By: Derek Hawkins//May 20, 2019//
7th Circuit Court of Appeals
Case Name: Juan Carlos Garcia-Martinez v. William P. Barr
Case No.: 18-1797
Officials: WOOD, Chief Judge, and SYKES and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.
Focus: Immigration – Removal Order
The task of identifying a “crime involving moral turpitude” has vexed courts and agencies for decades, if not centuries. “Moral turpitude” tends to be defined very broadly. So, for example, one reads in Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014), that it is “conduct that is contrary to justice, honesty, or morality; esp., an act that demonstrates depravity.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary defines it as “1: an act or behavior that gravely violates the moral sentiment or accepted moral standards of the community; esp.: sexual immorality …; 2: the morally culpable quality held to be present in some criminal offenses as distinguished from others ….” The Board of Immigration Appeals offers this: “The term ‘moral turpitude’ generally refers to conduct that is ‘inherently base, vile, or depraved, and contrary to the accepted rules of morality and the duties owed between persons or to society in general.” Matter of Silva-Trevino, 26 I. & N. Dec. 826, 833 (BIA 2016) (Silva-Trevino III). Each of those definitions leaves a lot of work to be done when particular crimes or specific acts must be characterized. Nonetheless, there is a rough consensus that the phrase is more than an epithet. The Supreme Court has held that crimes involving fraud.
Garcia-Martinez contends, his crime of conviction is not categorically one of moral turpitude. The Board found that there was no realistic probability that the New Jersey law could be applied to conduct outside the scope of the generic crime. It therefore concluded that Garcia-Martinez’s earlier conviction was for a crime involving moral turpitude. On Garcia-Martinez’s petition for review, we conclude that the Board committed several legal errors that may have affected its decision. We thus grant the petition and remand for further proceedings.
Petition Granted and remanded