Weekly Case Digests — Mar. 26, – Mar. 30, 2018

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7^th Circuit Digests

7^th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: The Cornucopia Institute, et al. v. United States Department of Agriculture, et al.

Case No.: 17-2422

Officials: EASTERBROOK and SYKES, Circuit Judges, and BUCKLO, District Judge

Focus: Standing

The National Organic Standards Board, an advisory committee, has 15 members, all appointed by the Secretary of Agriculture. 7 U.S.C. §6518(b), (c). The Board’s principal task is advising the Secretary what belongs on the “National List of approved and prohibited substances that shall be included in the standards for organic production and handling” (7 U.S.C. §6517(a)). See 7 U.S.C. §6518(k)(2).

On appeal plaintiffs have abandoned this line of argument. Instead Marchese and Goodman contend that they suffered the personal loss of being denied a fair opportunity to compete for positions on the Board. Loss of a chance to obtain some benefit can indeed be an injury sufficient to provide standing. Northeastern Florida Chapter of the Associated General Contractors of America v. Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 664–66 (1993). It is therefore possible in principle for someone passed over for appointment to a position to complain that the decision maker used forbidden criteria. See Colorado Environmental Coalition v. Wenker, 353 F.3d 1221 (10th Cir. 2004). But the other elements of standing—causation and redressability—still must be satisfied. See, e.g., Bensman v. United States Forest Service, 408 F.3d 945 (7th Cir. 2005), which holds that ability to show a procedural irregularity (which we assume Marchese and Goodman have done) does not establish standing unless a concrete loss has been caused by that irregularity and could be rectified by a judicial decision.

Affirmed
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7^th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: City of Chicago v. Redflex Traffic Systems, Inc.

Case No.: 17-1524

Officials: SYKES and BARRETT, Circuit Judges, and GRIESBACH, District Judge

Focus: Jurisdiction and Attorney’s Fees

In this classic case of chutzpah, Aaron Rosenberg, a former employee of Redflex Traffic Systems, Inc. (RTSI), seeks a share of the proceeds his former employer paid the City of Chicago to settle the case against it arising out of the fraud Rosenberg helped perpetrate. In a thorough decision, the district judge concluded that Rosenberg was neither the original source of the information on which the action was based, nor was he a volunteer within the meaning of the Chicago false claims ordinance that authorized the action. The district court therefore granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss Rosenberg’s claim for lack of jurisdiction and denied Rosenberg’s request for attorney’s fees. Compounding his audacity even more, Rosenberg appeals. We now affirm.

Affirmed
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7^th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: United States of America v. Jaimie Pankow

Case No.: 17-1337

Officials: BAUER, RIPPLE, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.

Focus: Sentencing Guidelines

Jaimie Pankow pleaded guilty to conspiring to distribute methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1). The district court imposed a below-guidelines sentence of 84 months’ imprisonment and 5 years’ supervised release. On appeal, Ms. Pankow principally contends that meaningful review of her sentence is impossible because the district court did not specify how much it “departed” from the guidelines range as a result of the Government’s motion under U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1. We affirm because the court was not required to specify that detail: traditional departures need not be calculated separately before the court considers other factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

Affirmed
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7^th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: Indiana Electrical Workers Pension Benefit Fund, et al. v. ManWeb Services, Inc.

Case No.: 16-2840

Officials: MANION, KANNE, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges

Focus: Pension Plan – Successor in Interest

For a second time in this case, we consider whether defendant‐appellee ManWeb Services, Inc. is a successor in interest to a defunct employer that owes withdrawal charges to a multiemployer pension plan. The original employer was Tiernan & Hoover, but everyone refers to it as “Freije” after its key founder, William Freije, and his son Richard. ManWeb entered into an asset purchase agreement with Freije in 2009. Freije was a small contractor specializing in refrigeration and cold‐storage engineering for commercial and industrial projects. ManWeb was a larger company offering a wider range of contracting services, with the notable exception, before it acquired Freije’s assets, of refrigeration projects such as cold‐storage warehouses. Freije’s unionized electricians were covered by a multiemployer pension plan.

