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Weekly Case Digests – September 16, 2019 – September 20, 2019

By: WISCONSIN LAW JOURNAL STAFF//September 20, 2019//

Weekly Case Digests – September 16, 2019 – September 20, 2019

By: WISCONSIN LAW JOURNAL STAFF//September 20, 2019//

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7th Circuit Digests

7th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: Rajesh Gupta v. Morgan Stanley Smith Barney, LLC, et al.

Case No.: 18-3584

Officials: SYKES, BRENNAN, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.

Focus: Arbitration

This appeal presents a question of contract formation. After Rajesh Gupta sued his former employer Morgan Stanley for discrimination, retaliation, and defamation, the company moved to compel arbitration. Morgan Stanley contends Gupta agreed to arbitrate these claims after he did not opt out of the company’s arbitration agreement. Gupta responds that during his employment he neither saw an arbitration offer nor agreed to arbitrate employment-related disputes. The district court sided with Morgan Stanley and sent the parties off to arbitration. Gupta appeals this ruling, and we affirm.

Affirmed

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7th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: Christopher Regan, et al. v. City of Hammond, Indiana

Case No.: 18-3051

Officials: WOOD, Chief Judge, and BAUER and ROVNER, Circuit Judges.

Focus: Dormant Commerce Clause

The plaintiffs in this case press a dormant commerce clause challenge to a local ordinance that requires a residential property owner who wishes to make repairs to the residence either to obtain a license or to hire a licensed contractor; but a homeowner making repairs to the single-family residence he or she occupies is exempted from this requirement. The plaintiffs argue that this scheme discriminates against interstate commerce and to that extent is contrary to the dormant commerce clause. But the ordinance draws no distinction between in-state or out-of-state property owners and imposes no burden on interstate commerce. We therefore affirm the district court’s entry of summary judgment against the plaintiffs.

Affirmed

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7th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: Mark A. Campbell v. Kevin Kallas, et al.

Case No.: 18-2075

Officials: WOOD, Chief Judge, and SYKES and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.

Focus: Qualified Immunity

Mark Campbell, also known as Nicole Rose Campbell, is an inmate in the Wisconsin prison system. In 2007 Campbell pleaded guilty to first-degree sexual assault of a child and is now serving a 34-year sentence. Campbell has been diagnosed with gender dysphoria; she is biologically male but identifies as female. Department of Corrections (“DOC”) medical staff are treating Campbell’s condition with cross-gender hormone therapy.

Beginning in September 2013, Campbell repeatedly requested a more radical intervention: sex-reassignment surgery. National standards of care recommend that patients undertake one year of “real life” experience as a person of their self-identified gender before resorting to irreversible surgical options. That preparatory period presents challenges for officials charged with the administration of sex-segregated prisons. DOC officials consulted an outside expert, who determined that Campbell was a potential surgical candidate. But the expert’s cautious conclusion was conditioned on DOC officials developing a safe, workable solution to the real-life-experience dilemma. Citing these concerns and DOC policy, officials denied Campbell’s request.

After filing grievances and exhausting administrative appeals, Campbell sued Dr. Kevin Kallas, the DOC Mental Health Director, and a host of other prison officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. She alleged that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to her serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment and sought damages and injunctive relief. Both sides moved for summary judgment, and the defendants also claimed qualified immunity. The district court denied the motions. As relevant here, the judge rejected the claim of qualified immunity, concluding that caselaw clearly established a constitutional right to effective medical treatment.

We reverse. Qualified immunity shields a public official from suit for damages unless caselaw clearly puts him on notice that his action is unconstitutional. The judge’s approach to the qualified-immunity question was far too general. The Eighth Amendment requires prison healthcare professionals to exercise medical judgment when making decisions about an inmate’s treatment. And they cannot completely deny the care of a serious medical condition. But cases recognizing those broad principles could not have warned these defendants that treating an inmate’s gender dysphoria with hormone therapy and deferring consideration of sex-reassignment surgery violates the Constitution. Moreover, it’s doubtful that a prisoner can prove a case of deliberate indifference when, as here, prison officials followed accepted medical standards. The defendants are immune from damages liability.

Reversed

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7th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: United States of America v. Steven A. Adams

Case No.: 18-2932

Officials: BAUER, HAMILTON, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.

Focus: Sentencing Guidelines

Defendant Steven Adams pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. In this appeal, he challenges the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress and its application of the Sentencing Guidelines to his case. We affirm. Probable cause supported the search warrant for Adams’ house, and in any event the officers could rely on the warrant in good faith. Further, the district court properly calculated Adams’ guideline range, taking into account his prior drug conspiracy conviction.

Affirmed

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7th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: United States of America v. Curtis L. Johnson

Case No.: 18-2350

Officials: EASTERBROOK, SYKES, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.

Focus: Sentencing – Appeal Waiver

During an in-chambers conference among court and counsel, Curtis Johnson’s attorney withdrew an objection to the restitution amount to be paid to the victims of his client’s wire fraud. Johnson was not present. Then, in open court, Johnson confirmed he no longer disputed restitution, recognized the plea agreement included an appeal waiver, pleaded guilty, and was sentenced. Johnson now challenges his sentence, arguing he did not waive this appeal and his sentence is unconstitutional because he was not present when his attorney dropped the restitution objection. We uphold the appeal waiver and dismiss Johnson’s appeal.

Dismissed

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7th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: Holly B. Vanzant, et al. v. Hill’s Pet Nutrition, Inc., et al.

Case No.: 17-3633

Officials: FLAUM, MANION, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.

Focus: Restitution – Unjust Enrichment

Holly Vanzant and Dana Land own cats with health problems. Their veterinarians prescribed cat food manufactured by Hill’s Pet Nutrition, Inc., and sold under Hill’s “Prescription Diet” brand. For several years Vanzant and Land purchased this higher-priced cat food from their local PetSmart stores using their veterinarian’s prescriptions. They eventually learned, however, that the Prescription Diet cat food is not materially different from nonprescription cat food. And the prescription requirement is illusory; no prescription is necessary. Feeling deceived, Vanzant and Land filed a class-action lawsuit against Hill’s and PetSmart, Inc., asserting claims under the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/1 et seq., and for unjust enrichment.

