Weekly Case Digests – May 6, 2019 – May 10, 2019

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7^th Circuit Digests

7^th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: Craftwood II, Inc., et al. v. Generac Power Systems, Inc., et al.

Case No.: 18-2883

Officials: EASTERBROOK, KANNE, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.

Focus: Standing to Sue – Subject-matter Jurisdiction

Two corporations, Craftwood II and Craftwood III, operate hardware businesses in California. They contend in this suit under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. §227, that defendants sent them unsolicited fax advertisements. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), contending that plaintiffs lack standing to sue. The district judge granted that motion—not so much because he found the lack of an injury as because he thought that defendants had substantially (though not technically) met the requirements of a defense in §227(b)(1)(C). On appeal defendants contend expressly what is only implicit in the district court’s decision: that unless plaintiffs prove injury from a violation of law, the suit must be dismissed for lack of a case or controversy. That proposition contradicts the holding of Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946), among many other decisions showing that a plaintiff’s failure on the merits does not divest a federal court of jurisdiction.

The district court erred in dismissing the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, and it would not be appropriate to dismiss it under Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c) either. Perhaps, after discovery (which has yet to occur), the record will show the absence of a material factual dispute. But as things stand plaintiffs have a plausible grievance. The judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Vacated and remanded

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7^th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: Steven Robert Lisse v. Wendy Alison Nora

Case No.: 18-1866; 18-1889

Officials: WOOD, Chief Judge, and BRENNAN and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.

Focus: Damages

Attorney Wendy Alison Nora appeals a decision requiring her and her client to pay damages and costs related to this bankruptcy litigation, as well as an order suspending her from the practice of law in the Western District of Wisconsin. These appeals, unfortunately, are not Nora’s first encounter with attorney discipline. See, e.g., In re Disciplinary Action against Nora, 450 N.W.2d 328 (Minn. 1990); In re Disciplinary Proceedings against Nora, 495 N.W.2d 99 (Wis. 1993); In re Rinaldi, 778 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 2015); In re Nora, 778 F.3d 662 (7th Cir. 2015); In re Disciplinary Proceedings against Nora, 909 N.W.2d 155 (Wis. 2018). While we hope this will be her last such encounter, her serial dilatory, vexatious, and unprofessional litigation practices lead us to affirm the district court’s orders. In addition, Nora’s frivolous motion practice and legal arguments in these appeals lead us to lift the suspension of our previous monetary sanction against Nora.

Affirmed with sanctions

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7^th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: Ronnie L. Winsted, Jr. v. Nancy A. Berryhill

Case No.: 18-2228

Officials: MANION, BRENNAN, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.

Focus: ALJ Error – Disability Benefits

Ronnie Winsted applied for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income claiming disability based on numerous conditions, including degenerative disc disease, osteoarthritis, and anxiety. An administrative law judge denied benefits, finding that Winsted could work with certain limitations. After the district court upheld this denial, Winsted appealed, arguing the ALJ did not consider his difficulties with concentration, persistence, and pace. We agree—the ALJ did not adequately explain how the limitations he placed on Winsted’s residual functional capacity accounted for the claimant’s mental difficulties, so we remand to the agency.

Reversed and remanded

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7^th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: James Gaston v. Parthasarathi Ghosh, et al.

Case No.: 17-3618; 18-1281

Officials: EASTERBROOK, KANNE, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.

Focus: Vicarious Liability – Private Corporations

Iskander v. Forest Park, 690 F.2d 126 (7th Cir. 1982), holds that private corporations, when deemed to be state actors in suits under 42 U.S.C. §1983, must be treated the same as municipal corporations. This means that they are not subject to vicarious liability. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676–77 (2009); Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691–94 (1978). Iqbal, Monell, and other decisions hold that municipalities and public employees may be held liable for their own decisions and policies but are not liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior for the acts, decisions, and policies of other persons, including subordinate public officials. Iskander held that the same approach applies to private corporations and their agents, to the extent that they are treated as state actors for the purpose of §1983. James Gaston asks us to overrule Iskander and hold that in litigation under §1983 a private corporation may be liable vicariously to the same extent as a private corporation in the law of torts.