The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), as amended by the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980 (MPPAA), establishes withdrawal liability for employers leaving a multiemployer pension plan. 29 U.S.C. § 1381. In this case, Freije withdrew from the Indiana Electrical Workers Benefit Fund (“the Fund”). The Fund assessed withdrawal liability of $661,978 against Freije. When Freije failed to pay, the Fund brought this action against both Freije and ManWeb as a successor in interest to Freije. Successor liability can apply under the MPPAA when the purchaser had notice of the liability and there is continuity of business operations. Upholsterers’ Int’l Union Pension Fund v. Artistic Furniture of Pontiac, 920 F.2d 1323, 1329 (7th Cir. 1990). At this point, the only issue in the case is the claim against ManWeb based on successor liability

The district court granted summary judgment for Man‐ Web in 2013, finding it lacked notice of Freije’s withdrawal li‐ ability. In the first appeal, we remanded, finding that “Man‐ Web had sufficient pre‐acquisition notice of [Freije’s] contingent withdrawal liability to satisfy the federal successor liability notice requirement.” Tsareff v. ManWeb Services, Inc., 794 F.3d 841, 848 (7th Cir. 2015) (“ManWeb I”). On remand, the district court again granted summary judgment for ManWeb, concluding that the Fund had not shown sufficient continuity of business operations to support successor liability. The Fund has appealed again. We find ourselves in respectful disagreement with our colleague on the district court. In the totality of relevant circumstances, ManWeb’s purchase of and use of Freije’s intangible assets—its name, goodwill, trademarks, supplier and customer data, trade secrets, telephone numbers and websites—and its retention of Freije’s principals to promote ManWeb to existing and potential customers as carrying on the Freije business under ManWeb’s larger umbrella, weigh more heavily in favor of successor liability than the district court recognized. We vacate the district court’s decision and remand for further consideration of this equitable determination.

Vacated and Remanded
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7^th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: United States of America v. Lance Dillard, et al.

Case No.: 15-3343

Officials: POSNER*, RIPPLE, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.

Focus: Sufficiency of Testimony

With the assistance of a cooperating informant, law enforcement surveilled multiple heroin sales involving Lance Dillard and Gregory Chester. On the basis of the evidence obtained in that surveillance, Mr. Dillard and Chester were arrested and charged in a three‐count indictment: two counts of distribution of heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C), and one count of conspiracy to distribute heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(a)(1). Both men were convicted on all applicable counts. Mr. Dillard then moved for judgment of acquittal and for a new trial. The district court denied the motions and sentenced him to 10 years’ imprisonment on each of the first two counts and 70 months on the third count, all to run concurrently.

Mr. Dillard now appeals. He concedes that the district court generally expressed unwillingness to allow testimony that related to his alleged membership in the Hobos, a particularly notorious gang. Nevertheless, he argues, the court allowed numerous law enforcement officials to describe their positions in terms that strongly suggested that Mr. Dillard was a member of a gang and allowed one reference to the Hobos in cross‐examination of a lay witness. He also contends that, after a single juror was exposed to inflammatory press coverage, the court’s decision to dismiss only that single juror was not sufficient remedial action.

We conclude that the district court did not err in its evidentiary rulings and that the jury was not exposed to significant prejudicial testimony. Furthermore, the district court took adequate steps to protect against any further potential juror bias. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

Affirmed
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7^th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: Dustan Dobbs v. DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc., et al.

Case No.: 17-2195

Officials: FLAUM, KANNE, and ROVNER, Circuit Judges.

Focus: Fee Reward

George McLaughlin represented Dustan Dobbs in a products liability suit against DePuy Orthopaedics. After DePuy offered to settle the suit, but a few months before Dobbs accepted that offer, Dobbs terminated the representation contract and removed McLaughlin as counsel. Now, McLaughlin seeks attorneys’ fees in quantum meruit for the services he and his co-counsel, Anthony Argeros, rendered in Dobbs’s case. He brought this action on his own behalf, on behalf of his employer at the time he took Dobbs’s case, and on behalf of Anthony Argeros’s estate.

