Please ensure Javascript is enabled for purposes of website accessibility

Weekly Case Digests — April 3-7, 2017

By: WISCONSIN LAW JOURNAL STAFF//April 7, 2017//

Weekly Case Digests — April 3-7, 2017

By: WISCONSIN LAW JOURNAL STAFF//April 7, 2017//

Listen to this article

7th Circuit Digests

7th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: Benyehudah Whitfield II v. Erika R. Howard, et al

Case No.: 15-2649

Officials: WOOD, Chief Judge, and BAUER and MANION, Circuit Judges.

Focus: Postponed Release

Benyehudah Whitfield spent nearly 17 years in the custody of the Illinois Department of Corrections. He contends that he would have been released earlier had it not been for the retaliatory revocation of good-time credits; he lost those credits in three prison disciplinary proceedings. Whitfield filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit after his release in 2011, alleging that his constitutional rights were violated by his improperly postponed release. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants, reasoning that Whitfield’s claims were barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641 (1997), and Burd v. Sessler, 702 F.3d 429 (7th Cir. 2012). We conclude, to the contrary, that those cases do not bar his action, and so we reverse and remand for further proceedings

Reversed and remanded

Full Text

7th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: Deng Arej v. Jeff Sessions

Case No.: 15-2061

Officials: POSNER, SYKES, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges

Focus: Removal Proceedings – Immigration – Petition to Review

The petitioner, Deng Arej, was born in South Sudan be‐ fore it was an independent nation, and was sent as a child to live in the northern part of Sudan because his parents were afraid that if he remained in the south he’d be drafted into the south’s army as a child soldier. When relocated to the north he concealed both his Christian faith and his southern ethnicity to avoid being killed by northern soldiers. Later, fearing that he would be drafted into the northern army, he fled to Egypt. He was admitted to the United States as a refugee in 2005. Though a native of South Sudan, now as we said an independent nation, he remains a citizen of the Re‐ public of the Sudan. Once in the United States, Arej committed a series of as‐ saults (one in a fight that resulted in a death, although he was not convicted of murder) and was sentenced to two years in prison. In April 2014, after he completed his prison sentence, an immigration judge ordered him removed (i.e., deported) to the Republic of the Sudan. He might have preferred to be removed to South Sudan, now that it’s an independent nation, as he is of South Sudanese origin and a Christian—but the record does not say which nation he prefers: probably, as we’ll see, neither. There have been previous removals of Sudanese immigrants, but it is unclear how many of them were removed to the northern republic and how many to the southern, and how many removed to one of the two countries moved or tried to move to the other. In January 2015, awaiting removal more than eight months after having been ordered removed, Arej sought U.S. asylum on the ground that South Sudan (to which he may have intended to move from the Republic of the Sudan were he removed to that republic) was “increasingly volatile and dangerous” and by May 2014 on the brink of civil war. And as he wasn’t even a citizen of the country, he might be unable to obtain protection from its government. He may have thought it obvious that he shouldn’t be removed to the north either, in view of his vulnerability to persecution there, being Christian; in any event he was opposing, on plausible grounds, removal to either country

Petition for review granted

Full Text

7th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: L.P. v. Marian Catholic High School, et al

Case No.: 16-2856

Officials: WOOD, Chief Judge, and POSNER and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges

Focus: Failure to State a Claim

Marian Catholic High School has a policy of subjecting its students to random drug tests. Although it is run by the Catholic Archdiocese of Chicago, it receives federal funds to cover the cost of this program. Students who test positive for illegal drugs are subject to a range of sanctions, from counseling to expulsion. The plaintiffs in this case are seven Marian students who received false positive results in the school-ordered tests. Six of them are African-American, and one is White. They have sued because they believe that the drug-testing program is being run in a way that discriminates against them on the basis of their race, in violation of both the Constitution and various federal statutes. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim, and later, after plaintiffs passed up the opportunity to file an amended complaint, dismissed the action with prejudice. Our own review of the complaint reveals nothing that would support a claim of racial discrimination or a violation of any of the statutes plaintiffs invoke. We therefore affirm.