One final observation. Gaston and other plaintiffs have contended that Iskander leads Wexford and similar organizations to skimp on medical care in order to enrich themselves. Wexford responds that, because it does not pay for the cost of MRI exams, surgeries, and other hospital treatment outside the prisons, it has no financial reason to withhold appropriate medical treatment. That may be true, but so far Wexford has not supplied evidence that it is true. Perhaps Wexford has contracts with hospitals providing that they will not bill it, but it has not produced them. Perhaps Illinois pays for out-of-prison treatment under the Medicaid program, but again the record lacks proof. Dr. Chmell testified that Wexford did not pay him, but the record does not reveal whether Wexford paid the University of Illinois. Gaston has lost this case for want of evidence, but the need to back up one’s contentions with evidence applies as much to Wexford as it does to any prisoner.

Affirmed

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7^th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: United States of America v. Arriba W. Lewis

Case No.: 17-3592

Officials: FLAUM, RIPPLE, and MANION, Circuit Judges.

Focus: Unlawful-stop Claim

Officer Sweeney pulled Arriba Lewis over for following too closely. Sweeney processed a warning while Lewis, who seemed unusually nervous, sat in the squad car. After learning Lewis was on federal supervised release for a cocaine conviction, Sweeney requested a drug‐ sniffing dog roughly 5 minutes into the stop. About 10 minutes and 50 seconds after Lewis pulled over, Sweeney handed him a warning. About 10 seconds later, a drug‐sniffing dog and its handler approached Lewis’s car. The dog alerted. Sweeney searched Lewis’s car and found heroin. Lewis was charged with possession with intent to distribute heroin. The district court denied his motion to suppress. He appeals, arguing the officer lacked lawful grounds to initiate the traffic stop and arguing the officer prolonged the stop without independent reasonable suspicion for the dog to sniff. But we disagree on both fronts, and affirm.

Affirmed

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7^th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: Stephen R. West v. Louisville Gas and Electric, et al.

Case No.: 18-1906

Officials: ROVNER, HAMILTON, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.

Focus: Easement

In this diversity action, plaintiff Stephen West contends that the addition of a fiber optic communications wire to a utilities transmission tower on his property exceeds the scope of the utilities easement that authorized the tower. West sued both Charter Communications, Inc. (“Charter”), whose subsidiary installed the wire, and Louisville Gas and Electric Company (“Louisville”), which owns the tower and is a party to the easement. The district court dismissed the claims against Charter, concluding that the addition of Charter’s communications wire to the tower is compatible with the scope and purpose of the easement and consequently does not violate the terms of the easement agreement nor does it amount to an unconstitutional taking of West’s property. West v. Louisville Gas & Elec. Co., 2018 WL 321686 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 8, 2018). Wishing to appeal that ruling, West entered into an agreement with Louisville providing that he would voluntarily dismiss his claims against Louisville, while reserving the right to revive them in the event we reversed the district court’s dismissal of the claims against Charter. West then filed a notice of appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Because the conditional dismissal of West’s claims against Louisville renders the judgment non-final, we dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction.

Dismissed

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7^th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: Bettie Burmester v. Nancy A. Berryhill

Case No.: 18-2106

Officials: BAUER, KANNE, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.

Focus: ALJ Error – Disability Benefits

Bettie Burmester applied for disability insurance benefits claiming she was unable to work due to physical impairments affecting her joints, chronic pain, and poor mental health. The Social Security Administration (“SSA”) denied her application. Burmester appeals the decision of the ALJ that held she was not disabled and the district court opinion affirming the ALJ’s denial of benefits. For the following reasons, we agree with the district court and affirm.

Affirmed

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WI Court of Appeals Digests

WI Court of Appeals – District III

Case Name: Barbara J. Maloney, et al. v. Francis Maloney, et al.

Case No.: 2018AP67

Officials: Stark, P.J., Hruz and Seidl, JJ.