In a previous appeal, we vacated a fee award to McLaughlin because the district court did not adequately address all the requisite quantum meruit factors. On remand, the district court evaluated each factor and awarded McLaughlin $87,500. For the reasons that follow, we affirm that award.

Affirmed
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7^th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: United States of America v. Timothy Ryan

Case No.: 16-4048

Officials: BAUER, KANNE, and ROVNER, Circuit Judges.

Focus: Substitution of Counsel

Timothy Ryan was convicted of possessing, receiving, and distributing child pornography. On appeal, he contends that his motion for substitution of counsel should have been granted and that the government failed to prove he knowingly distributed the files. He also argues his computer was improperly forfeited. The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

Affirmed
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7^th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: Rosemary Madlock v. WEC Energy Group, Inc.

Case No.: 17-1278

Officials: MANION, KANNE, AND ROVNER, Circuit Judges.

Focus: Employment Discrimination

Rosemary Madlock has worked for Wisconsin Electric Power Company (“WEPCO”) for approximately forty years. In 2016, she brought this § 1981 suit against WEPCO after she was transferred from one section of WEPCO’s billing division to another, a move she claims was the result of racial discrimination. She also claims WEPCO retaliated against her by disciplining her after she filed an internal discrimination complaint against her former supervisor.

The district court granted summary judgment to WEPCO, and Madlock now appeals. Because there is no genuine dispute about any material fact and WEPCO is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, we affirm the judgment of the district court

Affirmed
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7^th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: Jesus Antonio Cruz-Martinez v. Jefferson B. Sessions III

Case No.: 14-3754

Officials: FLAUM, EASTERBROOK, and MANION, Circuit Judges.

Focus: Immigration – Asylum Claim

Jesus Antonio Cruz-Martinez petitions this Court to review the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (Board) affirming the decision of the Immigration Judge (IJ). Cruz-Martinez argues on appeal that the Board erred by failing to consider his asylum claim and the reinstatement of his prior order of removal, denying him withholding of removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), and violating his right to due process by refusing to remand his case to the IJ for consideration of new evidence. We conclude his challenges are meritless and deny the petition for review.

Denied
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7^th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: Shannon Hyland v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company

Case No.: 17-2712

Officials: BAUER, EASTERBROOK, and ROVNER, Circuit Judges.

Focus: Insurance Claim – Liability and Interest – Subjuct Matter Jurisdiction

Monteil Hyland was a passenger in a car owned by Kimberly Perkins and driven by Miquasha Smith—who, at age 16, was not lawfully behind the wheel when she smashed the car at 12:46 a.m. one Saturday into two parked vehicles, seriously injuring Hyland. Smith has been convicted of aggravated reckless driving. Neither Smith nor her parents had auto insurance. But Perkins had a policy of insurance with Liberty Mutual. It covered her family, including her daughter Michiah Risby, plus anyone else driving the car with the family’s permission. Smith told Liberty Mutual that Risby gave her the car’s keys during a party; Risby denied doing that and said that she had given the keys to “Rob,” who was never identified.

The police reported that Smith had told many incompatible stories about the events. Liberty Mutual believed its insured, Risby, and when Shannon Hyland (Monteil’s mother, acting as his next friend) sued Smith it told Shannon’s lawyer that it would not provide a defense or indemnity. (From now on, all references to “Hyland” are to Shannon Hyland, the plaintiff in both the state and federal suits.) Eventually Smith defaulted, and a state court entered a judgment for about $4.6 million. Smith assigned to Hyland whatever claim she had against Liberty Mutual. In this suit under the diversity jurisdiction, the district court concluded that Liberty Mutual’s failure either to defend Smith or to seek a declaratory judgment of non-coverage violated Illinois law, making it liable for the entire tort judgment, even though the policy provided only $25,000 per person in coverage. 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124374 (C.D. Ill. Aug. 7, 2017). Liberty Mutual now concedes that it should have defended Smith while reserving a right to decline indemnity, but it contends that its liability cannot exceed the policy’s cap.

