Weekly Case Digests — July 23-July 27, 2018

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7^th Circuit Digests

7^th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: Anthony Robinson, et al. v. Alfred Perales, et al.

Case No.: 16-2291; 16-3390

Officials: KANNE, ROVNER, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges

Focus: Employment Discrimination

Anthony Robinson and Timothy Spangler, police officers employed by the University of Illinois at Chicago Police Department(“Department”), brought claims against the University of Illinois Board of Trustees and four individuals for race‐based discrimination, harassment and retaliation. The district court disposed of all but one of the claims through summary judgment. Robinson then prevailed at trial on a claim for retaliation against his supervisor, Alfred Perales, recovering nominal damages. The district court denied Robinson’s motion for a new trial and to alter the judgment. The court also declined to award attorneys’ fees to Robinson and denied Perales’s motion for judgment as a matter of law. Robinson, Spangler and Perales all appeal. We affirm in part and vacate and remand in part.

Affirmed in part. Vacated and Remanded in part.

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7^th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: Destiny Hoffman, et al. v. Susan Knoebel, et al.

Case No.: 17-2750

Officials: WOOD, Chief Judge, and HAMILTON and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.

Focus: Due Process Violation

Like many jurisdictions, Indiana has turned to “drug courts” to tackle substance-abuse problems more flexibly than traditional sentencing regimes might allow. Ind. Code § 33-23-16-5. These non-traditional court programs have been shown to reduce recidivism rates, at least in some jurisdictions. Compare Michael W. Finigan, et al., IMPACT OF A MATURE DRUG COURT OVER 10 YEARS OF OPERATION: RECIDIVISM AND COSTS 23–29 (Nat’l Inst. Just. 2007), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/219225.pdf  (analyzing the successes of the drug court in Portland, Oregon, in reducing recidivism), with Randall T. Brown, Systematic Review of the Impact of Adult Drug Treatment Courts, 155 J. LABORATORY & CLINICAL MED. 263, 263 (2010) (finding that “randomized trials failed to demonstrate a consistent effect on rearrest rates for drug-involved offenders” participating in drug treatment courts). Unfortunately, the Drug Treatment Court (“DTC”) in Clark County, Indiana, was not one of the success stories. Under the stewardship of Judge Jerome Jacobi, the court ran roughshod over the rights of its participants, who frequently languished in jail for weeks and even months without justification. The jail stays imposed as “sanctions” for noncompliance with program conditions were arbitrary and issued without due process. DTC staff made arrests despite a clear lack of authority to do so under state law. After these abuses were brought to light, numerous participants in the program filed a putative class action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the Indiana Supreme Court and Indiana Judicial Center shut down the program.

Indiana’s actions may have ended the DTC, but they did not end the litigation in the district court. That court denied class certification, dismissed some claims, and resolved most of the rest of the claims on summary judgment. A final plaintiff’s claim was settled before trial. In the end, the plaintiffs failed to win relief. On appeal, we are left with due process claims by seventeen plaintiffs against three defendants, and Fourth Amendment claims by three plaintiffs against two defendants. The district court resolved all of these claims in the defendants’ favor at summary judgment. While we have no doubt that the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights were violated, the question is whether these defendants were personally responsible for the systemic breakdown. Plaintiffs have failed to make that showing, and so the district court’s judgment dismissing the action must be affirmed.

Affirmed

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7^th Circuit Court of Appeals  

Case Name: Wisconsin Central Limited v. TiEnergy, LLC

Case No.: 17-2343

Officials: EASTERBROOK and BARRETT, Circuit Judges, and STADTMUELLER, District Judge.

Focus: Demurrage

Demurrage is a charge that rail carriers are statutorily required to impose when rail cars are detained beyond the time the tariff allows for loading or unloading. It serves two functions: it secures the rail carrier compensation for the use of the car, and it serves the public’s interest in making the cars available to transport other property. The sooner a car is back in service, the sooner it is available to move the property of others.

This case involves demurrage that accrued when rail cars belonging to Wisconsin Central were detained at TiEnergy’s facility after delivering a load of railroad ties. Wisconsin Central sued TiEnergy to recover the charges, asserting that TiEnergy was liable for them as consignee of the goods. TiEnergy argued that it had not agreed to be the consignee; it maintained that Allied, the company that shipped the ties, should foot the bill. The district court held TiEnergy responsible, and we affirm its judgment.