Affirmed

Full Text

7th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: Shlomo Leibovitch et al v. Islamic Republic of Iran et al and Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ, et al

Case No.: 16-2504

Officials: POSNER, EASTERBROOK, and MANION, Circuit Judges

Focus: Judgment Against Foreign Nation

In 2003, a 7-year-old Israeli girl was killed, her 3-year-old sister (an American citizen) permanently disabled, and six Israeli members of the children’s family (two other siblings of the Israeli girl plus her parents and grandparents) were injured emotionally, when the minivan they all were riding in on a highway in Jerusalem was shot up by members of Palestine Islamic Jihad, a terrorist group supported by the government of Iran. The surviving family members, plus the estate of the child who was killed, filed a damages suit against the Islamic Republic of Iran and its Ministry of Information and Security (we’ll simplify by pretending that the only defendant is Iran) in the federal district court in Chicago, under both the Antiterrorism Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2333, and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1605A. After protracted proceedings that included an appeal to this court, see Leibovitch v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 697 F.3d 561 (7th Cir. 2012), the district court entered a default judgment of $67 million against the Iranian defendants.

Affirmed

Full Text

7th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: Eric Mains v. Citibank, N.A. et al

Case No.: 16-1985

Officials: WOOD, Chief Judge, and POSNER and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges

Focus: Foreclosure

Eric Mains has been battling the impending foreclosure of his home for quite some time. Most recently, he brought an action in federal court raising various state and federal law theories, related primarily to alleged fraudulent activity by the defendants. But the state courts re‐ solved these matters long before he turned to the federal court. Mindful of our limited jurisdiction and the need to respect the finality of state‐court judgments, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of this case.

Affirmed

Full Text

7th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: Manuel Pantoja v. Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC

Case No.: 15-1567

Officials: KANNE, ROVNER, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.

Focus: FDCPA Violations

Back in 1993, according to de‐ fendant Portfolio Recovery Associates, plaintiff Manuel Pan‐ toja incurred a debt for a Capital One credit card that he ap‐ plied for but never actually used. Twenty years later, long af‐ ter the statute of limitations had run, Portfolio Recovery had bought Capital One’s rights to this old debt and sent Pantoja a dunning letter trying to collect. The federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) prohibits collectors of con‐ sumer debts from, among other things, using “any false, de‐ ceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. This appeal concerns the practice of attempting to collect an old consumer debt that is clearly unenforceable under the applicable statute of limitations. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of plaintiff Pantoja on his claim under § 1692e. The court found the dunning letter was deceptive or misleading because (a) it did not tell the consumer that the defendant could not sue on this time‐barred debt and (b) it did not tell the consumer that if he made, or even just agreed to make, a partial payment on the debt, he could restart the clock on the long‐expired statute of limitations, in effect bringing a long‐dead debt back to life. Pantoja v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC, 78 F. Supp. 3d 743 (N.D. Ill. 2015). We affirm, essentially for the reasons explained concisely by Judge Gettleman

Affirmed

Full Text

7th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: 1st Source Bank v. Joaquim Salles Leite Neto

Case No.: 17-1058

Officials: e POSNER, KANNE, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.

Focus: Personal Guarantee – Contract

Defendant Joaquim Neto, an international businessman from Brazil, entered into a trust agreement with Wells Fargo Bank in 2009 to purchase an aircraft for use in his business. Wells Fargo borrowed $6 mil‐ lion from plaintiff 1st Source Bank (a major Indiana bank), pledging the aircraft as collateral, and Neto signed a personal guarantee backing the loan. Three years later the Brazilian tax authorities seized the plane as part of an investigation into Neto’s attempt to avoid paying Brazilian import tax. Neto continued to pay the amount due on the loan until December 2014, but after he stopped paying, 1st Source sued him in a federal district court in Indiana, basing jurisdiction on diversity of citizenship. 1st Source filed a second lawsuit in July 2016 in Brazil, where the plane resides

Motion for Injunction Denied

Full Text

7th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: Lee Ann Prather v. Sun Life and Health Insurance Company

Case No.: 16-1861

Officials: WOOD, Chief Judge, and POSNER and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges

Focus: Insurance Coverage – Attorney Fees

The plaintiff’s decedent, Jeremy Prather, was employed by a company that had obtained a Group Insurance Policy from Sun Life which provided accidental death and dismemberment coverage for the company’s employees, in the amount of $92,000 for Prather. The policy limited coverage to “bodily injuries … that result directly from an accident and independently of all other causes.” The clause we’ve italicized was the focus of an appeal from the district court, which had granted summary judgment for Sun Life, which had invoked the clause to deny the payment of death and dismemberment coverage to Prather’s survivor on the ground that Prather’s death had not been the exclusive result of an accident—it had also been the result of “complications from surgical treatment.” Prather’s widow brought suit “to recover benefits due to [her]” under the plan. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1).

