Weekly Case Digests — Sep. 26 – Sept. 30, 2016

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7^th Circuit Digests

7^th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: Michael Hughes v. James Dimas, et al

Case No.: 16-1818

Officials: WOOD, Chief Judge, and POSNER and ROVNER, Circuit Judges.

Focus: 14^th Amendment

Judge prematurely dismissed appellant case on grounds that institution not required to comply with state statutes.

“The district judge dismissed Hughes’ complaint primarily on the grounds that the Constitution doesn’t require Rushville to comply with state statutes and that anyway a state statute is not enforceable in federal court. But this reasoning misconceives the basis of the suit. As indicated in the cases cited earlier, the Supreme Court understands the Fourteenth Amendment to require that civil detainees receive treatment for the disorders that led to their confinement and be released when they’ve improved enough no longer to be dangerous. Illinois has decided to permit only persons li‐ censed under the state’s Sex Offender Evaluation and Treatment Provider Act to make that evaluation. 225 ILCS 109/40; 725 ILCS 207/55(a)–(b). That decision can be under‐ stood as a response to doubts increasingly raised about the constitutional adequacy of the treatment provided to civilly detained sex offenders. See Lucy Massopust & Raina Borrelli, “‘A Perfect Storm’: Minnesota’s Sex Offender Program— More Than Twenty Years Without Successful Reintegration,” 41 William Mitchell Law Review 706 (2015); Douglas G. Smith, “The Constitutionality of Civil Commitment and the Requirement of Adequate Treatment,” 49 Boston College Law Review 1383 (2008); Karsjens v. Jesson, 109 F. Supp. 3d 1139, 1172 (D. Minn. 2015). But the bare record of the district court proceeding leaves unresolved whether Rushville is providing the plaintiff (and other persons detained at the facility) with treatment by licensed professionals who alone have the authority to determine the detainees’ right to be released. We note for example that Liberty Healthcare Corporation, which furnishes the clinical treatment personnel at Rushville, does not require that all of them be licensed. See Liber‐ ty Healthcare Corporation, “Counselor—sex offender treatment program,” www.glassdoor.com/job‐listing/counselor‐ sex‐offender‐treatment‐program‐liberty‐healthcare‐JV_IC11 28554_KO0,40_KE41,59.htm?jl=1942076790 (visited Sept. 16, 2016)

Reversed and remanded

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7^th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: Stacy Ernst, et al v. City of Chicago

Case No.: 14-3783; 15-2030

Officials: BAUER, MANION and KANNE , Circuit Judges.

Focus: Title VII

In district court, this Title VII case was split into two parts. The plaintiffs’ disparate-treatment claims went to a jury trial, in which the district court provided an erroneous jury instruction. Their disparate-impact claims were tried in a separate bench trial. This second group of claims turned largely on whether Chicago’s test was based on a statistically validated study of job-related skills. We remand for a new jury trial on the disparate-treatment claims, reverse the bench trial’s verdict on disparate impact because the physical-skills study was neither reliable nor validated under federal law, and affirm the evidentiary rulings below.

Affirmed

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7^th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: Kevin A. Williams v. Sharon Hansen, et. al.

Case No.: 15-2236

Officials: POSNER, EASTERBROOK, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.

Focus: Confiscation – 1^st amendment

Defendants provide no evidence that confiscation of death certificate ordered by appellant was not related to legitimate interest.

“Although “prisoners have protected First Amendment interests in both sending and receiving mail,” Rowe v. Shake, 196 F.3d 778, 782 (7th Cir. 1999), a prison can confiscate an inmate’s mail if confiscation “is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). But the prison must present “some evidence to show that the restriction is justified.” King v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 415 F.3d 634, 639 (7th Cir. 2005); see also Brown v. Phil‐ lips, 801 F.3d 849, 854 (7th Cir. 2015). The defendants’ brief argues that the “place in hell” note that accompanied the certificate threatened violence against Williams; yes, but violence in hell, not in the prison; no prison official suggested that the note portended violence in the prison. Again with‐ out any supporting statement by a prison official, the defendants argue that Williams could use the death certificate as a “trophy,” which would increase tension within the prison and decrease his chances for rehabilitation. A prison does have a legitimate safety concern about “boasting inmates” carrying around trophies of their victims. But Williams asserted in his deposition and affidavit that he had ordered the death certificate for use in state post‐conviction proceedings rather than to save as a trophy of his crime, and the defend‐ ants have presented no contrary evidence to support their assumption that Williams wanted a trophy. And the prison could have avoided this controversy in the first place by holding on to the death certificate except for the short time needed to include it (or indeed just a xerox copy of it) in Williams’s court filing.”