Affirmed

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7^th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: Thomas Wayne Lovelace v. Todd McKenna, et al.

Case No.: 17-1393

Officials: EASTERBROOK, KANNE, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.

Focus: Evidentiary Errors

Thomas Lovelace alleges that correctional officers at Dixon Correctional Center severely beat him while he was transferred between housing units. Lovelace sued the officers in federal court, claiming they used excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment and bringing additional state-law claims. After a four-day trial in January 2017, a jury returned a verdict in favor of the officers on all of Lovelace’s claims. Now, Lovelace argues that the district court committed two evidentiary errors that affected the outcome of the trial. Because the district court properly exercised its discretion, we affirm.

Affirmed

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7^th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: Ricardo Sanchez, et al. v. Jefferson B. Sessions, III

Case No.: 17-1673

Officials: BAUER, FLAUM, and ROVNER, Circuit Judges.

Focus: Immigration Removal Order

Ricardo Sanchez seeks review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals denying his motion to reopen its prior decision denying him discretionary cancellation of removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(1). Because Sanchez’s petition presents questions of law, we have jurisdiction to review the Board’s order and, for the reasons that follow, we grant his petition and remand to the Board for further proceedings.

Granted and Remanded

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7^th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: Alvaro Cortina-Chavez v. Jefferson B. Sessions

Case No.: 17-2116

Officials: BAUER, ROVNER, and SYKES, Circuit Judges

Focus: Immigration – Petition For Review

Alvaro Cortina-Chavez petitions for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) to deny his motion to reconsider the dismissal of his administrative appeal. We dismiss his petition to the extent that he seeks review of the BIA’s refusal to grant sua sponte review of its prior decision, and we deny the remainder of the petition.

Denied

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WI Court of Appeals Digests

WI Court of Appeals – District I

Case Name: State of Wisconsin v. Yvette L. Harris

Case No.: 2016AP2489-CR

Officials: Stark, P.J., Hruz and Seidl, JJ

Focus: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Yvette Harris appeals a judgment of conviction, entered following a jury trial, for Medicaid fraud1 and theft by false representation of an amount under $2500. Harris also appeals two orders. Harris appeals an order denying her postconviction motion contending: (1) the two convictions were multiplicitous and thus in violation of the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy; (2) her trial counsel provided ineffective assistance; and (3) the evidence at trial was insufficient to support her convictions. In addition, she appeals an order denying her motion for reconsideration of the circuit court’s denial of her postconviction motion. On appeal, Harris again contends that: (1) Medicaid fraud and theft by false representation are multiplicitous charges; (2) she was denied effective assistance of counsel on various grounds; (3) insufficient evidence was presented at trial to support her convictions; and (4) she should receive a new trial in the interest of justice. We reject all of Harris’s arguments and affirm.

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WI Court of Appeals – District III

Case Name: RREF II BHB-WI SKI, LLC v. S&K, Inc.,

Case No.: 2017AP410

Officials: Stark, P.J., Hruz and Seidl, JJ.

Focus: Breach of Contract – Damages

S & K, Inc., f/k/a Singh Restaurant Operations, Inc. (“S & K”), and its principal, Surinder Manak, appeal a joint and several money judgment against them and in favor of U.S. Venture, Inc. f/k/a U.S. Oil Co., Inc. (“U.S. Venture”), in the amount of $92,866.55. The circuit court granted summary judgment on U.S. Venture’s claims against S & K for breach of a retail supply agreement guaranteeing the annual purchase of a minimum amount of fuel, and against Manak for breach of a personal guaranty for all amounts due under that agreement. We reject S & K and Manak’s argument that U.S. Venture’s agreement was with a business entity distinct from S & K, as well as its argument that a genuine issue of material fact remained as to the amount of contractual damages to which U.S. Venture was entitled. We therefore affirm.

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WI Court of Appeals – District III

Case Name: State of Wisconsin v. Dale R. Delvoye

Case No.: 2017AP833-CR

Officials: HRUZ, J.