Focus: Summary Judgment – Distribution of Assets – Trusts & Estates

This appeal involves two claims made by Barbara Maloney, as personal representative of the Estate of Thomas R. Maloney (the Estate), against Francis and William Maloney. First, Barbara asserted a partition claim, asking the circuit court to order the sale of real property that the Estate, Francis, and William owned as tenants in common. Second, Barbara made a claim against Francis and William in their capacities as co-trustees of the Mary A. Maloney Family Trust (the Trust), asserting the Estate was entitled to Thomas Maloney’s share of the Trust’s assets. The circuit court granted Barbara summary judgment on both claims and subsequently denied Francis and William’s motion for reconsideration.

We conclude a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether the real property owned by the Estate, Francis, and William can be divided into parcels of approximately equal value. We therefore reverse that portion of the circuit court’s decision ordering the sale of the property, and we remand for further proceedings on Barbara’s partition claim. However, we conclude the court properly granted summary judgment to Barbara on her claim regarding the distribution of Thomas’s share of the Trust’s assets. We therefore affirm the court’s decision granting Barbara summary judgment on that claim.

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WI Court of Appeals – District I

Case Name: State of Wisconsin v. T.R.C.

Case No.: 2018AP820

Officials: BRENNAN, J.

Focus: Termination of Parental Rights

T.R.C. appeals from an October 17, 2017 order terminating her parental rights to her daughter, D.U.C. (D.), on grounds of continuing need of protection or services. See WIS. STAT. § 48.415(2). At birth, D. weighed just one pound and five ounces. She remained in the hospital for the first fifteen months of her life. She then lived with T.R.C. for ten months. She was removed from T.R.C.’s home at age two based on repeated referrals to child welfare officials and, between that point and the time of the disposition of this case, was continuously in out-of-home placement for forty-six months. She was almost six at the time of the TPR order. T.R.C. seeks reversal of the order on three grounds.

First, T.R.C. argues that her no contest plea at the grounds phase was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent because the trial court failed in its mandatory duties in the plea colloquy to explain the different standard of proof that would apply at the dispositional hearing and because she did not in fact understand the consequences of the no-contest plea. Second, T.R.C. argues that at the dispositional hearing, trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in four ways: (1) when the family case manager testified about D.’s episodes of diarrhea after visits with T.R.C., trial counsel failed to object that the family case manager was not a medical expert; (2) trial counsel failed to call as witnesses one of D.’s pediatric specialists and a doctor who had conducted a psychological evaluation that included positive statements about T.R.C.; (3) trial counsel failed to argue that WIS. STAT. § 48.415 was unconstitutional as applied to T.R.C. because her parental rights were terminated in spite of evidence that she was capable of caring for D. and because there were other alternatives to termination; and (4) trial counsel failed to argue that the State had not proved that T.R.C. had “caused [D.] to be sick.”

Third, T.R.C. asks that this court reverse the order in the interest of justice, claiming that subsequent criminal allegations in a separate matter against the guardian ad litem created a conflict of interest that “tainted” the proceedings and claiming that “there are no compelling reasons to terminate” T.R.C.’s parental rights. For the reasons below, we conclude that T.R.C. has not satisfied her burden to show that her plea was not entered knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. She has not shown that trial counsel performed deficiently. She has not shown that reversal in the interest of justice is warranted. We therefore affirm.

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WI Court of Appeals – District III

Case Name: State of Wisconsin v. Timothy Edward Curtis

Case No.: 2018AP920-CR

Officials: SEIDL, J.

Focus: OWI – Probable Cause

Timothy Curtis appeals a judgment of conviction, entered upon his no-contest plea, to second-offense operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated (OWI). Curtis asserts that he was arrested without probable cause, and, therefore, the circuit court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained after his arrest. We disagree and affirm.

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WI Court of Appeals – District II

Case Name: State of Wisconsin v. Freeman Earl Bell, Jr.

Case No.: 2018AP667

Officials: Reilly, P.J., Gundrum and Hagedorn, JJ.

