Subject-matter Jurisdiction

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7^th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: Anthony D. Kolton, et al. v. Michael W. Frerichs, Treasurer of Illinois

Case No.: 16-3658

Officials: EASTERBROOK, KANNE, and ROVNER, Circuit Judges.

Focus: Subject-matter Jurisdiction

An initial problem with the district court’s ruling is that Williamson County has nothing to do with subject-matter jurisdiction. True, this court has affirmed dismissals for want of subject-matter jurisdiction based on failure to abide by Williamson County. See Peters v. Clifton, 498 F.3d 727, 734 (7th Cir. 2007); Patel v. Chicago, 383 F.3d 569, 570, 573–75 (7th Cir. 2004); Sprint Spectrum LP v. Carmel, 361 F.3d 998, 1001, 1004– 05 (7th Cir. 2004); Greenfield Mills, Inc. v. Macklin, 361 F.3d 934, 945, 957–61 (7th Cir. 2004). These opinions do not discuss the question whether Williamson County is indeed jurisdictional. This court also (in what seems like dictum) once characterized Williamson County as about jurisdiction. See Behavioral Institute of Indiana, LLC v. Hobart Common Council, 406 F.3d 926, 930–31 (7th Cir. 2005). This may reflect a bygone practice of using the term “jurisdiction” loosely to refer to all obstacles to decision on the merits. Arnow v. NRC, 868 F.2d 223, 225 (7th Cir. 1989), overruled by Builders Bank v. FDIC, 846 F.3d 272, 274–75 (7th Cir. 2017), is one example.

The distinction between subject-matter jurisdiction and the merits matters because judges must enforce limits on jurisdiction even when litigants prefer a substantive decision. If Williamson County curtails jurisdiction, then the court must decide in every case under the Takings Clause whether the plaintiff has exhausted procedures for obtaining compensation under state law. The court would have to raise the issue on its own, combing a state’s statute books and case law for potential remedies, and decide without the litigants’ aid whether each of the potential remedies is adequate. Cf. Builders Bank, 846 F.3d at 274–75. That is a prospect to be avoided if possible. We see no reason to depart from the Supreme Court’s understanding of Williamson County as leaving open the possibility of waiver or forfeiture. See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of Environmental Protection, 560 U.S. 702, 729 (2010).

Vacated and Remanded

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Attorney Derek A. Hawkins is the managing partner at Hawkins Law Offices LLC, where he heads up the firm’s startup law practice. He specializes in business formation, corporate governance, intellectual property protection, private equity and venture capital funding and mergers & acquisitions. Check out the website at www.hawkins-lawoffices.com or contact them at 262-737-8825.