Focus: OWI – Mistrial

Dale Delvoye appeals a judgment, entered after a jury trial, convicting him of second-offense operating a motor vehicle with a prohibited alcohol concentration (PAC). Delvoye argues the circuit court should have ordered a mistrial when the deputy who arrested Delvoye briefly testified about his request that Delvoye submit to a preliminary breath test. We affirm.

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WI Court of Appeals – District II

Case Name: Frank Godec v. Hidden Lakes Community Ass’n, LTD., et al.

Case No.: 2017AP1106

Officials: Reilly, P.J., Gundrum and Hagedorn, JJ.

Focus: Tax Assessment – Validity

Frank Godec challenges a $75 annual assessment levied by the subdivision association of which he is a member. On dueling motions for summary judgment, the circuit court found the assessment valid. We affirm.

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WI Court of Appeals – District III

Case Name: State of Wisconsin v. Paul William Herdenberg

Case No.: 2017AP1128

Officials: Stark, P.J., Hruz and Seidl, JJ.

Focus: Plea Withdrawal

Paul Herdenberg, pro se, appeals orders denying a WIS. STAT. § 974.06 (2015-16) motion to withdraw his no contest plea and the denial of his motion for reconsideration. We affirm.

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WI Court of Appeals – District III

Case Name: Lakeland Communications Group LLC v. Polk County

Case No.: 2017AP1262

Officials: Stark, P.J., Hruz and Seidl, JJ.

Focus: Statutory Interpretation – Digger’s Hotline

Lakeland Communications Group LLC (Lakeland) appeals an order, entered following a bench trial, dismissing two consolidated small claims actions it brought against Polk County. The actions stemmed from two separate incidents where County maintenance crews damaged Lakeland’s roadside transmission facilities while they were mowing vegetation. Lakeland contends the circuit court erred in determining the County was not negligent per se under WIS. STAT. § 182.0175, the Digger’s Hotline statute, because the County failed to call the Hotline before conducting mowing operations. Lakeland also contends the court erred in concluding the County had no common law liability for negligence in this case. We reject Lakeland’s arguments and affirm.

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WI Court of Appeals – District I

Case Name: State of Wisconsin v. Paul E. Ayala

Case No.: 2017AP1510-CR

Officials: BRASH, J.

Focus: OWI – Abuse of Discretion – Expert Witness

Paul E. Ayala appeals from his judgment of conviction, entered upon a jury’s verdict, for operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated (OWI) as a third offense. Ayala argues that the trial court erred in excluding the testimony of Ayala’s expert witness relating to a medical diagnosis that Ayala intended to use in his defense. The trial court determined that because the expert was a pharmacologist, and not a medical doctor capable of making such a diagnosis, that his testimony in that regard was inadmissible. The State contends that this was a proper exercise of the trial court’s discretion. We agree and affirm.

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WI Court of Appeals – District I

Case Name: State of Wisconsin v. M.A.H.

Case No.: 2017AP1785; 2017AP1786

Officials: DUGAN, J.

Focus: Termination of Parental Rights

M.A.H. appeals from the orders terminating her parental rights to K.H. and M.H. and the orders denying her postdisposition motion. She contends that the no-contest plea agreement that she entered into was inherently coercive, and her plea was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. She also asserts that this court should order a new trial in the interest of justice.

For the reasons stated below, we conclude that M.A.H.’s claim of inherent coercion is not supported by the record, and that the trial court properly determined that M.A.H.’s no-contest plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Furthermore, M.A.H. has not established a basis for a new trial. Therefore, we affirm.

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WI Court of Appeals – District I

Case Name: State of Wisconsin v. K.C.H,

Case No.: 2017AP1787; 2017AP1788

Officials: DUGAN, J.

Focus: Termination of Parental Rights

K.C.H. appeals from the orders terminating his parental rights to K.H. and M.H. and the orders denying his postdisposition motion. He contends that the no-contest plea agreement that he entered into was inherently coercive, and his plea was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. He also asserts that this court should order a new trial in the interest of justice.

For the reasons stated below, we conclude that K.C.H.’s claim of inherent coercion is not supported by the record, and that the trial court properly determined that K.C.H.’s no-contest plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Furthermore, K.C.H. has not established a basis for a new trial. Therefore, we affirm.