Focus: Newly Discovered Evidence

Freeman Earl Bell, Jr., appeals, pro se, from an order of the circuit court denying his second WIS. STAT. § 974.06 (2017-18) postconviction motion. Bell sought a second Machner hearing based on supplemental evidence and new claims. We reject Bell’s arguments and affirm the order.

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WI Court of Appeals – District IV

Case Name: State of Wisconsin v. Michael J. Scott, et al.

Case No.: 2017AP1345

Officials:  Lundsten, P.J., Sherman, and Blanchard, JJ.

Focus: 4th Amendment Violation

The State of Wisconsin appeals the circuit court’s summary judgment order dismissing the State’s civil forfeiture complaint naming Michael Scott, Lori Scott, one car, one pickup, one all-terrain vehicle, two personal watercraft, cash, and marijuana. The State seeks a judgment awarding the non-drug property to the State. Police seized the property from in or around the Scotts’ residence during the execution of a search warrant as part of a criminal investigation. The State pursued criminal cases against the Scotts and, separately, this forfeiture action based on WIS. STAT. §§ 961.55 and 961.555 (2015-16). These statutes create a process for civil forfeiture of property that has allegedly been used in violation of, or derived from violations of, Chapter 961 of the Wisconsin Statutes, the Controlled Substances Act.

In the criminal cases, the circuit court excluded all of the evidence seized by the State based on a determination that the State violated the Fourth Amendment in obtaining the search warrant, based on a lack of probable cause in the warrant affidavit. In this forfeiture action, the Scotts moved for summary judgment based on the Fourth Amendment violation in the criminal cases. The court granted the summary judgment motion, based on a determination that all of the seized evidence must be excluded at trial under One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693 (1965) (Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule applies to state civil forfeiture proceedings that are of a “quasi-criminal nature”).

The State argues that we should “decline to extend” Plymouth Sedan to civil forfeiture actions, such as this one, that are brought under WIS. STAT. §§ 961.55 and 961.555. We disagree. As we explain below, the exclusionary rule applies to civil forfeiture actions of this type because, under Plymouth Sedan, they are “quasi-criminal” actions intended to penalize criminal conduct. The State makes an alternative argument in the event that the exclusionary rule applies. Specifically, the State argues that it is entitled to raise a new argument that would defeat suppression, namely, that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies. The Scotts fail to address this argument, which the State did not make in the criminal cases. In the absence of adversarial briefing, we do not resolve as a general matter whether the State may, in a civil forfeiture action, make arguments against the application of the exclusionary rule that were not made in a related, prior criminal action. Rather, we treat the lack of a response by the Scotts as a concession and, on that basis, remand to the circuit court for further proceedings in which the State may attempt to pursue an argument based on the good-faith exception.

Accordingly, we reverse the order granting summary judgment and remand for the court to consider whether the State may proceed with a good-faith exception argument.

Recommended for Publication

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WI Court of Appeals – District I

Case Name: State of Wisconsin v. Leevan Roundtree

Case No.: 2018AP594-CR

Officials: Lundsten, P.J., Kloppenburg and Fitzpatrick, JJ.

Focus: Constitutionality – Felony Possession of Firearm

Leevan Roundtree, by counsel, appeals a judgment convicting him of possession of a firearm by a felon. He also appeals an order denying his postconviction motion. On appeal, Roundtree argues that the felon-in-possession statute is unconstitutional as applied to him. We reject this argument, and affirm.

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WI Court of Appeals – District IV

Case Name: State of Wisconsin v. Christian B. Greenup

Case No.: 2018AP709-CR

Officials:  Lundsten, P.J., Blanchard, and Fitzpatrick, JJ.

Focus: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Christian Greenup appeals a circuit court judgment convicting him of child sexual assault. He also appeals the court’s order denying his postconviction motion. Greenup argues that (1) the circuit court erred in denying his request to call jurors as witnesses at the postconviction hearing, (2) the court erred in admitting a videotaped interview of the victim, (3) trial counsel was ineffective, and (4) he should receive a new trial in the interest of justice. We affirm.

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WI Court of Appeals – District I

Case Name: State of Wisconsin v. Bobby Joe Johnson, Jr.