Full Text

7th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: Ivan Johnson v. Karen Jaimet

Case No.: 15-2577

Officials: WOOD, Chief Judge, and ROVNER and SYKES, Circuit Judges.

Focus: Exclusion of Hearsay Evidence

Douglas Keefer’s badly beaten body was found by police in Keefer’s own backyard in Rock Falls, Illinois, the morning of November 27, 2006. A jury convicted Ivan Johnson of Keefer’s murder. While Johnson admits he beat Keefer the night before, in the same backyard, he insists that he did not kill him. Keefer’s actual murderers, Johnson says, were two men with baseball bats who attacked Keefer later that night, in the same spot. Johnson’s theory apparently came from Dustin Manon, a one‐time occupant of the Whiteside County Jail. Manon told police that his cellmate there, Donnie Masini, told him that Masini had hired two men to kill Keefer with bats and that they did so. Unsurprisingly, Masini denied making the statement when police questioned him. The trial court barred Johnson from introducing Masini’s hearsay statement, reasoning that it was too unreliable to allow into evidence. The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed. After exhausting other options, Johnson now seeks habeas corpus relief. He argues, as relevant here, that the state court’s exclusion of the hearsay evidence was an unreasonable application of Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973). The district court denied Johnson’s petition, but it granted him a certificate of appealability. We agree with our colleague that the state court’s decision did not run afoul of Chambers and thus that Johnson is not entitled to habeas corpus relief.

Affirmed

Full Text

7th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: Matthew C. Stechauner v. Judy P. Smith

Case No.: 16-1079

Officials: BAUER, FLAUM, and EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judges.

Focus: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Matthew Stechauner seeks habeas relief from his Wisconsin convictions for second-degree reckless homicide and armed robbery. He argues that the Wisconsin appeals court unreasonably denied post-conviction relief despite alleged Miranda violations and ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court declined to hold an evidentiary hearing and denied Stechauner’s petition for habeas relief. For the following reasons, we affirm.

Affirmed

Full Text

WI Court of Appeals Digests

WI Court of Appeals – District III

Case Name: Chad Webster et al v. Daniel Krizan, et al

Case No.: 2016AP25

Officials: Stark, P.J., Hruz and Seidl, JJ.

Focus: Court Error – Summary Judgment

Travis and Ronald Krizan appeal a summary judgment entered in favor of Chad and Brenda Webster. They argue the circuit court erred by granting the Websters’ motion for summary judgment while denying their cross-motion for summary judgment. We reject their arguments and affirm the judgment.

Full Text

WI Court of Appeals – District I

Case Name: Wisconsin Bell, Inc. v. Labor and Industry Review Commission, et al

Case No.: 2016AP355

Officials: Brennan, P.J., Kessler and Brash, JJ.

Focus: Sufficiency of Evidence

Wisconsin Bell, Inc., appeals an order of the circuit court remanding the decision of the Labor and Industry Review Commission (LIRC) based on the sufficiency of the evidence. Respondent Charles E. Carlson filed two disability discrimination claims against his former employer, Wisconsin Bell, alleging that Wisconsin Bell had suspended him without pay in 2010 and subsequently terminated his employment in 2011 because of his disability, bipolar disorder, in violation of the Wisconsin Fair Employment Act (WFEA). See generally WIS. STAT. § 111.31. LIRC found that Wisconsin Bell had not violated the WFEA with regard to Mr. Carlson’s suspension, but determined that there was a violation with regard to Mr. Carlson’s termination. Wisconsin Bell then filed a petition for judicial review of LIRC’s decision with the Milwaukee County Circuit Court. The circuit court found LIRC’s analysis of the issues and facts of the case to be “incomplete” and remanded it to LIRC to further analyze and weigh the evidence. Wisconsin Bell now appeals that decision, arguing that LIRC’s theory of causation, referred to as the “inference method,” is not a reasonable interpretation of the WFEA, and thus LIRC’s decision should be reversed. In the alternative, if the inference method is found by this court to be reasonable, Wisconsin Bell asserts that LIRC’s decision should be reversed as a matter of law because there is insufficient evidence to support the imposition of liability using that method.