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WI Court of Appeals – District I

Case Name: AA Auto Rental Inc., v. Flying AJ’s Towing Company LLC, et al.

Case No.: 2017AP1824

Officials: BRASH, J.

Focus: Vehicle Liens – Statutory Notice

Flying AJ’s Towing Company, LLC appeals from a judgment in favor of AA Auto Rental, Inc. in the amount of $1700.00, plus costs. This judgment stems from a small claims action that arose after Flying AJ’s towed a vehicle owned by AA Auto Rental. The primary issue was whether Flying AJ’s had provided the proper notice to AA Auto Rental that the vehicle had been towed, in accordance with WIS. STAT. § 779.415, the statute that regulates vehicle liens placed by towing services. The trial court found that Flying AJ’s had failed to properly provide that statutory notice. We agree and affirm.

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WI Court of Appeals – District III

Case Name: Lila Zastrow, et al. v. American Transmission Company LLC, et al.

Case No.: 2017AP1848

Officials: STARK, P.J.

Focus: Easement

This appeal involves efforts by American Transmission Company LLC and ATC Management Inc. (collectively ATC) to acquire an easement over property owned by Lila Zastrow and David Hendrickson (collectively, Zastrow) in order to construct two high-voltage transmission lines. The Public Service Commission (PSC) issued ATC a certificate of public convenience and necessity (Certificate) for the construction of the transmission lines. After receiving a jurisdictional offer from ATC, Zastrow filed the instant lawsuit under WIS. STAT. § 32.06(5) (2015-16), challenging ATC’s right to condemn her property. Zastrow contended ATC had failed to negotiate with her in good faith regarding the terms of a vegetation management plan within the proposed easement. She argued such good faith negotiation was required under § 32.06(2a).

The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of ATC, concluding WIS. STAT. § 32.06(2a) does not require a condemnor to negotiate in good faith regarding any subject other than compensation. We agree with the circuit court’s conclusion. We further conclude that nothing in the Certificate required ATC to negotiate with Zastrow regarding the terms of a vegetation management plan. We also reject Zastrow’s argument that ATC made false statements about its obligation to negotiate, in violation of WIS. STAT. § 32.29. Ultimately, we conclude that, while framed as a challenge to ATC’s duty of good faith negotiation, the instant lawsuit is actually an attempt to indirectly challenge the PSC’s failure to include specific vegetation management conditions in the Certificate. However, Zastrow did not seek judicial review of the PSC’s decision, and she has therefore forfeited her right to consideration of that issue. For all of these reasons, we affirm the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of ATC.

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WI Court of Appeals – District IV

Case Name: State of Wisconsin v. Patrick W. Mackie

Case No.: 2017AP1392-CR

Officials: Lundsten, P.J., Blanchard and Fitzpatrick, JJ.

Focus: Court Error – Jury Instructions

Patrick Mackie appeals a judgment of conviction for first-degree child sexual assault, following a jury trial. Mackie contends that he is entitled to a new trial because the circuit court erred by denying his request for a jury instruction on the defense of mistake. Alternatively, Mackie contends that he is entitled to resentencing because the sentencing court relied on inaccurate information related to Mackie’s alcohol use. We reject both contentions. We affirm.

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WI Court of Appeals – District IV

Case Name: Petitioner v. Robert D. Evans

Case No.: 2017AP2297

Officials: Lundsten, P.J., Sherman and Kloppenburg, JJ.

Focus: Email Volunteer System – Jurisdiction

In this appeal from a domestic abuse injunction order, Robert Evans argues that an unlawful “email volunteer system” was used to assign a substitute judge. As used here, an “email volunteer system” is a method of assigning a substitute judge to a case by sending an email to the other judges and assigning the first responding available judge to the case. We conclude that Evans fails to show that the use of an email volunteer system violates any statute. We also conclude that, to the extent that Evans is arguing that the use of an email volunteer system violates Wisconsin Supreme Court Rules setting forth administrative duties of the chief judge, we lack authority to review such non-judicial actions. Accordingly, we affirm.

Recommended for Publication

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WI Court of Appeals – District IV

Case Name: Monroe County Department of Human Services v. A.D.

Case No.: 2018AP825

Officials: BLANCHARD, J.