Case No.: 2018AP803-CR

Officials: Lundsten, P.J., Blanchard and Fitzpatrick, JJ.

Focus: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Bobby Joe Johnson, Jr., appeals a judgment of conviction and an order denying postconviction relief entered by the Milwaukee County Circuit Court. Shots were fired into a residence, killing Whitney Rhodes. At trial, the State presented testimony from several witnesses, including Johnson’s brother, Atoary Harrington, all of whom testified that Harrington and Johnson were both armed and present at the scene of the shooting. Johnson was convicted of second-degree reckless homicide by use of a dangerous weapon as a party to the crime, and possession of a firearm by a felon.

Johnson filed a postconviction motion and requested a new trial for two reasons. First, Johnson alleged that he had newly discovered evidence in the form of a sworn statement by Harrington in which he recanted his trial testimony and claimed that he, rather than Johnson, fired the shots that killed Rhodes. Second, Johnson alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to investigate, and call to testify at trial, persons who claim that they saw Johnson at the scene but that he did not have a firearm, and that they heard Harrington make statements incriminating himself regarding the shooting. The circuit court denied the motion without an evidentiary hearing, and Johnson appeals.

We conclude that Johnson has failed to provide newly discovered evidence to corroborate Harrington’s recantation, and the circuit court properly denied the request for an evidentiary hearing on that claim. We also conclude that Johnson has failed to provide sufficient facts to entitle him to an evidentiary hearing on his ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim. We therefore affirm the judgment of conviction and order of the circuit court.

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WI Court of Appeals – District IV

Case Name: Stacie Jean Rios v. Ryan Justmann

Case No.: 2018AP1498

Officials: BLANCHARD, J.

Focus: Sufficiency of Evidence – Replevin

tacie Jean Rios appeals dismissal of her small claims action against Ryan Justmann.

Rios alleges in this small claims action that Justmann, her landlord, permitted upstairs tenants to harm her. Based on this allegation, she purports to state a claim for money, a tort or personal injury claim, and a replevin claim. Attached to the summons and complaint are various documents purporting to support allegations of urine “being dumped through the ceiling into [Rios’] kitchen” and marijuana “smoke coming into” her home, which was “life threatening” to her.

Rios fails to develop an argument on appeal that could undermine the findings and conclusions of the circuit court. Her brief-in-chief and her reply brief simply repeat factual allegations that she made at the hearing. Rios apparently intends for these allegations to somehow stand for an argument that the circuit court overlooked evidence establishing that Justmann violated her rights in a way that could entitle her to a remedy under the law. However, no recognizable argument that suggests error by the circuit court emerges from her list of allegations. I affirm.

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WI Court of Appeals – District IV

Case Name: Jackson County Department of Human Services v. R.H.H., Jr.,

Case No.: 2018AP2440; 2018AP2441; 2018AP2442; 2018AP2443

Officials: FITZPATRICK, J.

Focus: Termination of Parental Rights

R.H.H. appeals a grant of partial summary judgment in favor of the Jackson County Department of Human Services (the County) and orders of the Jackson County Circuit Court terminating his parental rights to N.H., A.R.H., M.H., and M.R.M.K. The circuit court found R.H.H. unfit under WIS. STAT. § 48.415(4) based on a continuing denial of visitation. R.H.H. argues that the court-ordered conditions necessary for R.H.H. to be granted visitation violated his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, and that the circuit court’s grant of partial summary judgment violated his due process rights. Additionally, R.H.H. argues that he did not receive the written notice required by § 48.415(4).

The constitutional issues need not be decided. Rather, I conclude that partial summary judgment should not have been granted in favor of the County because the order denying visitation did not contain the written notice required by WIS. STAT. § 48.415(4). Accordingly, the orders of the circuit court terminating R.H.H.’s parental rights to his children are reversed. Because the County can not meet its burden of proof that R.H.H. received the required written notice, on remand the circuit court shall enter partial summary judgment in favor of R.H.H. and dismiss the § 48.415(4) ground for termination of parental rights. The County may then proceed to trial on the remaining allegation in the petition to terminate parental rights or, alternatively, recommence proceedings under § 48.415(4) with the proper written notice.

