Statutory Interpretation – Armed Habitual Criminal

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7^th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: Spencer Riley v. Victor Calloway

Case No.: 17-1831

Officials: WOOD, Chief Judge, MANION, and KANNE, Circuit Judges.

Focus: Statutory Interpretation – Armed Habitual Criminal

Spencer Riley was acquitted of first-degree murder by an Illinois jury, but he later was convicted at a bench trial of being an “armed habitual criminal.” The state had charged these crimes together but, with defense counsel’s acquiescence, obtained a severance to proceed separately with the armed habitual criminal count. The state appellate court affirmed Riley’s conviction on that count, and the Supreme Court of Illinois declined further review. Riley then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 claiming that, in light of his acquittal of murder, the state was collaterally estopped from prosecuting him as an armed habitual criminal because of Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970). Riley had pursued, but lost, that same argument on direct appeal, and the district court denied relief on the ground that the appellate court did not unreasonably apply clearly established federal law in rejecting his Ashe claim. We agree with the district court’s assessment and affirm its judgment.

Affirmed

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