Focus: Termination of Parental Rights

A.D. raises two arguments challenging the circuit court’s order terminating her parental rights to D.D., both directed at the court’s grant of partial summary judgment on the ground of “[c]ontinuing denial of periods of physical placement or visitation,” establishing parental unfitness. See WIS. STAT. § 48.415(4). First, A.D. contends that genuine issues of material fact preclude partial summary judgment in the grounds phase. In substance, this argument is based on statutory interpretation. Second, she argues that § 48.415(4) violates substantive due process as applied to her. She may also intend to argue that § 48.415(4) is facially unconstitutional. See U.S. Const. Amend. 14; Wis. Const. Art. 1, § 1. I reject each argument and accordingly affirm.

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WI Supreme Court Digests

WI Supreme Court

Case Name: State of Wisconsin v. Gerald P. Mitchell

Case No.: 2018 WI 84

Focus: OWI – 4^th Amendment Violation

This appeal is before us on certification from the court of appeals. Gerald Mitchell was convicted of operating while intoxicated and with a prohibited alcohol concentration, based on the test of blood drawn without a warrant while he was unconscious, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 343.305(3)(b) (2013–14). Mitchell contends that the blood draw was a search conducted in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.

We conclude that Mitchell voluntarily consented to a blood draw by his conduct of driving on Wisconsin’s roads and drinking to a point evidencing probable cause of intoxication. Further, through drinking to the point of unconsciousness, Mitchell forfeited all opportunity, including the statutory opportunity under Wis. Stat. § 343.305(4), to withdraw his consent previously given; and therefore, § 343.305(3)(b) applied, which under the totality of circumstances herein presented reasonably permitted drawing Mitchell’s blood. Accordingly, we affirm Mitchell’s convictions.

Affirmed

Concur: KELLY, J., concurs, joined by R.G. BRADLEY, J. (opinion filed).

Dissent: A.W. BRADLEY, J., dissents, joined by ABRAHAMSON, J. (opinion filed).

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WI Supreme Court

Case Name: State of Wisconsin v. Patrick H. Dalton

Case No.: 2018 WI 85

Focus: Plea Withdrawal – Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

The petitioner, Patrick Dalton, seeks review of an unpublished court of appeals decision affirming his judgment of conviction and sentence and upholding the circuit court’s order denying his postconviction motion. Dalton asserts that he is entitled to withdraw his no contest pleas because his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move to suppress blood evidence collected without a warrant. In the alternative, he argues that he is entitled to resentencing because the circuit court relied on an improper sentencing factor.

Specifically, Dalton contends first that because police lacked the exigent circumstances necessary to draw his blood without a warrant, his counsel was ineffective for failing to move to suppress the evidence. He asserts next that the circuit court impermissibly lengthened his sentence for exercising his constitutional right to refuse a warrantless blood draw.

We conclude that exigent circumstances existed, permitting police to draw Dalton’s blood absent a warrant. Accordingly, his counsel was not ineffective for failing to file a meritless motion to suppress. We further conclude that the circuit court violated Birchfield v. North Dakota, 579 U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2185- 86 (2016), by explicitly subjecting Dalton to a more severe criminal penalty because he refused to provide a blood sample absent a warrant. Consequently, Dalton is entitled to resentencing.

Accordingly, although we agree with the court of appeals that Dalton’s counsel was not ineffective, we nevertheless reverse and remand to the circuit court for resentencing.

Reversed and Remanded

Concur:

Dissent: ROGGENSACK, C.J., dissents, joined by GABLEMAN, J. (opinion filed). ZIEGLER, J., dissents, joined by GABLEMAN, J. (opinion filed).

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WI Supreme Court

Case Name: Milwaukee Police Association, et al. v. City of Milwaukee

Case No.: 2018 WI 86

Focus: ERISA – Pensions  

When the Employee Retirement System (ERS) was created for the City of Milwaukee (the City) in 1937, the State granted each employee-member of the ERS the right to vote for the election of three employees to serve on the ERS Annuity and Pension Board (the Board) comprised of seven members. In 1947, the State granted all first class cities the opportunity to manage the ERS pursuant to the exercise of home rule powers. However, the State also protected individual rights of those persons who were members of an ERS because the State precluded amendment or alteration that modified “the annuities, benefits or other rights of any persons who are members of the system prior to the effective date of such amendment.” § 31(1), ch. 441, Laws of 1947.