Affirmed in part

Reversed and remanded in part

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7^th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: Gregory Bowes et al v. Indiana Secretary of State, et al.

Case No.: 16-2350

Officials: FLAUM, ROVNER, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.

Focus: Special Election

Plaintiffs Gregory P. Bowes and Christopher K. Starkey lost in the May 2014 Democratic primary election for Marion County Superior Court judges. A few months later, and just before the general election, the district court for the Southern District of Indiana held that the statute establishing the system for the election of such judges, Indiana Code § 33–33–49–13, was unconstitutional. That decision was affirmed by this Court. Plaintiffs then sought a special election, which they argued was the only way to vindicate their constitutional rights. The district court held that a special election was not appropriate and granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment. For the reasons that follow, we agree and affirm.

Affirmed

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7^th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: United States of America v. Robert Kolbusz

Case No.: 15-2962

Officials: BAUER, POSNER, and EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judges.

Focus: Wire Fraud – Indictment Change

Kolbusz, a dermatologist, submitted thousands of claims to the Medicare system and private insurers for the treatment of actinic keratosis, a skin condition that sometimes leads to cancer. He received many millions of dollars in payments. The evidence at trial permitted a reasonable jury to conclude that many if not substantially all of these claims could not have reflected an honest medical judgment—and that the treatment Kolbusz claimed to have supplied may have failed to help any patient who actually had actinic keratosis. We need not recount the evidence. Kolbusz put on a vigorous defense, but the record permitted the jury to find that he committed the crimes as charged.

Affirmed

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7^th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: United States Soccer Federation, Inc. v. United States National Soccer Team Players Association

Case No.: 15-3402

Officials: MANION and KANNE, Circuit Judges and PEPPER, District Judge

Focus: Arbitration – Collective Bargaining Agreement

The present case kicked off in 2013, when the Players Association disapproved the US Soccer Federation’s proposed tequila poster advertisement, which contained player images. Counterattacking, the US Soccer Federation issued a notice, declaring that the CBA/UPA does not require Players Association approval for use of player likenesses for six or more players in print creative advertisements by sponsors, based on the express terms of the agreement. Crying foul, the Players Association filed a grievance and demanded arbitration, arguing that the CBA/UPA does require this, based on the past practice of the parties. The arbitrator issued an award in favor of the Players Association. The district court confirmed the arbitrator’s award and granted summary judgment for the Players Association. The US Soccer Federation appealed. We reverse.

Reversed and remanded

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7^th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: Landmark American Insurance Company v. Peter Hilger

Case No.: 15-2566

Officials: BAUER, FLAUM, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.

Focus: Premature Judgment

Peter Hilger faces two separate lawsuits alleging that he and several codefendants persuaded credit unions in Michigan and Tennessee to fund loans by overstating the value of the life-insurance policies that would serve as collateral. Hilger tendered his defense to Landmark American Insurance Company under a professional liability policy held by one of his codefendants, O’M and Associates LLC (“O’MA”). Although Hilger is not a named insured under O’MA’s policy, the policy defines “covered persons and entities” to include O’MA’s independent contractors; Hilger sought coverage as such. Landmark responded by filing this action for a declaratory judgment that it has no duty to defend Hilger. The insurance company argued that Hilger did not perform the professional services at issue in the Michigan and Tennessee suits as an O’MA independent contractor and is therefore not covered under O’MA’s policy. The district court, sitting in diversity and applying Illinois law, disagreed and entered judgment on the pleadings for Hilger. Landmark now appeals, arguing that it is entitled to take discovery and offer evidence regarding the true nature of Hilger’s relationship to O’MA. We agree with Landmark that judgment on the pleadings was inappropriate. Under Illinois law an insurer that seeks a declaration of its duty to defend may offer evidence outside the underlying complaint for purposes of establishing that no duty exists. While the insurer may not use a declaratory judgment action to litigate liability in the underlying lawsuit, that limitation is inapplicable to this case. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment and remand for further proceedings.

Reversed and remanded

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7^th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: James Melton v. Tippecanoe County

Case No.: 14-3599

Officials: MANION and KANNE, Circuit Judges, and PEPPER, District Judge. *

Focus: FLSA – Sufficiency of Evidence

After he disregarded an order from his supervisor that he could not change his schedule to make up for missed time, Plaintiff James Melton was discharged from his job at the Tippecanoe County Surveyor’s Office. Melton later filed suit against the County, alleging that during his time there, he had arrived early and worked through lunch every day and was not compensated for overtime in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act. The district court granted summary judgment to the County because Melton had not designated sufficient evidence to find that he worked more than forty hours in a workweek. We affirm

Affirmed

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7^th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: O.B. et al v. Felicia F. Norwood

Case No.: 16-2049

Officials: WOOD, Chief Judge, and POSNER and EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judges

Focus: Preliminary Injunction – Medicaid Act

Preliminary injunction compelling defendants to provide medical assistance was sound.

