular areas in the computer—such as files, folders, or databases—to which their computer access does not extend. It does not cover those who, like Van Buren, have improper motives for obtaining information that is otherwise available to them.

Reversed and remanded

Dissenting: THOMAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and ALITO, J., joined.

Concurring:

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