Statutory Interpretation – Immigration and Nationality Act – Limited Review Provision

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United States Supreme Court

Case Name: Pedro Pablo Guerrero-Lasprilla, et al. v. William Barr, et al.

Case No.: 18-776; 18-1015

Focus: Statutory Interpretation – Immigration and Nationality Act – Limited Review Provision

The Immigration and Nationality Act provides for judicial review of a final Government order directing the removal of an alien from this country. 8 U. S. C. §1252(a). Section 1252(a)(2)(C) limits the scope of that review where the removal rests upon the fact that the alien has committed certain crimes. And §1252(a)(2)(D), the Limited Review Provision, says that in such instances courts may consider only “constitutional claims or questions of law.” Petitioners Guerrero-Lasprilla and Ovalles, aliens who lived in the United States, committed drug crimes and were subsequently ordered removed (Guerrero-Lasprilla in 1998 and Ovalles in 2004). Neither filed a motion to reopen his removal proceedings “within 90 days of the date of entry of [the] final administrative order of removal.” §1229a(c)(7)(C)(i). Nonetheless, Guerrero-Lasprilla (in 2016) and Ovalles (in 2017) asked the Board of Immigration Appeals to reopen their removal proceedings, arguing that the 90-day time limit should be equitably tolled. Both petitioners, who had become eligible for discretionary relief due to various judicial and Board decisions years after their removal, rested their claim for equitable tolling on Lugo Resendez v. Lynch, 831 F. 3d 337, in which the Fifth Circuit had held that the 90-day time limit could be equitably tolled. The Board denied both petitioners’ requests, concluding, inter alia, that they had not demonstrated the requisite due diligence. The Fifth Circuit denied their requests for review, holding that, given the Limited Review Provision, it “lack[ed] jurisdiction” to review petitioners’ “factual” due diligence claims. Petitioners contend that whether the Board incorrectly applied the equitable tolling due diligence standard to the undisputed facts of their cases is a “question of law” that the Provision authorizes courts of appeals to consider.

Because the Provision’s phrase “questions of law” includes the application of a legal standard to undisputed or established facts, the Fifth Circuit erred in holding that it had no jurisdiction to consider petitioners’ claims of due diligence for equitable tolling purposes. Pp. 3–13.

Nothing in the statute’s language precludes the conclusion that Congress used the term “questions of law” to refer to the application of a legal standard to settled facts. A longstanding presumption, the statutory context, and the statute’s history all support the conclusion that the application of law to undisputed or established facts is a “questio[n] of law” within the meaning of §1252(a)(2)(D). Pp. 5–11.

Vacated and remanded

Concur:

Dissent: THOMAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which ALITO, J., joined as to all but Part II–A–1.

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Derek A Hawkins is trademark corporate counsel for Harley-Davidson. Hawkins oversees the prosecution and maintenance of the Harley-Davidson’s international trademark portfolio in emerging markets.