Having appellate jurisdiction, we now must ask whether the district court had subject-matter jurisdiction, a question that the judge and the parties alike ignored. We are reluctant to get into this dispute about the meaning of Illinois insurance law, for we lack the remit to supply an authoritative answer. It is enough for current purposes to say that, even if proximate cause by itself suffices, Hyland has not shown how the insurer’s conduct could have caused Smith any loss exceeding $25,000—and recall that Hyland is Smith’s assignee, so only Smith’s injury matters.

If Smith had a plausible defense, either to liability or to the amount of Hyland’s claim, then the insurer’s failure to send a lawyer to help Smith make those arguments could be seen as a proximate cause of the state-court judgment. But some judgment against Smith was inevitable and the amount of the judgment must be taken as justified. Hyland has not argued otherwise. The maximum loss caused by the failure to defend thus is $25,000, and the award in this suit cannot exceed that sum.

Liberty Mutual is not satisfied with this conclusion. It also maintains that it does not owe interest on even the $25,000. That’s wrong. Illinois provides for post-judgment interest at 9% per annum. 735 ILCS 5/2-1303. The district judge found that Liberty Mutual should have paid the judgment against Smith in July 2014, and Liberty Mutual does not contest that decision to the extent that the principal obligation is capped at $25,000. Thus Smith’s substantive entitlement, as a matter of Illinois law, is $25,000 plus interest from July 2014. This is what Hyland now holds by assignment. That the insurer later offered to pay $25,000 is irrelevant; §5/2-1303 provides that interest stops only with tender of payment. (Liberty Mutual’s reliance on the policy’s language does not help it, because the policy limits interest only in suits that Liberty Mutual defended.) And Liberty Mutual does not contend that interest after the date of the federal judgment should run at the federal post-judgment rate rather than the state post-judgment rate; we do not decide whether a change from one rate to the other would be appropriate. The judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded for the entry of a judgment for $25,000 plus interest at 9% per annum from July 28, 2014, until the date of payment.

Vacated and Remanded
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7^th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: United States of America v. Chad E. Marmion

Case No.: 17-2151

Officials: WOOD, Chief Judge, and BAUER and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.

Focus: Sentencing

Chad Marmion asserts procedural challenges to the 35‐month prison sentence he received after he violated his supervised release. Because the district judge considered the relevant policy statements and explained her reasoning, we affirm the judgment.

Affirmed
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7^th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: John Cannici v. Village of Melrose Park, Illinois

Case No.: 17-1424

Officials: BAUER, MANION, and ROVNER, Circuit Judges.

Focus: Equal Protection Claim

Defendant-appellee, the Village of Melrose Park (“the Village”), terminated plaintiff-appellant, John Cannici, a former firefighter with the Village, for violating the “Residency Requirements for Officers and Employees” (“Residency Ordinance”) found in the Village’s Code of Ordinances. Cannici filed suit against the Village claiming a violation of both his due process and equal protection rights, as well as requesting review under the Illinois Administrative Review Act (“the Act”). The district court dismissed his due process and equal protection claims and refused to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law administrative review claim.

Cannici now appeals the district court’s dismissal of his due process and equal protection claims. Specifically, Cannici claims the district court improperly labeled the Board’s conduct as “random and unauthorized,” and thus, improperly analyzed his due process claim. He further claims the district court improperly applied Engquist in denying his equal protection claim. We affirm.

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WI Court of Appeals Digests

WI Court of Appeals – District I

Case Name: State of Wisconsin v. Raymond L. Nieves

Case No.: 2014AP1623-CR

Officials: Kessler, Brash and Dugan, JJ.

Focus: Postconviction Motion Denied

This case comes before us on remand from the supreme court. The supreme court reversed our decision vacating Raymond L. Nieves’s judgment of conviction and remanding for a new trial. See State v. Nieves, No. 2014AP1623-CR, unpublished slip op. (WI App Apr. 5, 2016) (Nieves I), rev’d, 2017 WI 69, 376 Wis. 2d 300, 897 N.W.2d 363 (Nieves II). On remand, we conclude that the postconviction court properly denied Nieves’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim without holding a hearing. Therefore, we affirm.

