Search Warrant – Probable Cause

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7^th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: United States of America v. Ryan D. Patton

Case No.: 19-2466

Officials: EASTERBROOK, HAMILTON, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.

Focus: Search Warrant – Probable Cause

After pleading guilty to distributing methamphetamine, Ryan Patton was sentenced to 76 months’ imprisonment. The guilty plea reserved the right to contest on appeal the validity of a search warrant that led to the drug’s discovery. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2). That is the only appellate issue.

The Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment reads: “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” Only the “probable cause” part of this formulation is contested, and if the record does not definitively establish the presence of probable cause, neither does it definitively establish its absence. This leads us to consult tiebreakers.

One tiebreaker is the rule that a reviewing court must accord “great deference” to the decision of the judge who issued the warrant. See, e.g., Gates, 462 U.S. at 236; United States v. McIntire, 516 F.3d 576 (7th Cir. 2008) (discussing the history of this approach). Like the district judge, Patton assumes that the federal court will make a de novo (which is to say, independent) decision about probable cause. If so, the absence of a transcript would be a serious problem. But the judge in a criminal prosecution is not supposed to make an independent decision.

One goal of the Fourth Amendment is to induce police to obtain judicial approval before searching a home. When the police turn to a judge, the principal protector of privacy is that judge. After the search has occurred, suppressing evidence does not restore privacy. Police who take the subject to a judge have done what they should, and the issuing judge’s decision deserves respect from later actors. The other tiebreaker is the rule of Leon, which holds that the exclusionary rule does not apply to evidence “obtained by officers acting in reasonable reliance on a search warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate but ultimately found to be unsupported by probable cause.” 468 U.S. at 900. Patton insists that it was not “reasonable” for Detective Mings to rely on the warrant issued by the state judge. But in making that argument Patton again assumes that the affidavit was its only support. Mings may not have a clear recollection of what happened before the state judge, but he remembers that the informant testified and answered the judge’s questions. We think it reasonable for an officer in that position to believe that the judge has done everything required by law.

Leon wrapped up: In the absence of an allegation that the magistrate abandoned his detached and neutral role, suppression is appropriate only if the officers were dishonest or reckless in preparing their affidavit or could not have harbored an objectively reasonable belief in the existence of probable cause. 468 U.S. at 926. The text of the affidavit is not the end-all when the state judge hears testimony (and, anyway, Mings was not “dishonest or reckless”). We do not think that it would have been impossible for an officer to have “an objectively reasonable belief in the existence of probable cause.” Nor would every reasonable officer believe that unrecorded oral presentations to a state judge must be ignored. It follows that the district judge did not err in denying Patton’s motion to suppress the evidence.

Affirmed

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Derek A Hawkins is trademark corporate counsel for Harley-Davidson. Hawkins oversees the prosecution and maintenance of the Harley-Davidson’s international trademark portfolio in emerging markets.