The district judge dismissed the Consumer Fraud Act claim for two reasons: (1) the complaint lacked the specificity required for a fraud claim; and (2) the claim is barred by a statutory safe harbor for conduct specifically authorized by a regulatory body—here, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”). The judge dismissed the unjust-enrichment claim because it was premised on the same conduct as the statutory claim.

We reverse. First, the safe-harbor provision does not apply. Under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301 et seq., pet food intended to treat or prevent disease and marketed as such is considered a drug and requires approval of a new animal drug application. Without FDA approval, the manufacturer may not sell it in interstate commerce and the product is deemed adulterated and misbranded. The FDA issued guidance recognizing that most pet-food products in this category do not have the required approval; the guidance states that the agency is less likely to initiate an enforcement action if consumers purchase the food through or under the direction of a veterinarian (among other factors guiding the agency’s enforcement discretion). But the guidance does not specifically authorize the conduct alleged here, so the safe harbor does not apply.

And the plaintiffs pleaded the fraud claim with the particularity required by Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. So the statutory claim may proceed. The unjust enrichment claim is more appropriately construed as a request for relief in the form of restitution based on the alleged fraud. In Illinois unjust enrichment is not a separate cause of action but is a condition brought about by fraud or other unlawful conduct. Toulon v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 877 F.3d 725, 741 (7th Cir. 2017). The request for restitution based on unjust enrichment therefore rests entirely on the consumer fraud claim, and it too may move forward.

Reversed

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7th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: Federal Trade Commission v. Credit Bureau Center, LLC, et al.

Case No.: 18-2847; 18-3310

Officials: MANION, SYKES, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.

Focus: Restitution Award

Michael Brown is the sole owner and operator of Credit Bureau Center, a credit-monitoring service. (We refer to both collectively as “Brown.”) Brown’s websites used what’s known as a “negative option feature” to attract customers. The websites offered a “free credit report and score” while obscuring a key detail in much smaller text: that applying for this “free” information automatically enrolled customers in an unspecified $29.94 monthly “membership” subscription. The subscription was for Brown’s credit-monitoring service, but customers learned this information only when he sent them a letter after they were automatically enrolled. Brown’s most successful contractor capitalized on the confusion by posting Craigslist advertisements for fake rental properties and telling applicants to get a “free” credit score from Brown’s websites.

The Federal Trade Commission eventually took notice. It sued Brown under section 13(b) of the Federal Trade Commission Act (“FTCA”), 15 U.S.C. § 53(b), alleging that the websites and referral system violated several consumer-protection statutes. The Commission sought a permanent injunction and restitution. Relevant here, the district judge found that Brown was a principal for his contractor’s fraudulent scheme and that the websites failed to meet certain disclosure requirements in the Restore Online Shopper Confidence Act (“ROSCA”). Id. § 8403. The judge entered a permanent injunction and ordered Brown to pay more than $5 million in restitution to the Commission.

Brown now concedes liability as a principal for his contractor’s Craigslist scam. And he doesn’t dispute that his own websites failed to meet some of ROSCA’s disclosure requirements. So we have no trouble affirming the judge’s decision to hold him liable for both. We also affirm the issuance of a permanent injunction. Brown’s argument there rests on an erroneous understanding of the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause.

But the restitution award is a different matter. By its terms, section 13(b) authorizes only restraining orders and injunctions. Stare decisis cannot justify adherence to an approach that Supreme Court precedent forecloses. Accordingly, we overrule Amy Travel and hold that section 13(b) does not authorize restitutionary relief. Because the Commission brought this case under section 13(b), we vacate the restitution award.

Vacated in part. Affirmed in part.

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7th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: Terry L. Smith v. Illinois Department of Transportation

Case No.: 18-2948

Officials: FLAUM, MANION, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.

Focus: Title VII Violation

After a rocky probationary period, the Illinois Department of Transportation discharged its employee Terry Smith. Smith sued the Department under Title VII, arguing that it had subjected him to a hostile work environment and fired him in retaliation for his complaints about racial discrimination. The district court granted summary judgment to the Department on both claims, and Smith insists that it was wrong to do so. He contends that the district court mistakenly concluded that testimony from two of his witnesses was inadmissible and that he has enough evidence to make it to a jury in any event. We disagree and affirm the district court.

Affirmed

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7th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: Amy Lee Sullivan, d/b/a Design Kit v. Flora, Inc.,

Case No.: 17-2241; 18-2534

Officials: FLAUM, BARRETT, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.

Focus: Court Error – Damages

This appeal presents a question of first impression for us on the scope of statutory damages recoverable under the Copyright Act of 1976. Section 504(c)(1) of the Act permits a copyright holder “to recover, instead of actual damages and profits, an award of statutory damages for all infringements involved in the action, with respect to any one work,” with Congress separately instructing that, in determining statutory damages, “all the parts of a compilation or derivative work constitute one work.” This case requires us to determine what constitutes “one work” in a fact pattern where a jury found infringement on multiple works registered in a single copyright application.

Amy Sullivan, a graphic design artist, produced a series of 33 illustrations for Flora, Inc., an herbal supplement company, to use in two advertising campaigns. Upon noticing that Flora was using the illustrations in other ads, Sullivan brought suit for copyright infringement and opted to pursue statutory damages. She did so to maximize her potential payout by classifying each of her 33 illustrations as “one work” within the meaning of § 504(c)(1) of the Copyright Act. Flora disagreed, contending that the illustrations were part of two broader compilations and thus, if Sullivan prevailed, § 504(c)(1) limited her to just two statutory damage awards—one award for infringement on the illustrations used in each of the two advertising campaigns. The district court agreed with Sullivan, and instructed the jury that she could recover separate awards of statutory damages for 33 acts of infringement on 33 separate illustrations. The jury found infringement on each of the 33 illustrations and returned a statutory damages award of $3.6 million.

