Immigration – Asylum

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United States Supreme Court

Case Name: Merrick B. Garland v. Ming Dai, et al.,

Case No.: 19-1155; 19-1156

Focus: Immigration – Asylum

The question comes to us in cases involving Cesar Alcaraz-Enriquez and Ming Dai. Mr. Alcaraz-Enriquez is a Mexican national. Authorities detained him when he attempted to enter this country illegally. In proceedings before an immigration judge (IJ), Mr. Alcaraz-Enriquez sought to avoid being returned to Mexico on the ground that his life or freedom would be threatened there. See 8 U. S. C. §1231(b)(3)(A). But Congress has said this form of relief from removal is unavailable if, among other things, “the Attorney General decides that . . . the alien, having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime[,] is a danger to the community of the United States.” §1231(b)(3)(B)(ii). This proviso posed a problem for Mr. Alcaraz-Enriquez because, during a previous illegal entry, he pleaded nolo contendere to “inflict[ing] corporal injury [on a] spouse [or] cohabitant” under California law and received a 2-year sentence. Cal. Penal Code Ann. §273.5(A) (West 2014).

The key question thus became whether Mr. Alcaraz Enriquez’s California conviction amounted to “a particularly serious crime.” The parties appear to agree that the answer to that question turns on which version of events one accepts: The version found in a probation report issued at the time of Mr. Alcaraz-Enriquez’s conviction, or the version he testified to years later as part of his removal proceeding. The IJ received and considered both.

The Ninth Circuit has long applied a special rule in immigration disputes. The rule provides that, in the absence of an explicit adverse credibility determination by an immigration judge or the Board of Immigration Appeals, a reviewing court must treat a petitioning alien’s testimony as credible and true. At least 12 members of the Ninth Circuit have objected to this judge-made rule, and we granted certiorari to decide whether it can be squared with the terms of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 66 Stat. 163, as amended, 8 U. S. C. §1101 et seq.

The Ninth Circuit’s deemed-true-or-credible rule cannot be reconciled with the INA’s terms. Instead, immigration cases like these should proceed as follows. First, the factfinder—here the IJ—makes findings of fact, including determinations as to the credibility of particular witness testimony. The BIA then reviews those findings, applying a presumption of credibility if the IJ did not make an explicit adverse credibility determination. Finally, the court of appeals must accept the agency’s findings of fact as “conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.”

Nor can we affirm the Ninth Circuit’s judgments on alternative grounds. The Ninth Circuit failed to consider that the BIA may have implicitly rebutted the presumption of credibility. The Ninth Circuit also erroneously allowed credibility to operate as a trump card, foreclosing the possibility that even credible testimony may be outweighed by other more persuasive evidence or be insufficient to satisfy the burden of proof. Accordingly, the judgments of the Court of Appeals are vacated, and these cases are remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Vacated and remanded

Dissenting:

Concurring:
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Derek A Hawkins is Corporate Counsel, at Salesforce.