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WI Court of Appeals – District II

Case Name: State of Wisconsin v. Timothy P. Gregory

Case No.: 2016AP1265-CR

Officials: Neubauer, C.J., Reilly, P.J., and Hagedorn, J.

Focus: Sufficiency of Evidence

A jury convicted Timothy P. Gregory of three counts of first-degree sexual assault of a child following charges that he sexually assaulted two sisters. Gregory raises a litany of challenges to his convictions on (1) The circuit court erroneously admitted other-acts evidence of an earlier 1986 sexual assault; (2) The circuit court should have granted a motion for mistrial in response to improper remarks by one of the witnesses; (3) The circuit court violated his right to present a defense by excluding certain evidence of alleged affairs involving the victims’ mother; (4) The circuit court erred by excluding photographs of the victims’ family continuing to socialize with Gregory and his family after the assaults; (5) Gregory’s attorney rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to object and move for a mistrial in response to an allegedly improper propensity argument during the prosecutor’s closing argument; (6) The circuit court erred by instructing the jury to disregard a comment Gregory’s attorney made during closing arguments regarding a potential corroborating witness who was not called to testify; and (7) A new trial is warranted in the interests of justice. We see no error and affirm.

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WI Court of Appeals – District I

Case Name: Kay Gnat-Schaefer v. Jason Amrani, et al.

Case No.: 2017AP100

Officials: Reilly, P.J., Gundrum and Hagedorn, JJ.

Focus: Insurance Claim – Coverage

In this insurance-coverage dispute, Jason Amrani and his development company, Chase Properties and Investments LLC, appeal from an order granting a judgment in favor of intervening defendant Erie Insurance declaring that Erie is not required to defend or indemnify Amrani and/or Chase in an action filed by Kay Gnat-Schaefer. We agree with the circuit court that the Erie policies’ business-pursuit exclusions apply to exclude coverage and the occasional-business exception to that exclusion does not reinstate coverage. We affirm the judgment.

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WI Court of Appeals – District II

Case Name: Bark River Brigade, U.A., v. Wexford Heights, LP, et al.

Case No.: 2017AP710

Officials: Neubauer, C.J., Reilly, P.J., and Gundrum, J.

Focus: Statutory Interpretation

Bark River Brigade, U.A. (Bark River) consists of a group of property owners who object to the nearby development of land by Wexford Heights, LP, (Wexford) as a gas station/restaurant. Bark River appeals the dismissal of its certiorari action, filed on December 14, 2016, which challenged the Town of Lisbon’s September 2, 2015 grant of a conditional use permit to Wexford. Bark River concedes it was required to pursue a challenge to the Town’s grant of the permit within thirty days of September 2, 2015, and concedes its certiorari action filed on December 14, 2016, did not meet this requirement. It argues, however, that pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 893.13(2) (2015- 16), the thirty-day time limit was tolled by its October 2, 2015 filing of a motion to intervene in a separate certiorari action Wexford had pending against the Town of Lisbon (Wexford action) and through final denial of Bark River’s appeal. We affirm as the time limit was not tolled and thus Bark River’s December 2016 certiorari action was not timely filed.

Whether a certiorari action is properly commenced is a question of law. Koenig v. Pierce Cty. DHS, 2016 WI App 23, ¶17, 367 Wis. 2d 633, 877 N.W.2d 632. “Whether a statutory limitations period requires dismissal of an action where the underlying facts are not in dispute is also a question of law.” Town of Burnside v. City of Indep., 2016 WI App 94, ¶9, 372 Wis. 2d 802, 889 N.W.2d 186 (citation omitted). By its plain language, this provision tolls a statutory time limitation in circumstances where an “action” is commenced. The law is well-settled that a motion to intervene is a “special proceeding” and the filing of such a motion does not constitute the commencement of an “action.” See State v. Alger, 2015 WI 3, ¶¶27-29, 360 Wis. 2d 193, 858 N.W.2d 346. Thus, § 893.13(2) simply does not apply here to toll the thirty-day time limit for commencing a certiorari action following the Town’s September 2, 2015 grant of the conditional use permit to Wexford. See Colby v. Columbia Cty., 202 Wis. 2d 342, 362, 550 N.W.2d 124 (1996) (“[T]he operation of § 893.13 applies only to commenced actions.”). Because Bark River’s October 2, 2015 filing of its motion to intervene did not constitute the commencement of an action, that filing could not and did not toll the thirty-day limitation period. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.