On appeal Flora challenges the district court’s ruling on statutory damages and separate rulings on two additional defenses to liability asserted at trial. While procedural shortcomings defeat these latter two challenges, Flora is right that the district court committed error in permitting separate awards of statutory damages unaccompanied by any finding that each or any of the 33 illustrations constituted “one work” within the meaning and protection of § 504(c)(1) of the Copyright Act. It is neither appropriate nor possible for us to make that finding on the record before us. So we vacate the judgment in Sullivan’s favor and remand for further proceedings.

Affirmed in part. Vacated and remanded in part.

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7th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: United States of America v. Marshon Simon

Case No.: 18-2442

Officials: FLAUM, MANION, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.

Focus: Probable Cause – Suppression of Evidence

Police officers pulled Marshon Simon over for failing to signal sufficiently ahead of turning. A drug-sniffing dog alerted on Simon’s car so officers searched it. They did not find drugs, but they found a gun. The government charged Simon with being a felon-in-possession. The district judge denied Simon’s motions for recusal, suppression, and supplementation. Simon entered a conditional guilty plea and received a sentence of 15 years. He raises a litany of issues on appeal. He argues the judge should have recused himself because before he was a judge he supervised a prior prosecution of Simon. He argues the judge should have suppressed the gun because the officers lacked probable cause to initiate the traffic stop and because they prolonged the stop to allow for the dog sniff. He argues the dog’s alert was false and the dog was unreliable because he was improperly trained. He argues the judge should have allowed him to supplement the evidence after denial of suppression. Finally, he argues one of his prior felonies should not have counted as a predicate for purposes of the Armed Career Criminal Act. Concluding the judge committed no reversible error in denying Simon’s motions, we affirm.

Affirmed

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7th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: United States of America v. Heon Seok Lee

Case No.: 18-1687; 18-1950

Officials: KANNE, BARRETT, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.

Focus: Sentencing Guidelines

Crowbar in hand, U.S. Customs Officer Jorge Parra spent December 8, 2010 “cracking open containers” at a warehouse near the Los Angeles seaport. Parra pried open one from South Korea to inspect its freight. Inside he found a fully assembled, five-foot tall industrial fan called a turbo blower. A placard riveted to the side read, “Assembled in USA.”

Presented with a fully assembled machine fresh off the boat from South Korea, which brazenly advertised its assembly in the United States, little sleuthing was required to determine something was amiss. Parra’s discovery kicked off a federal investigation that traced back to the defendant in this case, Heon Seok Lee. Prosecutors eventually charged Lee with executing a scheme to defraud local governments by falsely representing that his company manufactured its turbo blowers in the United States.

A grand jury indicted Lee on five counts of wire fraud and three counts of smuggling. After a trial, the jury found Lee guilty on all counts. Lee now appeals his convictions and the restitution ordered, and the government cross-appeals Lee’s prison sentence. We find no fault in the trial or the sentence.

Affirmed

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7th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: Whole Woman’s Health Alliance, et al. v. Curtis T. Hill, Jr., et al.

Case No.: 19-2051

Officials: WOOD, Chief Judge, and FLAUM and EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judges.

Focus: 14th Amendment – Abortion – Preliminary Injunction

Indiana, like many states, has an elaborate network of laws regulating abortion care. The present appeal presents a narrow question: is one provider entitled to a preliminary injunction against one part of those laws, as it relates to one clinic in one city? More will come along later, as the district court proceeds to resolve the underlying case, in which plaintiffs have asserted more broadly that various aspects of Indiana’s abortion regime violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. But the merits stage of the case is still in its infancy. The provider now before us is Whole Woman’s Health Alliance (“the Alliance”). It is having trouble complying with Indiana’s abortion laws, despite its attempts to do so. The Alliance has for the past two years been unable to obtain a license from the Indiana State Department of Health (“the Department”). It needs such a license in order to open a clinic that exclusively provides medication abortion care in South Bend, Indiana. After almost two years, two unsuccessful applications, a statutory amendment to relevant definitions, and a moving target of wide-ranging requests for information, the Alliance concluded that its attempts were futile and turned to the federal court for assistance. It filed a motion for a preliminary injunction that would exempt it from the licensing requirement, thereby allowing it to provide care at the South Bend clinic while the case proceeds.

The district court granted the requested preliminary relief. It held that the Alliance has shown a likelihood of success on the merits of its claim that Indiana’s requirement of licensure for clinics that provide only medication abortions (that is, those induced exclusively by taking pills), as applied to the South Bend clinic, violates both the Due Process and the Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The state has taken an interlocutory appeal asking us to lift that injunction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). While that appeal has been pending, we issued an order narrowing the scope of the district court’s injunction, and we heard oral argument on the question whether the preliminary injunction should be stayed immediately. Briefing has been proceeding apace in the main appeal from the injunction, but we conclude that we now have enough before us to resolve that appeal as well as the narrower stay issue we considered at argument.

We hold that the district court’s broad condemnation of Indiana’s licensing scheme runs contrary to Supreme Court precedent. While this litigation is pending, the state may for the most part administer that system in the ordinary course. Nonetheless, we have concerns about the state’s handling of the Alliance’s license application. Indiana may use licensing as a legitimate means of vetting and monitoring providers. To the extent that Indiana is using its licensing scheme to prevent the South Bend clinic from opening simply to block access to pre-viability abortions, rather than as a legitimate means of vetting and monitoring providers, it is acting unconstitutionally. We therefore order the district court to modify the injunction to instruct Indiana to treat the Alliance’s South Bend facility as though it were provisionally licensed. This respects the state’s interest in regulating medical facilities, while at the same time it allows the Alliance to keep providing medication abortions at its South Bend clinic while the case proceeds. As the district court develops the record in this case, it may continue to examine whether the state has proceeded in good faith in its handling of the Alliance’s license application, or if instead the apparently ever-changing requirements mask a decision to deny all such licenses. This inquiry includes but is not limited to whether the Department’s conduct was a sincere attempt to ensure that the Alliance is a qualified provider that meets the requirements for a license, or pretext for an unconstitutional action.