We disagree with Wisconsin Bell. Upon review, we find the inference method of causation to be a reasonable interpretation of the WFEA by LIRC, and further, that the evidence in the record is sufficient to support LIRC’s findings and decision. We therefore reverse the circuit court, and affirm LIRC.

Recommended for publication

Full Text

WI Court of Appeals – District I

Case Name: State of Wisconsin v. Peter J. Long

Case No.: 2016AP729

Officials: Kessler

Focus: Sentencing

Peter L. Long, pro se, appeals from an order of the circuit court denying his motion to reopen his case and to commute his sentence. Because Long has completed his sentence, we conclude that Long’s appeal is moot. Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court.

Full Text

WI Court of Appeals – District III

Case Name: State of Wisconsinv. Desmond Anthony Mattis

Case No.: 2016AP982

Officials: Stark, P.J.

Focus: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Desmond Mattis, pro se, appeals an order denying his motion for postconviction relief without a hearing. We affirm.

Full Text

WI Court of Appeals – District III

Case Name: State of Wisconsin v. Michael T. Winius

Case No.: 2016AP1392

Officials: Stark, P.J., Hruz and Seidl, JJ.

Focus: Sentencing – Sentence Modification

Michael Winius, pro se, appeals from an order denying his “Motion for Reconsideration of Sentence Modification or in the Alternative Sentence Modification.” The motion sought reconsideration of a 2011 circuit court order denying sentence modification based on new factors. Citing WIS. STAT. §§ 806.07 and 805.15(3) (2015-16),  the present motion alleges newly discovered evidence revealed by newspaper accounts of a “secretive system” that denied inmates access to the prison programs deemed necessary by the parole commission. Winius argues: (1) the “secretive system” constitutes a new factor justifying a sentence reduction; (2) the “secretive system” violates his constitutional rights to due process and constitutes an ex post facto law; (3) Judge McGinnis exhibited judicial bias; and (4) this court should exercise its discretionary reversal powers under WIS. STAT. § 752.35. We reject these arguments and affirm the order.

Full Text

WI Court of Appeals – District II

Case Name: State of Wisconsin v. Daniel G. Scheidell

Case No.: 2015AP1598-CR

Officials: Reilly, P.J., Gundrum and Hagedorn, JJ.

Focus: Newly Discovered Evidence – Motion for New Trial

This appeal addresses the ramifications of the discovery of “newly discovered evidence” that had it been known at the time of trial would have resulted in a different legal analysis than that applied by the circuit court. On October 11, 1995, Daniel G. Scheidell was convicted following a

“he said, she said” jury trial of attempted first-degree sexual assault and armed burglary against J.D. Nineteen years later, Scheidell brought a motion for a new trial under WIS. STAT. § 974.06 (2015-16)1 with the assistance of the Wisconsin Innocence Project (WIP). The circuit court granted Scheidell’s motion for a new trial based on newly discovered third-party perpetrator DNA evidence in the firstdegree sexual assault of K.C., and the State appealed. We affirm the decision of the circuit court vacating Scheidell’s judgment of conviction.

Full Text

WI Court of Appeals – District III

Case Name: Marcelene C. Van Dyn Hoven v. Gerald G. Van Dyn Hoven

Case No.: 2016AP202

Officials: Neubauer, C.J., Gundrum and Hagedorn, JJ.

Focus: Divorce – Martial Settlement Agreement

Gerald Van Dyn Hoven appeals from an order that denied his WIS. STAT. § 806.07 (2015-16) motion to reopen the marital settlement agreement (MSA) between him and his ex-wife, Marcelene Van Dyn Hoven, and imposed sanctions against him. Marcelene cross-appeals the order, challenging the adequacy of the sanction. We affirm the order in its entirety.

Full Text

WI Court of Appeals – District II

Case Name: State of Wisconsin v. Avorey Celestian Burns

Case No.: 2016AP1052-CR

Officials: Neubauer, C.J., Reilly, P.J., and Gundrum, J.

Focus: Sentencing – Inaccurate Information

Avorey Celestian Burns pled no contest to possession of a firearm by a felon. Burns argues that he merits resentencing on grounds that the sentencing court relied on inaccurate information and erroneously exercised its discretion when it expressed concern, without foundation, that he might “shoot it out with someone.” We disagree with Burns and affirm the judgment of conviction and the order denying his motion for postconviction relief.