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WI Court of Appeals – District IV

Case Name: State of Wisconsin v. James L. Lumpkin

Case No.: 2016AP2145-CR

Officials: Sherman, Blanchard and Kloppenburg, JJ.

Focus: Postconviction Motion Denied

James Lumpkin appeals a judgment of conviction and an order denying his postconviction motion. We reverse on one count due to ineffective assistance of counsel, but we affirm as to other counts.

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WI Court of Appeals – District IV

Case Name: David MacLeish, et al. v. Boardman & Clark LLP, et al.

Case No.: 2016AP2491

Officials: Sherman, Blanchard and Kloppenburg, JJ

Focus: Sufficiency of Evidence – Malpractice

David MacLeish, Hayden MacLeish, Kay MacLeish, and Robin MacLeish (collectively, the MacLeish children) appeal a summary judgment dismissing their legal malpractice action against Boardman & Clark, LLP, Quale Hartman, S.C., Continental Casualty Company, and OneBeacon Insurance Company (collectively, the Respondents). The MacLeish children alleged in their complaint that Attorney Forrest Hartmann, an attorney formerly associated with Boardman & Clark, was negligent in the manner in which he administered the estate of their father, Charles MacLeish, in 1984. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the Respondents on the ground that the summary judgment evidence does not show that the MacLeish children may proceed with this legal malpractice action against the Respondents. We affirm.

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WI Court of Appeals – District III

Case Name: City of Chetek v. Daniel John McKee

Case No.: 2017AP207

Officials: STARK, P.J

Focus: Refusal of Breath Test – OWI

Daniel McKee appeals a judgment revoking his privilege to operate a motor vehicle after he refused to submit to a breath test. McKee contends his refusal was justified under WIS. STAT. § 343.305(9)(a)5.c. because a physical disability or disease prevented him from submitting to the test. We reject McKee’s arguments and affirm.

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WI Court of Appeals – District III

Case Name: Kim Westrich, et al. v. Memorial Health Center, Inc.

Case No.: 2017AP568

Officials: Stark, P.J., Hruz and Seidl, JJ.

Focus: Court Error – Damages

This case is before us for the second time. Kim Westrich fell while sedated following a colonoscopy at Memorial Health Center, Inc. (“the Hospital”). In 2011, a jury found that the Hospital’s negligence exceeded Westrich’s negligence, and it awarded damages to Westrich and his wife, Elizabeth. The Hospital appealed, and we reversed the judgment and remanded for a new trial. Following a second trial in September 2016, a jury again found in favor of the Westriches and awarded them damages.

The Hospital now appeals for the second time, arguing: (1) the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion by preventing the Hospital from naming new expert witnesses on remand; (2) one of the jurors in the second trial was objectively biased; (3) the circuit court erroneously accepted the Westriches’ offer to waive that portion of their damages representing the jury’s allocation of fault to Westrich, in order to cure an inconsistency in the jury’s verdict; (4) the jury’s verdict violates the five-sixths rule; and (5) the Hospital is entitled to a new trial in the interest of justice due to the cumulative effect of these and other errors. We reject each of the Hospital’s arguments and affirm.

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WI Court of Appeals – District I

Case Name: State of Wisconsin v. David Willie McLemore

Case No.: 2017AP803

Officials: Blanchard, Kloppenburg, and Fitzpatrick, JJ.

Focus: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

David Willie McLemore appeals a circuit court order denying his Chapter 980 petition for discharge, as well as an order denying his motion for postdisposition relief. McLemore argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to object at two points during the discharge hearing. Because we conclude that McLemore’s attorney was not ineffective, we affirm the circuit court’s orders.

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