Statutory Interpretation – Scope of Employment

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7^th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: Urija Elston v. County of Kane

Case No.: 19-1746

Officials: EASTERBROOK, MANION, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.

Focus: Statutory Interpretation – Scope of Employment

Urija Elston and his friends were playing basketball at a park in DuPage County while Brian Demeter, an off-duty sheriff’s deputy for neighboring Kane County, was watching his child’s soccer game on an adjacent field. When Elston and his friends started heckling one another with salty language, Demeter confronted them and demanded that they stop using expletives. Flashing both his badge and gun from under his plainclothes, Demeter also warned the group to “watch who you’re messing with.” When the boys refused to clean up their language, Demeter grabbed Elston by the neck, threw him to the ground, and climbed on top of him. At some point during the struggle, Demeter tried to pull Elston’s arms behind his back, as though attempting to arrest him. Bystanders separated Demeter and Elston, but not before Demeter could rip Elston’s shirt in an attempt to keep hold of him.

Under Illinois law, there are three necessary criteria for an employee’s action to be within the scope of his employment. First, the relevant conduct must be of the kind that the employee was employed to perform. Second, the conduct must have occurred substantially within the time and space limits authorized by the employment. And third, the conduct must have been motivated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the employer. See Adames v. Sheahan, 909 N.E.2d 742, 755 (Ill. 2009) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228 (AM. LAW INST. 1958)). Because “all three criteria … must be met,” failure to establish any one of them is sufficient to place conduct outside the scope of employment. Id. Thus, to survive the County’s motion for summary judgment, Demeter must show that a reasonable jury could find in his favor on all three criteria.

The parties dispute whether Demeter’s action satisfied the first criterion—i.e., whether the conduct was of the kind that Demeter would perform as a sheriff’s deputy. We’re willing to assume for the sake of argument that it was. Even so, Elston cannot succeed because he has not met his burden on the second and third criteria. On the second, Elston must show that there is a genuine dispute of material fact with respect to whether Demeter’s conduct occurred substantially within the time and space limits authorized by his employment. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248–49 (1986).

Like the correctional official in Copeland, Demeter’s conduct did not advance any valid goal of his employer. The Kane County Sheriff’s Office had no interest in “maintaining the peace” in a neighboring county. And it’s not as though Demeter was responding to an emergency—no one would characterize the use of expletives as a crisis. No reasonable jury could conclude that Demeter’s actions were motivated, even in part, by an intent to serve his employer’s interests. Instead, on his day off with his family, Demeter acted out of personal animus to accost, threaten, and physically assault a teenager for using foul language within earshot of spectators and players at his child’s soccer game. The fact that Demeter used his badge, gun, and training in an unauthorized manner in pursuit of that purely personal goal does not bring his conduct within the scope of his employment.

The district court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of the County is AFFIRMED.

Affirmed

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Derek A Hawkins is trademark corporate counsel for Harley-Davidson. Hawkins oversees the prosecution and maintenance of the Harley-Davidson’s international trademark portfolio in emerging markets.