“The state’s reference to “many steps already taken” is un‐ substantiated in its briefs, and its reference to “erroneous assumptions” is a misunderstanding of the law, as we’ll show. But we want first to note that the state has not told us what “steps” it has taken to provide in‐home nursing care for children with the afflictions involved in this case. Has it made active efforts to recruit nurses for such children? There is no indication that it has, and certainly no evidence. It hasn’t told us how many nurses (if any) it has ever recruited to provide home nursing care for afflicted children, or even how many nurses there are in Illinois (163,000, according to The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, State Health Facts, “Total Number of Professionally Active Nurses,” April 2016, http://kff.org/other/state‐indicator/total‐registered‐nurses/? currentTimeframe=0&sortModel=%7B%22colId%22:%22Loca tion%22,%22sort%22:%22asc%22%7D). Nor are we told how many nurses in other states might be recruited at reasonable cost to provide care for the children of the plaintiffs and other class members, should it be difficult to recruit Illinois nurses.”

Affirmed

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7^th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: United States of America v. Talon G. Wright

Case No.: 15-3109

Officials: EASTERBROOK and SYKES, Circuit Judges, and ADELMAN, District Judge

Focus: Motion to Suppress

A day after police responded to a domestic dispute between Talon Wright and Leslie Hamilton, an investigator returned to the couple’s apartment to follow up on suspicions that Wright was in possession of child pornography. With Hamilton’s consent, the investigator searched the apartment and conducted a forensic preview of a desktop computer found in the living room. The preview revealed images of child pornography on the hard drive. Wright was indicted on child-pornography and child exploitation charges. He moved to suppress the evidence recovered from the warrantless search of his computer, arguing that Hamilton lacked authority to consent. The district judge denied the motion. Wright pleaded guilty but reserved his right to appeal the denial of suppression and now does so. We affirm. Although Wright owned the desktop computer, Hamilton was a joint user who enjoyed virtually unlimited access to and control over it. The computer was located in the living room of the couple’s apartment, and everyone in the family, including Hamilton and her children, used it freely. These facts, which were conveyed to the investigator prior to the search and later confirmed through further investigation, establish Hamilton’s common authority over the computer.

Affirmed

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7^th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: Sammy J. Moore v. Peter Liszewski, et al

Case No.: 14-3244

Officials: BAUER, POSNER, and FLAUM, Circuit Judges.

Focus: Excessive Force – Nominal Damages

Order awarding appellant attorney’s fees and costs as appropriate and nominal damages. Appellant not entitled to more based on trial outcome and decision of jury.

“The plaintiff in our case of course wants more than just nominal damages. He argues that he was injured by Liszewski–that in the altercation Liszewski had struck him on the head twice with Liszewki’s walkie‐talkie. But there was contrary evidence as well, evidence that the injury was attributable to the plaintiff’s having fallen and hit his head on a table, an accident not caused by Liszewski. The jury evidently agreed with that evidence, as it was entitled to do. There were a number of witnesses, both prison inmates and prison staff, to the altercation, and the cause of the injury could not be definitively determined. This allowed the jury to side with Liszewski to the extent of ruling that Moore had incurred no actual damages but entitling him to nominal damages and whatever increments, such as court costs and attorneys’ fees, to which an award of nominal damages entitles the plaintiff. The judge awarded those costs and fees directly to the lawyer whom the judge had recruited for Moore, and that was proper because Moore had incurred neither expense.”

Affirmed

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7^th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: Wayne Kubsch v. Ron Neal

Case No.: 14-1898

Officials: WOOD, Chief Judge, and POSNER, FLAUM, EASTERBROOK, KANNE, ROVNER, WILLIAMS, SYKES, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges

Focus: Writ of Habeas Corpus – Precedent

On September 18, 1998, someone murdered three people in Mishawaka, Indiana: Beth Kubsch, Rick Milewski, and his son Aaron Milewski. Beth’s husband, Wayne Kubsch, was accused and convicted of the triple murders and sentenced to death. After direct appeals and postconviction proceedings in Indiana’s state courts, Kubsch turned to the federal court for habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Although he raised a number of arguments in support of his petition, by now they have been distilled into one overarching question: did the state courts render a decision contrary to, or unreasonably applying, the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973)? The stakes could not be higher: because the state courts found Chambers inapplicable, the jury never heard evidence that, if believed, would have shown that Kubsch could not have committed the crimes. The district court and a panel of this court concluded that the state court decisions passed muster under the deferential standards imposed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). See Kubsch v. Neal (Kubsch IV), 800 F.3d 783 (7th Cir. 2015). That opinion was vacated when the full court decided to hear the case en banc. We now reverse and remand for issuance of the writ.