Affirmed

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7th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: Jeanette M. Janusiak v. Sarah Cooper

Case No.: 19-1198

Officials: KANNE, HAMILTON, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.

Focus: Suppression of Evidence – Involuntary Statements

After an infant died in the care of petitioner Jeanette Janusiak, a Wisconsin jury found her guilty of first‐degree intentional homicide. On direct appeal, state courts rejected her argument that statements she made during an interrogation were involuntary and should have been suppressed. Janusiak then asserted that argument in federal court in her petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The district court denied relief.

On appeal, Janusiak contends her statements were coerced by (1) comments that law enforcement made to her about keeping access to her children, (2) the length and other features of the interrogation, and (3) her vulnerability as a pregnant woman and mother. We affirm because the state appellate court reasonably applied the correct standard to determine that Janusiak’s statements were voluntary. We affirm.

Affirmed

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7th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: Laura L. Rozumalski v. W.F. Baird & Associates, LTD.,

Case No.: 18-3586

Officials: WOOD, Chief Judge, and BAUER and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.

Focus: Title VII Violation – Retaliation Claim

Laura Rozumalski was sexually harassed by her direct supervisor, Mark Riedel. That much is undisputed. Also undisputed is that when Rozumalski reported the harassment to her employer, W.F. Baird & Associates, Ltd. (“Baird”), the company responded by swiftly investigating the incident and firing Riedel. But that is not the end of the story. This case is about the aftermath of those events and how they culminated in Rozumalski’s loss of her own job.

Rozumalski claims that Baird dismissed her in retaliation for her role in Riedel’s firing, in retaliation for complaining about her supervisor’s continued friendship with Riedel, or as a result of sex discrimination. The district court concluded that no trier of fact could find in her favor. We agree with that disposition: while it may be possible for workplace harassment to haunt a victim’s ability to succeed long after the incident, the facts that Rozumalski has presented do not support a finding of retaliation. She has similarly failed to create a jury issue on discrimination. We therefore affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Baird.

Affirmed

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7th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: Refined Metals Corporation v. NL Industries Inc.,

Case No.: 18-3235

Officials: WOOD, Chief Judge, and FLAUM and SYKES, Circuit Judge

Focus: Time-barred – CERCLA – Contribution Claim

This is a case about who should bear the costs of cleaning up a contaminated lead smelter site in Beech Grove, Indiana, a suburb of Indianapolis. Plaintiff Refined Metal Corporation (“Refined”) has owned the site since 1980, when it acquired it from defendant NL Industries Inc. (“NL”). After years of litigation involving both the federal Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) and the Indiana Department of Environmental Management (“IDEM”), Refined entered into a settlement with both agencies in 1998. The 1998 Decree, as we will call it, required Refined to close the site, pay a $210,000 fine, and remedy the contamination. For their part, EPA and IDEM agreed not to bring suit against Refined on at least some of their potential claims (though the parties dispute the scope of those covenants). These covenants not to sue took effect immediately upon the entry of the 1998 Decree. In 2017, almost 19 years later, Refined sued NL to recoup some of the cleanup costs for which it is responsible.

A delay of 19 years is a long time to keep an entitlement to reimbursement up in the air. The question before us is whether it is so long that Refined lost its statutory right to bring this action. The district court found that Refined’s claim qualified as a “contribution action” under section 113(f)(3)(B) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(3)(B). Contribution claims are subject to a three-year statute of limitations, and so the court dismissed the suit on that ground. It also relinquished supplemental jurisdiction over Refined’s state law claims. On appeal, Refined argues that its suit is instead a “cost-recovery” action under section 107(a) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a), and that it would be timely under that subsection’s more permissive limitations period. NL contends that it wins no matter which CERCLA provision applies, given that the statute of limitations applicable to section 107(a) is only six years and, as NL sees things, that clock began running and expired long ago.

It matters, in our opinion, whether this is a section 113(f)(3)(B) contribution action or a section 107(a) cost-recovery case. If it were the latter, we would need to conduct a searching examination of what actions to clean up the site anyone has taken, and when. But we can skip that inquiry, because we agree with the district court that this is a section 113(f)(3)(B) contribution action, and the limitations period had expired by the time Refined filed suit. We therefore affirm the decision of the district court.

Affirmed

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7th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: United States of America v. Vahan Kelerchian

Case No.: 18-1320

Officials: HAMILTON, BARRETT, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.

Focus: Jury Instructions

Federal law imposes tight restrictions on private possession of machineguns and laser gunsights but allows law enforcement agencies to purchase and use both machineguns and laser sights. This appeal concerns criminal conspiracies among a firearms dealer and law enforcement officers to fool manufacturers into thinking they were selling to local police forces when the machineguns and laser sights were instead going into private hands.

Defendant-appellant Vahan Kelerchian was a licensed firearms dealer. His co-conspirators were Joseph Kumstar, the Deputy Chief of the Lake County Sheriff’s Department in Indiana, and Ronald Slusser, a patrolman who was the armorer for the department’s SWAT team. The trio defrauded firearms manufacturer Heckler & Koch and the laser sight producer Insight Technologies into selling them machineguns and laser sights restricted by law for law enforcement and military use. After many fraudulent transactions, the three were indicted on several charges. Kumstar and Slusser pleaded guilty. Kelerchian went to trial and was convicted on four counts of conspiracy and four counts of making false writings. On appeal, Kelerchian raises numerous issues, but we affirm his convictions on all counts. In Parts I and II, we provide the factual and procedural background for Kelerchian’s arguments. In Part III, we analyze his numerous challenges to his convictions.

Affirmed

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7th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: Driveline Systems, LLC, v. Arctic Cat, Inc.

Case No.: 18-1424

Officials: WOOD, Chief Judge, and BAUER and ROVNER, Circuit Judges.