In 1967, the City exercised its home rule over the ERS, consistent with the State’s protections of individual member rights. However, in 2013, the City amended its charter ordinance and reduced the voting rights of employees. Each employee-member was permitted to vote for only one employee to serve on the Board, rather than three, and employees could no longer vote for the employees of their choice. The City also gave the mayor three appointments, thereby increasing the size of the Board to eleven members.

Milwaukee Police Association (MPA) members and Milwaukee Professional Fire Fighters Association (MPFFA) members challenged the 2013 amendment, saying that it altered the “other rights” of employee-members of the ERS who were members prior to the amendment in violation of State law. Upon review, we conclude that the City’s 2013 amendment to its charter ordinance that reduced each individual employee-member’s right to vote for three employees of his or her choice to serve on the Board, while diluting employees’ voice on the Board, modified “other rights” and therefore, is contrary to State law. Accordingly, for the reasons stated more fully below, we reverse the decision of the court of appeals and restore the right of employee-members to vote for three employees of their choice to serve as employee-members of the Board. We also return the Board’s size to its size prior to 2013.

Reversed

Concur: R.G. BRADLEY, J., concurs, joined by GABLEMAN, J. (opinion filed).

Dissent: ABRAHAMSON, J., dissents, joined by A.W. BRADLEY J. (opinion filed). KELLY, J., dissents (opinion filed).

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WI Supreme Court

Case Name: State of Wisconsin v. Christopher John Kerr

Case No.: 2018 WI 87

Focus: Motion to Suppress Evidence

This is a review of the Bayfield County circuit court’s order granting Christopher John Kerr’s (“Kerr”) motion to suppress evidence discovered during a search incident to arrest on the basis that “‘judicial integrity’ is vital enough to justify exclusion of evidence when the issuing court’s arrest warrant was invalid ab initio.” We reverse.

Reversed and Remanded

Concur: ZIEGLER, J., concurs, joined by ROGGENSACK, C.J., GABLEMAN, J., and KELLY, J., (joins footnote 2) (opinion filed).

Dissent: A.W. BRADLEY, J., dissents, joined by ABRAHAMSON, J. (opinion filed).

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WI Supreme Court

Case Name: John McAdams v. Marquette University

Case No.: 2018 WI 88

Focus: Breach of Contract

Marquette University suspended a tenured faculty member because of a blog post criticizing an encounter between an instructor and a student. Dr. John McAdams took exception to his suspension, and brought a claim against the University for breach of contract. He asserts that the contract guarantees to him the right to be free of disciplinary repercussions for engaging in activity protected by either the doctrine of academic freedom or the United States Constitution. The University denies Dr. McAdams’ right to litigate his breach of contract claim in our courts. Instead, it says, we must defer to its procedure for suspending and dismissing tenured faculty members. It claims we may not question its decision so long as it did not abuse its discretion, infringe any constitutional rights, act in bad faith, or engage in fraud.

The University is mistaken. We may question, and we do not defer. The University’s internal dispute resolution process is not a substitute for Dr. McAdams’ right to sue in our courts. The University’s internal process may serve it well as an informal means of resolving disputes, but as a replacement for litigation in our courts, it is structurally flawed.

The undisputed facts show that the University breached its contract with Dr. McAdams when it suspended him for engaging in activity protected by the contract’s guarantee of academic freedom. Therefore, we reverse the circuit court and remand this cause with instructions to enter judgment in favor of Dr. McAdams, conduct further proceedings to determine damages (which shall include back pay), and order the University to immediately reinstate Dr. McAdams with unimpaired rank, tenure, compensation, and benefits, as required by § 307.09 of the University’s Statutes on Faculty Appointment, Promotion and Tenure (the “Faculty Statutes”).

Reversed and Remanded

Concur: R.G. BRADLEY, J., concurs (opinion filed). KELLY, J., concurs, joined by R.G. BRADLEY, J. (opinion filed).

Dissent: A.W. BRADLEY, J., dissents, joined by ABRAHAMSON, J. (opinion filed).

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