Full Text

WI Court of Appeals – District II

Case Name: Town of Mukwonago v. Ralinda L. Howard, et al

Case No.: 2016AP1651-FT

Officials: Neubauer, C.J.

Focus: Zoning Violation

The Town of Mukwonago appeals from a judgment and two orders which held ALH Irrevocable Trust and Ralinda L. Howard in contempt for violating a stipulation and a provision of the Town’s zoning code by having “kept” more than seven horses on ALH’s property on three occasions. The circuit court sanctioned ALH and Howard together, $500 for each of the three violations and made them jointly and severally liable. The Town complains that the circuit court should have found twenty-four separate violations and that the sanction should be imposed against ALH and Howard separately.

Full Text

WI Court of Appeals – District IV

Case Name: State of Wisconsin v. Maria Castillo-Dominguez

Case No.: 2015AP1960-CR

Officials: Kloppenburg, P.J., Lundsten and Sherman, JJ.

Focus: Motion to Suppress

Maria Castillo-Dominguez appeals a judgment of conviction for first-degree reckless homicide, see WIS. STAT. § 940.02(1) (2011- 12), and an order denying her motion for postconviction relief. CastilloDominguez contends that the circuit court erred in denying her motion to suppress

incriminating statements made by her to law enforcement officers during a noncustodial interrogation. She also contends that she is entitled to a new trial on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm.

Full Text

WI Court of Appeals – District II

Case Name: Kenosha County Department of Human Services v. C.D.K.

Case No.: 2015AP2179

Officials: Blanchard, J.

Focus: Termination of Parental Rights

C.D.K. appeals a circuit court order terminating her parental rights and an order denying post-disposition relief. Asserting that she was not advised of, and did not understand, her right to require Kenosha County to prove the allegations in the TPR petition by clear and convincing evidence and that 10 of 12 jurors would have to agree in order for a verdict to be accepted by the court, C.D.K. argues that the circuit court erred in concluding that her admission to grounds for the TPR was entered, to use her phrase, “intelligently and understandingly.” C.D.K. also argues that the circuit court erred in concluding that she received effective assistance of counsel when her counsel encouraged her to admit grounds and to focus on the disposition phase instead of contesting the grounds. For reasons set forth below, I reject both arguments and affirm.

Full Text

WI Court of Appeals – District IV

Case Name: State of Wisconsin v. Karl W. Nichols

Case No.: 2016AP88-CR

Officials: Kloppenburg, P.J., Lundsten and Sherman, JJ.

Focus: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

This appeal concerns defense counsel’s failure prior to trial to request that the State produce a written list that M.R.W., the child victim of an alleged sexual assault by Karl Nichols, had presented at the conclusion of a second forensic interview, and which M.R.W. said was “things

that … I changed from the [first forensic] interview” three months earlier.1 After a trial at which the video recordings of both interviews were played to a jury, and several witnesses including M.R.W. testified, the jury found Nichols guilty of first-degree sexual assault of a child. On Nichols’s post-conviction motion, the circuit court vacated the judgment of conviction and dismissed the case with prejudice. The court ruled that Nichols’s trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to request the list prior to trial, and that the State failed to preserve and produce the list in violation of Nichols’s right to due process. The State appeals. We conclude that the circuit court should have rejected Nichols’s ineffective assistance and related due process arguments. In addition, Nichols argues that we previously erred when we denied his motion to dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Nichols contends that we erred on the merits of that motion and that it was additional error to decide the motion in a one-judge order. We reject both arguments. Finally, we deny Nichols’s motion for sanctions for a frivolous appeal. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings

Full Text

WI Court of Appeals – District III

Case Name: Barron County Department of Health and Human Services v. C.K. and M.B.-T

Case No.: 2016AP1381; 2016AP1382; 2016AP1383

Officials: Seidl, J.

Focus: Termination of Parental Rights

M.B.-T. appeals termination of parental rights (TPR) orders for his three children, C.K., E.K., and K.K, and an order denying his postdispositional motion.  He argues the circuit court improperly granted a default judgment on the grounds for termination because: (1) he had inadequate notice and warning to appear; and (2) the court erroneously exercised its discretion when it entered the default judgment against him. He also contends the court applied the incorrect legal standard when considering whether to vacate the default judgment. Further, M.B.-T. argues his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to raise these arguments he advanced in his postdispositional motion. Finally, he requests a new trial in the interest of justice. We reject each of his arguments and affirm.