Focus: Summary Judgment – Issue of Material Fact

Driveline Systems, LLC (“Driveline”) filed a breach of contract lawsuit against Arctic Cat, Inc. (“Arctic Cat”) over a supply contract for specially manufactured goods. Counts II-V were resolved against Driveline by summary judgment. The remaining claim and Arctic Cat’s countersuit were resolved by a trial on the papers. Driveline appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment on Count II, arguing that there were genuine issues of material fact which preclude summary judgment.

Because genuine issues of material fact exist, neither party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The district court’s grant of summary judgment is vacated and the matter is remanded to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Vacated and remanded

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WI Court of Appeals Digests

WI Court of Appeals – District III

Case Name: State of Wisconsin v. Lila Claire Rudawski

Case No.: 2018AP539-CR

Officials: Stark, P.J., Hruz and Seidl, JJ.

Focus: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Lila Rudawski appeals a judgment, entered upon her no-contest plea, convicting her of possession with intent to deliver between three and ten grams of amphetamine, as a repeater and as a second and subsequent offense. Rudawski also appeals the order denying her motion for postconviction relief. Rudawski argues the circuit court erred by denying her motion to suppress evidence. In the alternative, she claims she was denied the effective assistance of trial counsel with respect to the suppression motion. We reject these arguments and affirm the judgment and order.

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WI Court of Appeals – District I

Case Name: David J. McCormick, et al. v. Auto Club Insurance Association

Case No.: 2018AP753

Officials: Brash, P.J., Kessler and Dugan, JJ.

Focus: Court Error – Doctrine of Accord and Satisfaction

David J. McCormick and Pearse A. McCormick (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) appeal the dismissal of their claims against the Auto Club Insurance Association (“AAA”). The Plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred when it granted summary judgment in favor of AAA after concluding that the Plaintiffs’ claims were barred under the doctrine of accord and satisfaction, and when it denied the Plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration. We affirm.

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WI Court of Appeals – District III

Case Name: State of Wisconsin v. Sean N. Jones

Case No.: 2018AP948-CR

Officials: Stark, P.J., Hruz and Seidl, JJ.

Focus: Sufficiency of Evidence

Sean Jones appeals a judgment of conviction for armed robbery as a party to the crime, as well as an order denying his motion for postconviction relief. Jones asserts there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that Jones knew his accomplice was armed with a firearm during the commission of the offense. Additionally, Jones argues the real controversy was not fully tried because the circuit court failed to give certain jury instructions, including the instruction for the lesser-included offense of simple robbery, and because it admitted certain improper identification evidence, including evidence of Jones’s nickname, “Sneak.” Finally, Jones challenges certain aspects of his sentence. He contends the court failed to explain how the specific length of Jones’s initial confinement advanced the articulated sentencing objectives, and that it also failed to award 204 days’ sentence credit for the time Jones was in custody between his arrest and his sentencing after revocation of a probationary term imposed in earlier cases.

We reject Jones’s challenges to his conviction and to the circuit court’s exercise of its sentencing discretion, but we conclude Jones is entitled to the sentence credit he seeks. To explain, we conclude the jury could reasonably infer from the circumstances of the robbery that Jones knew his accomplice was armed with a firearm. We also conclude Jones is not entitled to a new trial in the interest of justice based upon either the court’s failure to give certain jury instructions or the court’s evidentiary decisions. We further reject Jones’s challenge to the court’s exercise of its sentencing discretion because the court provided the required explanation for the general range of the sentence imposed. However, because Jones was held in custody on a probation hold as a result of the armed robbery, he is entitled to sentence credit for the time he spent confined between his arrest and his sentencing after revocation. Accordingly, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand with directions for the circuit court to grant Jones’s motion for sentence credit.

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WI Court of Appeals – District I

Case Name: The Greater Milwaukee Foundation v. American Company of Irish Dance, et al.

Case No.: 2018AP1294

Officials: Brash, P.J., Dugan and Gundrum, JJ.

Focus: Corporate Succession

American Company of Irish Dance (American) appeals an order in which the trial court declared a successor organization to the Trinity Irish Dance Company (Trinity I). Trinity I was the beneficiary of a fund established by the Bill Borchert Larson Revocable Living Trust (Trust) and administered by the Greater Milwaukee Foundation (Foundation). The Trust stated that the Foundation was to make distributions to Trinity I from the fund as long as Trinity I was in compliance with certain requirements set forth in the Trust. The Trust further provided that a successor organization to Trinity I would be eligible to receive distributions from the fund as well, as long as that successor organization also complied with the requirements of the Trust.

In 2014, after a legal dispute between the Board of Directors and one of the founders, Trinity I changed its name to American. American continued to make claims for distributions from the fund under its new name. However, another dance company—also named Trinity Irish Dance Company, and started by the founder of Trinity I involved in the legal dispute (Trinity II)—began making claims to the fund as well. The Foundation filed a petition with the trial court seeking construction of the Trust and a declaratory judgment as to whether American or Trinity II was the “successor organization” to Trinity I under the Trust.

The trial court held that Trinity II was the successor organization to Trinity I. The court considered extrinsic evidence—in particular, testimony received at a court trial—to determine the intent of Bill Borchert Larson, the testator, with regard to the meaning of “successor organization” in the Trust. The court found that Trinity II met that intent.

We disagree with the trial court’s analysis. The law of corporate succession clearly states that American changing its name from Trinity I did not change its corporate identity. Therefore, it was not necessary to determine a successor organization, since American is the same entity as Trinity I, the beneficiary named in the Trust. Furthermore, the terms of the Trust were clear and unambiguous in stating that Trinity I—now American—is the intended beneficiary of the fund as long as it remains in compliance with the requirements of the Trust.

We therefore reverse the order of the trial court declaring Trinity II the successor organization to Trinity I, and remand this matter for the entry of an order declaring that American is the beneficiary of the fund, subject to the requirements of the Trust, with the Foundation to determine compliance with those requirements as directed in the Trust.

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WI Court of Appeals – District I

Case Name: State of Wisconsin v. Patrick D. Zolliecoffer

Case No.: 2018AP1639-CR

Officials: Kessler, Brennan and Kloppenburg, JJ.

