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Abuse of Discretion – Sentence Modification

By: Derek Hawkins//July 15, 2019//

Abuse of Discretion – Sentence Modification

By: Derek Hawkins//July 15, 2019//

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WI Court of Appeals – District III

Case Name: State of Wisconsin v. Dustin M. Yanda

Case No.: 2018AP412-CR

Officials: Stark, P.J., Hruz and Seidl, JJ.

Focus: Abuse of Discretion – Sentence Modification

Dustin Yanda appeals a judgment of conviction for causing injury by intoxicated use of a motor vehicle and an order denying his motion for sentence modification. Yanda discovered after sentencing that he was statutorily ineligible to participate in the Challenge Incarceration Program (CIP) and the Earned Release Program (ERP), despite the circuit court having declared him eligible for those programs at sentencing. Yanda subsequently sought sentence modification, alleging that his statutory ineligibility constituted a “new factor” warranting sentence modification. On appeal, Yanda argues the circuit court applied an improper legal standard when it denied his motion, based upon the court’s statement that Yanda’s statutory ineligibility for the programs did not “frustrate the purpose of the sentence.”

We conclude the circuit court applied the proper legal standard when determining whether the new factor of Yanda’s statutory ineligibility for the CIP and the ERP justified modifying Yanda’s sentence. Specifically, we conclude the court’s remark—that Yanda’s statutory ineligibility did not “frustrate the purpose” of his sentence—did not violate State v. Harbor, 2011 WI 28, 333 Wis. 2d 53, 797 N.W.2d 828. Harbor made clear that there is no independent requirement that a defendant demonstrate that an alleged new factor frustrates the purpose of his or her sentence. Harbor did not, however, state that a circuit court cannot consider, during the exercise of its discretionary authority to determine whether a new factor justifies sentence modification, whether the new factor frustrates the purpose of the defendant’s sentence. Accordingly, we hold that the court here did not erroneously exercise its discretion when, in determining whether the new factor of Yanda’s statutory ineligibility justified sentence modification, it considered whether that factor frustrated the court’s sentencing goals. We reject Yanda’s argument to the contrary and affirm.

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Derek A Hawkins is trademark corporate counsel for Harley-Davidson. Hawkins oversees the prosecution and maintenance of the Harley-Davidson’s international trademark portfolio in emerging markets.

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