By: Derek Hawkins//June 25, 2018//
7th Circuit Court of Appeals
Case Name: De’Angelo A. Cross, et al. v. United States of America, et al.
Case No.: 17-2282; 17-2724
Officials: WOOD, Chief Judge, HAMILTON, Circuit Judge, and BUCKLO, District Judge.
Focus: Sentencing Guidelines
When compliance with the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines was still understood to be mandatory, district courts were required to impose an extended term of incarceration on so-called career criminals. This class of repeat felons was limited to those previously convicted twice for drug crimes or crimes of violence. The latter offenses included any felony “involv[ing] conduct that present[ed] a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2) (1992); U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2) (2000). We will call that definition of a crime of violence the “residual clause” in this opinion.
The Supreme Court jettisoned the mandatory nature of the guidelines in 2005, in its decision in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220. The Booker decision did not, however, immediately affect sentences imposed on defendants previously. Thus, De’Angelo Cross and Carl Davis continued to serve obligatory sentences as career offenders as required by the mandatory guidelines. Both Cross and Davis qualified for that designation because of the residual clause. Their present appeal challenged the constitutionality of that clause.
Two recent developments form the backdrop for our decision: first, the Supreme Court’s holding in Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), that the identical language in the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2012), is unconstitutionally vague; and second, the Court’s ruling in Beckles v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886 (2017), that Johnson does not extend to the post-Booker advisory guidelines, including the career-offender guideline. We conclude that Beckles applies only to advisory guidelines, not to mandatory sentencing rules. Under Johnson, the guidelines residual clause is unconstitutionally vague insofar as it determined mandatory sentencing ranges for pre-Booker defendants. Cross and Davis are both entitled to be resentenced.
We hold that both Cross and Davis are entitled to relief from their career-offender classifications, based on the Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson. We thus REVERSE the district court and REMAND these cases with instructions to grant Cross’s and Davis’s section 2255 motions and to resentence them in accordance with this opinion.
Reversed and Remanded