Focus: Court Error – Abuse of Discretion – Substitute Counsel

Patrick D. Zolliecoffer seeks a new trial after his convictions for disorderly conduct, battery to a law enforcement officer, and attempted disarming of a peace officer. He contends on appeal that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to substitute counsel on the eve of trial and when it denied his Batson motion challenging two of the State’s peremptory strikes as racially based.

The State argues that Zolliecoffer is not entitled to a new trial. The State argues the trial court properly exercised its discretion in denying Zolliecoffer’s motion to substitute counsel because he made it the Friday before the Monday start of trial, the case had been pending eight months, he had been permitted to substitute counsel previously, and he had been granted adjournments previously. The State notes that the trial court said the motion “appeared to, perhaps, be for the purpose of delay.” The State also argues that Zolliecoffer offered no reason as to why he could not proceed with his assigned counsel. As to his Batson challenge, the State concedes the trial court failed to make the factual determinations that the Batson analysis requires. It argues that Zolliecoffer is entitled to a remand for a hearing for the trial court to rule on the Batson challenge.

For the following reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not erroneously exercise its discretion when it denied Zolliecoffer’s motion for substitution of counsel. We also conclude that the trial court erred in denying Zolliecoffer’s Batson motion because it failed to apply the Batson analysis and make the findings necessary to the application of that analysis. We must remand for the trial court to do so because we are precluded from making findings of fact. See Wurtz v. Fleischman, 97 Wis. 2d 100, 107 n.3, 293 N.W.2d 155 (1980) (holding that WIS. CONST. art. VII, § 5(3), “precludes [the court of appeals] from making any factual determinations where the evidence is in dispute”). We therefore affirm in part, reverse in part and remand for a hearing on the Batson challenge.

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WI Court of Appeals – District I

Case Name: State of Wisconsin v. Scott F. Ferguson, Jr.,

Case No.: 2018AP1651-CR

Officials: Brash, P.J., Kessler and Dugan, JJ.

Focus: Sufficiency of Evidence

Scott F. Ferguson, Jr., appeals from a judgment of conviction for one count of first-degree intentional homicide by use of a dangerous weapon and four counts of possession of a firearm by an adjudicated delinquent. See WIS. STAT. §§ 940.01(1)(a), 939.63(1)(b), and 941.29(2)(b) (2015-16). Ferguson argues that he is entitled to a new jury trial because the admission of a particular photograph violated his constitutional right of confrontation. He also argues that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of three firearm possession charges. We affirm.

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WI Court of Appeals – District I

Case Name: State of Wisconsin v. Alfonso Lorenzo Brooks

Case No.: 2018AP1774-CR

Officials: Kessler, Gundrum and Dugan, JJ.

Focus: Abuse of Discretion – Motion to Suppress – Community Caretaker Function

On August 28, 2015, Alfonso Lorenzo Brooks was charged with one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm. According to the criminal complaint, on August 24, 2015, Milwaukee County Sheriff’s Department Deputies Dean Zirzow and Travis Thompson witnessed a vehicle travelling at approximately sixty-five to seventy miles-per-hour in a fifty miles-per-hour zone. The deputies conducted a traffic stop. Brooks, the driver, was the sole occupant of the vehicle. Upon checking Brooks’s driver’s license, the deputies discovered that Brooks was operating with a suspended driver’s license and informed him that the vehicle would have to be towed because there were no other drivers present. The deputies also informed Brooks that they would conduct an inventory search of the vehicle. During the search, the deputies retrieved a firearm from the trunk of the vehicle. The deputies were aware that Brooks was a convicted felon. Brooks was subsequently arrested and charged.

Brooks filed a motion to suppress evidence retrieved from the inventory search arguing that the firearm was obtained as a result of an illegal search and an improper exercise of the deputies’ community caretaker function. Both deputies and Brooks testified at the hearing. Zirzow testified that he initially pulled Brooks over for “unreasonable and imprudent speed.” After discovering that Brooks’s license was suspended, Zirzow informed Brooks that the car would have to be towed because there were no other drivers present and that the deputies would be conducting an inventory search of the vehicle. Zirzow explained that inventory searches allow valuable items to be withdrawn from the vehicle prior to the tow. Brooks asked Zirzow if his girlfriend could pick the car up, however, Zirzow explained that per the sheriff’s department’s policy, other vehicles were not allowed on the scene and that a vehicle must be towed if no other valid drivers are present. Zirzow informed Brooks that he was free to leave during the inventory search, but encouraged him to stay on the scene until the tow truck arrived. Zirzow spoke with Brooks while Thompson conducted the search. Thompson indicated to Zirzow that he found a gun in the trunk of the car, which “changed the circumstance of the events.” The deputies ran a criminal history on Brooks and subsequently arrested him for being a felon in possession of a firearm.

Brooks testified that after Zirzow told him the car would be towed, Brooks informed Zirzow that he did not understand the purpose of the tow because the vehicle was not a road hazard and was not violating any parking ordinances. Brooks testified that Zirzow told him it was policy Thompson testified that inventory searches involve searching each part of the vehicle to both allow drivers the opportunity to take anything they need from the car and to protect the sheriff’s department from liability. The circuit court denied Brooks’s motion to suppress, finding that Brooks was properly stopped for speeding and that the deputies followed their protocol. Brooks subsequently pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm and was sentenced to thirty-seven months of initial confinement and thirty months of extended supervision.

Brooks filed a postconviction motion for relief, arguing that the search and tow of the vehicle “was an improper exercise of law enforcement’s community caretaker function because the vehicle was lawfully parked and not obstructing traffic.” The motion also argued that defense counsel was ineffective for “failing to submit additional evidence showing that the Sheriff’s Department’s written policies and procedure did not authorize searching and towing Mr. Brooks’ car.” The postconviction court denied the motion without a hearing. This appeal follows. On appeal, Brooks raises the same issues raised in his postconviction motion. We affirmed.

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WI Court of Appeals – District I

Case Name: Elizabeth Harwood v. Wheaton Franciscan Services, Inc., et al.

Case No.: 2018AP1836

Officials: Brash, P.J., Kessler and Brennan, JJ.

