By: Derek Hawkins//October 22, 2018//
WI Court of Appeals – District IV
Case Name: The Gage Corporation, Int., et al. Tamareed Company
Case No.: 2017AP881
Officials: Sherman, Blanchard, and Fitzpatrick, JJ.
Focus: Breach of Contract and Enrichment Claim
This is a contract dispute involving, on one side, a sales representative, Tamareed Company, and on the other, two manufacturers, The Gage Corporation, Int., and Mid-City Steel, Inc. Tamareed contends that Gage/Mid-City owes Tamareed approximately $1.2 million as a commission payment. This contention is based on Tamareed’s position that it fulfilled its contractual obligation to assist Gage/Mid-City in securing a contract to sell an architectural feature for a building project in Saudi Arabia. After the Saudi building project deal collapsed, Gage/Mid-City refused to pay Tamareed the $1.2 million commission it sought. This litigation followed.
Addressing summary judgment motions, the circuit court determined that Tamareed and Gage/Mid-City formed a contract through a series of letters and email messages. The court also determined, however, that this contract was ambiguous on the issue of what circumstances would trigger Tamareed’s entitlement to a commission, creating a jury issue. At trial, a jury found in Gage/Mid-City’s favor that Tamareed was not entitled to a commission. Based on those verdicts, the jury did not reach questions about the amount of commission owed or the potential for exemplary damages.
On appeal, Tamareed argues that the circuit court: (1) erred in concluding that the contract between Tamareed and Gage/Mid-City was ambiguous on the issue of what would entitle Tamareed to a commission because, according to Tamareed, case law resolves the ambiguity; (2) erred in dismissing Tamareed’s claim for unjust enrichment on the court’s stated ground that, if a contract covers the subject of an unjust enrichment claim, an allegedly aggrieved party cannot pursue both an unjust enrichment claim and a breach of contract claim; and (3) erroneously exercised its discretion in allowing certain expert testimony at trial and instructing the jury that it could consider the expert testimony. We reject each of Tamareed’s arguments and, accordingly, affirm.