Full Text

WI Supreme Court Digests

WI Supreme Court

Case Name: State of Wisconsin v. Jeffrey P. Lepsch

Case No.: 2017 WI 27

Focus: Biased Jury – Violation of Due Process

This is a review of an unpublished decision of the court of appeals, State v. Lepsch, No. 2014AP2813-CR, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 19, 2015) (per curiam), which affirmed the La Crosse County circuit court’s judgment of conviction of defendant Jeffrey Lepsch (“Lepsch”) and order denying Lepsch’s motion for postconviction relief.

A jury found Lepsch guilty of killing two individuals during an armed robbery in La Crosse, Wisconsin. Lepsch was sentenced to consecutive life terms in prison. Before this court, Lepsch argues he is entitled to a new trial due to alleged errors pertaining to jury selection and the jury Lepsch received.

More specifically, Lepsch presents the following arguments: (1) Lepsch’s right to a trial by an impartial jury was violated because certain of the jurors in his case were subjectively and objectively biased; (2) Lepsch’s right to due process of law was violated because of circumstances that created the likelihood or appearance of bias and because of alleged deficiencies in the circuit court’s investigation into and mitigation of these circumstances; (3) Lepsch’s right to be present at a critical stage of his proceedings, right to a public trial, and right to a jury properly sworn to be impartial were violated because the La Crosse County Clerk of Courts administered the oath to the prospective jurors in Lepsch’s case

outside of Lepsch’s presence; and (4) Lepsch’s right to receive the proper number of peremptory strikes, to full use of those strikes, and to have biased jurors removed for cause was violated by the circuit court. Lepsch explains that “all of the issues litigated in this appeal have been raised via a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.” We conclude that each of Lepsch’s claims fails, and that he is not entitled to a new trial. Consequently, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals.

Affirmed

Concurring: Abrahamson, Bradley

Dissenting:

Full Text

US Supreme Court Digests

US Supreme Court

Case Name: Moore v. Texas

Case No.: 15-797

Focus: 8th Amendment

By rejecting the habeas court’s application of medical guidance and by following the Briseno standard, including the nonclinical Briseno factors, the CCA’s decision does not comport with the Eighth Amendment and this Court’s precedents

“The Eighth Amendment, which “ ‘reaffirms the duty of the government to respect the dignity of all persons,’ ” Hall, 572 U. S., at ___, prohibits the execution of any intellectually disabled individual, Atkins, 536 U. S., at 321. While Atkins and Hall left to the States “the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce” the restriction on executing the intellectually disabled, Hall, 572 U. S., at ___ (internal quotation marks omitted), States’ discretion is not “unfettered,” id., at ___, and must be “informed by the medical community’s diagnostic framework,” id., at ___–___. Relying on the most recent (and still current) versions of the leading diagnostic manuals, the Court concluded in Hall that Florida had “disregard[ed] established medical practice,” id., at ___, and had parted ways with practices and trends in other States, id., at ___–___. Hall indicated that being informed by the medical community does not demand adherence to everything stated in the latest medical guide. But neither does precedent license disregard of current medical standards. “

Vacated and Remanded

Concurring:

Dissenting: Roberts, Thomas, Alito,

Full Text

US Supreme Court

Case Name: Expressions Hair Design et al v. Schneiderman

Case No.: 15-1391

Focus: Constitutionality

This Court’s review is limited to whether §518 is unconstitutional as applied to the particular pricing scheme that, before this Court, petitioners have argued they seek to employ: a single-sticker regime, in which merchants post a cash price and an additional credit card surcharge

“Section 518 prohibits the pricing regime petitioners wish to employ. Section 518 does not define “surcharge.” Relying on the term’s ordinary meaning, the Court of Appeals concluded that a merchant imposes a surcharge when he posts a single sticker price and charges a credit card user more than that sticker price. This Court “generally accord[s] great deference to the interpretation and application of state law by the courts of appeals.” Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U. S. 469, 484, n. 13. Because the interpretation of the Court of Appeals is not “clearly wrong,” Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U. S. 491, 500, n. 9, this Court follows that interpretation.”

Vacated and Remanded

Concurring: Breyer, Sotomayor, Alito

Dissenting:

Full Text

Polls

Should Steven Avery be granted a new evidentiary hearing?

View Results

Loading ... Loading ...

Legal News

See All Legal News

WLJ People

Sea all WLJ People

Opinion Digests