Focus: Class Action – Certification

Wheaton Franciscan Services, Inc., (Wheaton Franciscan) and two other defendants appeal an order certifying a class and appointing plaintiff Elizabeth Harwood as class representative. Harwood alleged that Wheaton Franciscan violated WIS. STAT. § 146.83(3f)(b)4.-5. (2017-18) by charging Harwood and others at least $28 each in illegal added fees for copies of their health records. Harwood moved to certify a class that included all persons in Wisconsin who were Wheaton Franciscan patients (or persons they authorized in writing to obtain their medical records) who were charged retrieval fees or certification fees for the six years preceding the filing of the complaint. The proposed class excluded certain persons and entities, including any persons who did not pay the fees.

The trial court decided the motion, applying the newly revised version of the class certification rule, WIS. STAT. § 803.08, which went into effect after this action was filed. The parties do not dispute the application of the current statute and they do not dispute that it was adopted with the express purpose of harmonizing Wisconsin’s class action statute with the federal class action statute and federal case law. They dispute only whether the trial court erroneously exercised its discretion when it ruled that Harwood had satisfied the requirements for the class to be certified under the current version.

The trial court rejected Wheaton Franciscan’s arguments as “representing] defenses to the merits of the Plaintiff’s case [that] do not preclude certifying the class,” and quoted Messner v. Northshore University HealthSystem, 669 F.3d 802, 811 (7th Cir. 2012), which stated that “[a] court should not turn the class certification proceedings into a dress rehearsal for the trial on the merits.” Its decision focused on the fact that Harwood had “provided a list of forty-four invoices, as well as the invoices themselves with the patient names redacted, representing separate clients … that have been allegedly charged improper fees for certified medical records in violation of WIS. STAT. § 146.83.”

Noting that the revised class action statute that took effect July 1, 2018, “imposes more stringent requirements than the prior version of WIS. STAT. § 803.08 and applicable case law,” the trial court concluded that Harwood had satisfied the requirements—that the proposed class is large enough to make it impractical to proceed without a class action, that the members of the proposed class share a common interest, that Harwood’s claim is typical of the claims of the class, and that Harwood, the named party, will provide adequate representation to the proposed class. The trial court further concluded that “questions of law and fact predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to individual actions for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” It therefore certified the class.

The revised class certification rule directed Wisconsin courts to look to federal case law for guidance. Just like Wisconsin law, federal appellate courts “review class-certification decisions deferentially, in recognition of the fact that [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 23 gives the district courts broad discretion to determine whether certification of a class-action lawsuit is appropriate.” Ervin v. OS Rest. Servs., Inc., 632 F.3d 971, 976 (7th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). Federal appellate courts will “reverse the class-certification decision only when [they] find an abuse of discretion.” Id. For the reasons set forth, we conclude that the trial court correctly considered the relevant facts, applied the legal standard set forth in the newly revised WIS. STAT. § 803.08 consistent with federal law on class certification, kept its analysis focused on the class certification question, and reached a reasonable decision. We affirm.

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WI Court of Appeals – District III

Case Name: State of Wisconsin v. Traci Lynn Busha

Case No.: 2018AP1863-CR

Officials: SEIDL, J.

Focus: OWI – Miranda Warnings

Traci Busha appeals a judgment convicting her of third-offense operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated (OWI). Busha contends the circuit court erred by denying her motion to suppress statements that she made to a police officer before she received Miranda warnings. We conclude Busha was not in custody at the time she made the statements in question, and, as such, Miranda warnings were not required. We therefore affirm.

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WI Court of Appeals – District I

Case Name: State of Wisconsin v. Bobby L. Green

Case No.: 2018AP1935-CR

Officials: Brash, P.J., Kessler and Dugan, JJ.

Focus: Plea Withdrawal

Bobby L. Green appeals from a judgment convicting him of first-degree reckless injury with use of a dangerous weapon and possession of a firearm by a person adjudicated delinquent for an act that would be a felony if committed by an adult. See WIS. STAT. §§ 940.23(1)(a), 939.63(1)(b), 941.29(1m)(bm) (2015-16). He also appeals the order denying his postconviction motion. Green contends that he is entitled to plea withdrawal. We disagree and affirm.

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WI Court of Appeals – District I

Case Name: State of Wisconsin v. Johnny Maldonado

Case No.: 2018AP1969

Officials: Brash, P.J., Kessler and Dugan, JJ.

Focus: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Johnny Maldonado appeals from an order denying his WIS. STAT. § 974.06 (2017-18) motion for postconviction relief. He argues that he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his motion. Maldonado continues to allege that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to call two particular witnesses to impeach Trinidad’s testimony and by failing to object to the admission of hearsay testimony concerning Boogie Man. He further argues that postconviction counsel provided ineffective assistance for failing to raise these clearly stronger issues prior to Maldonado’s direct appeal. For reasons outlined below, we conclude that the record conclusively demonstrates that Maldonado was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his motion or other relief. We reject his arguments and affirm.

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WI Court of Appeals – District II

Case Name: State of Wisconsin v. Daniel A. Griffin

Case No.: 2018AP649-CR

Officials: Neubauer, C.J., Reilly, P.J., and Gundrum, J.

Focus: Court Error – Other Acts Evidence

Daniel A. Griffin appeals from a judgment convicting him of first-degree reckless homicide and two counts of child abuse intentionally causing great bodily harm in the death of fourteen-month-old MHP and the injuries suffered by his twin brother, MDP. Griffin argues that the court erroneously excluded evidence that the twins’ mother caused MHP’s death and the injuries to MDP. Griffin also argues that the court erroneously admitted videos of Griffin interacting with the twins as other-acts evidence. We reject all of Griffin’s arguments and affirm.

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WI Court of Appeals – District II

Case Name: State of Wisconsin v. Aaron M. Wigman

Case No.: 2018AP1311-CR

Officials: Neubauer, C.J., Reilly, P.J., and Gundrum, J.