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WI Supreme Court Digests

WI Supreme Court

Case Name: Daniel Marx, et al. v. Richard L. Morris and R.L. Co., LLC,

Case No.: 2019 WI 34

Focus: Breach of Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing – Improper Self Dealing

This appeal comes before us on certification from the court of appeals pursuant to Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.61 (2015-16). Two members of a limited liability company (LLC), Fracsand, LLC by Daniel Marx (Marx) and Management Funds, LLC by Michael Murray (Murray), brought an action against another member, Richard Morris (Morris) and his LLC, R.L. Co., LLC, after North Star Sand, LLC (North Star) sold valuable assets to a company owned by Morris. At the time of the sale, Morris was a manager of North Star.

Marx and Murray alleged that Morris willfully failed to deal fairly with them while having a material conflict of interest in the transaction, in violation of Wis. Stat. § 183.0402(1). They also alleged a number of common-law claims involving improper self-dealing. Marx and Murray brought all their claims in their individual LLC and personal capacities rather than in the name of North Star.

We accepted certification of the appeal and now conclude the following: first, the members of an LLC have standing to assert individual claims against other members and managers of the LLC based on harm to the members or harm to the LLC. Corporate principles of derivative standing do not apply to the distinct business form of an LLC.

Second, Marx and Murray’s common law claims survive because they have not been displaced at this point in the litigation by particular provisions of North Star’s Operating Agreement or by Wis. Stat. ch. 183. Third, there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether Morris violated Wis. Stat. § 183.0402(1) by dealing unfairly with Marx and Murray, and potentially with regard to the common law claims. For these reasons, we affirm the decision of the circuit court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Affirmed in part. Remanded in part.

Concur:

Dissent: KELLY, J. concurs and dissents, joined by ABRAHAMSON, J. and R.G. BRADLEY, J. (opinion filed).

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Supreme Court Digests

United States Supreme Court

Case Name: Michael J. Biestek v. Nancy A. Berryhill

Case No.: 17-1184

Focus: Expert Testimony

The Social Security Administration (SSA) provides benefits to individuals who cannot obtain work because of a physical or mental disability. To determine whether an applicant is entitled to benefits, the agency may hold an informal hearing examining (among other things) the kind and number of jobs available for someone with the applicant’s disability and other characteristics. The agency’s factual findings on that score are “conclusive” in judicial review of the benefits decision so long as they are supported by “substantial evidence.” 42 U. S. C. §405(g).

This case arises from the SSA’s reliance on an expert’s testimony about the availability of certain jobs in the economy. The expert largely based her opinion on private market-survey data. The question presented is whether her refusal to provide that data upon the applicant’s request categorically precludes her testimony from counting as “substantial evidence.” We hold it does not.

Affirmed

Dissenting: SOTOMAYOR, J., filed a dissenting opinion. GORSUCH, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which GINSBURG, J., joined.

Concurring:

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United States Supreme Court

Case Name: Russell Bucklew v. Anne L. Precythe, et al.

Case No.: 17-8151

Focus: Statutory Interpretation – Capital Punishment – Consitutionality

Russell Bucklew concedes that the State of Missouri lawfully convicted him of murder and a variety of other crimes. He acknowledges that the U. S. Constitution permits a sentence of execution for his crimes. He accepts, too, that the State’s lethal injection protocol is constitutional in most applications. But because of his unusual medical condition, he contends the protocol is unconstitutional as applied to him. Mr. Bucklew raised this claim for the first time less than two weeks before his scheduled execution. He received a stay of execution and five years to pursue the argument, but in the end neither the district court nor the Eighth Circuit found it supported by the law or evidence. Now, Mr. Bucklew asks us to overturn those judgments. We can discern no lawful basis for doing so.

Affirmed

Dissenting: BREYER, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which GINSBURG, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., joined as to all but Part III. SOTOMAYOR, J., filed a dissenting opinion.

Concurring: THOMAS, J., and KAVANAUGH, J., filed concurring opinions.

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