Focus: Jury Instructions

A jury found Aaron M. Wigman guilty of two counts of making threats to law enforcement officers, contrary to WIS. STAT. § 940.203(2) (2017-18). He appeals from the judgment of conviction and from the order denying his motion for postconviction relief. Wigman argues that sufficient evidence supported modifying the instruction with the five Perkins factors: (1) No recipient of his Facebook posts reacted with violence, and neither police officer was directly targeted to receive any of the posts; (2) the rhetoric, if bellicose, was hypothetical and conditional and did not threaten imminent violence; (3) he did not communicate directly with the officers through his posts; in fact, the two officers were steered to access them only by others who had seen the posts; (4) he had not made previous similar statements about violent acts toward the officers; and (5) given his relatively compliant behavior at his arrest, the officers had no reason to believe he had a propensity to engage in violence.  We affirm.

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WI Court of Appeals – District II

Case Name: State of Wisconsin v. Christopher J. Durski

Case No.: 2018AP1750-CR

Officials: GUNDRUM, J.

Focus: Court Error – Expert Testimony

Christopher Durski appeals from a judgment of conviction for operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated, fourth offense. He claims the court erred in denying his suppression motion and in permitting certain expert testimony on retrograde extrapolation. We conclude the court did not err, and we affirm.

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WI Court of Appeals – District II

Case Name: State of Wisconsin v. Robert L. Kavalauskas

Case No.: 2019AP610-CR

Officials: REILLY, P.J.

Focus: OWI – Reasonable Suspicion

Robert L. Kavalauskas appeals from a judgment of conviction for operating a vehicle while intoxicated, second offense (OWI 2nd), contrary to WIS. STAT. § 346.63(1)(a). Kavalauskas argues that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to detain him. We disagree and affirm.

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WI Court of Appeals – District IV

Case Name: State of Wisconsin v. Alfonso C. Loayza

Case No.: 2018AP2066-CR

Officials: Fitzpatrick, P.J., Blanchard and Kloppenburg, JJ.

Focus: Sentencing Guidelines – OWI

Alfonso Loayza appeals a judgment of conviction for operating while intoxicated and an order denying his postconviction motion. We conclude that the State did not prove one of Loayza’s prior convictions, and therefore we reverse and remand for sentencing as a seventh offense.

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WI Court of Appeals – District IV

Case Name: Jacob W. Beedle, et al. v. Wisconsin Mutual Insurance Company, et al.

Case No.: 2018AP2147

Officials: Fitzpatrick, P.J., Blanchard, and Kloppenburg, JJ.

Focus: Insurance Claim – Coverage

Jacob Beedle appeals a summary judgment dismissing IMT Insurance Company (“the insurer”) from Beedle’s suit against the insurer and its insured, Pierce Phillips (“the insured”), based on the circuit court’s application of a business exclusion in a homeowner’s insurance policy. While the insured and Beedle were constructing a pole barn together, Beedle was allegedly injured. Beedle alleges that his injury was caused by the insured’s negligence. The insured was primarily employed by a company to construct such barns. However, the particular project that the insured was working on when Beedle was allegedly injured was a side job for the insured that was not part of his primary employment.

Beedle argues that the court erred in concluding that the business exclusion applies here to bar coverage for losses “arising out of or in connection with a business,” the “business” being the insured’s construction of pole barns. Beedle contends that, because the construction project was a side job for the insured and not part of his primary employment, it fell outside the policy’s definition of “business.” We disagree with Beedle and agree with the circuit court. We conclude that a reasonable insured in the position of the insured here would understand that the business exclusion applies to exclude coverage for claims arising out of the activity that the insured was engaged in at the time of the alleged injuries. Accordingly, we affirm.

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WI Supreme Court Digests

WI Supreme Court

Case Name: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Thomas D. Vaitys

Case No.: 2019 WI 85

Focus: Attorney Disciplinary Proceedings

Pending before the court is a report and recommendation filed by Referee Richard M. Esenberg. The report recommends that we accept Attorney Thomas D. Vaitys’ petition for consensual license revocation, order him to pay restitution, and revoke his license to practice law in Wisconsin. Attorney Vaitys is the subject of an Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR) disciplinary complaint alleging that he committed 19 counts of professional misconduct in several client matters. He is also the subject of two pending grievances that have not yet been fully investigated by the OLR.

We agree that both revocation and restitution are appropriate, and we agree that Attorney Vaitys shall pay the costs of this proceeding, which are $4,703.85 as of July 10, 2019.

Attorney’s license revoked

Concur:

Dissent:

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WI Supreme Court

Case Name: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Cole J. White

Case No.: 2019 WI 86

Focus: Attorney Disciplinary Proceedings

We review a supplemental referee’s report and recommendation concluding that Attorney Cole J. White committed 27 counts of professional misconduct in his handling of four client matters. The referee recommended that this court impose a 15-month suspension of Attorney White’s law license. We adopt the referee’s findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendation regarding discipline. We also agree with the referee’s recommendation that Attorney White be required to make restitution to two clients. Finally, we impose the full costs of this proceeding, which total $17,105.44 as of January 23, 2019, on Attorney White.

Attorney’s license suspended

Concur:

Dissent:

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WI Supreme Court

Case Name: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Gordon C. Ring

Case No.: 2019 WI 87

Focus: Attorney Disciplinary Proceedings

This is a reciprocal discipline matter. On June 25, 2019, the Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR) filed a two-count complaint against Attorney Gordon C. Ring. Count one alleged that by virtue of Attorney Ring’s recent two-year license suspension by the Illinois Supreme Court, Attorney Ring should be subject to reciprocal discipline in Wisconsin pursuant to SCR 22.22. Count two alleged by failing to notify the OLR of his disbarment in Illinois within 20 days of the effective date of the imposition of such discipline, Attorney Ring violated Supreme Court Rule (SCR) 22.22(1). After service of the complaint, the parties stipulated to the imposition of reciprocal discipline. We approve the stipulation, and we therefore order a two-year suspension of Attorney Ring’s Wisconsin law license.

Attorney’s license suspended

Concur:

Dissent:

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