Reversed and remanded

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WI Court of Appeals Digests

WI Court of Appeals – District

Case Name: Debra K. Sands v. John R. Menard, et al

Case No.: 2012AP2377; 2015AP870

Officials: Stark, P.J., Hruz and Seidl, JJ.

Focus: Breach of Fiduciary Duty

This case involves, in part, the extent to which an attorney can assert a claim under Watts v. Watts, 137 Wis. 2d 506, 405 N.W.2d 303 (1987), arising out of legal services allegedly provided to a cohabiting partner and his businesses. Debra Sands appeals orders dismissing her claims against John Menard, Jr., Menard, Inc., and Menard Thoroughbreds, Inc., (“the Menard Defendants”) and against the trustees of the John R. Menard, Jr. 2002 Trust and related trusts (“the Trustees”). Sands claims she cohabitated with Menard from 1998 until 2006, and during that time she performed work for Menard and his companies that increased their value and for which she was not fully compensated. Sands further claims Menard repeatedly represented to her during their relationship that he would give her ownership interests in his companies as compensation for her services, but he has since failed to do so. For the reasons explained below, we conclude the circuit court properly granted summary judgment dismissing Sands’ claims against the Menard Defendants and the Trustees. We also conclude the court properly granted summary judgment to Sands on Menard, Inc.’s counterclaim for breach of fiduciary duty. We therefore affirm.

Recommended for publication

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WI Court of Appeals – District I

Case Name: Shalaan Fisher et al v. Compassionate Doctors, Inc., et al

Case No.: 2014AP953

Officials: Curley, P.J., Brennan and Brash, JJ.

Focus: Divorce – Intentional Infliction of Bodily Harm

Shalaan Fisher, pro se, appeals the circuit court’s order dismissing her civil action against Abdullattief A. Sulieman, her estranged husband, and Compassionate Doctors, Inc., a company wholly owned by Sulieman. The issue is whether the circuit court properly dismissed the claims. We conclude that it did. Therefore, we affirm

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WI Court of Appeals – District I

Case Name: State of Wisconsin v. Kenneth D. Grady

Case No.: 2015AP538

Officials: Curley, P.J., Brennan and Brash, JJ

Focus: Ineffective Asisstance of Counsel

Kenneth D. Grady, pro se, appeals an order denying his collateral postconviction motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Grady argues that his trial lawyer, Patrick Earle, provided him with constitutionally ineffective assistance by failing to review discovery materials with him before he entered his plea. Grady also argues that the combined effect of the errors caused him prejudice. Finally, Grady asks for a new trial in the interests of justice. We affirm.

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WI Court of Appeals – District III

Case Name: State of Wisconsin v. Kevin D. Flowers

Case No.: 2015AP813

Officials: Stark, P.J., Hruz and Seidl, JJ.

Focus: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Kevin Flowers, pro se, appeals an order denying his WIS. STAT. § 974.06 postconviction motion. Flowers argues his postconviction counsel was ineffective and the circuit court exhibited judicial bias when denying his postconviction motion. We reject Flowers’ arguments and affirm

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WI Court of Appeals – District I

Case Name: State of Wisconsin v. Jessie Lamar Weathersby

Case No.: 2015AP974-CR

Officials: Kessler, Brennan and Brash, JJ.

Focus: Motion to Suppress

The State of Wisconsin appeals from an order of the circuit court that granted Jessie Lamar Weathersby’s motion to suppress evidence. The circuit court concluded that a police officer had seized Weathersby when the officer activated the emergency lights on his unmarked squad car, but the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to detain Weathersby at that time, so any evidence seized during the stop should be suppressed. We conclude that a seizure did not occur when the officer activated his lights and, when it did occur, it was supported by reasonable suspicion. We therefore reverse the suppression order and remand this matter for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

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WI Court of Appeals – District III

Case Name: State of Wisconsin v. Brian Hayes

Case No.: 2015AP1386

Officials: Stark, P.J., Hruz and Seidl, JJ.

Focus: Tolling – Timely Filing

Marquelus Brown appeals an order dismissing his petition for a writ of certiorari as untimely. He contends the petition was timely filed under WIS. STAT. § 893.735 and other tolling provisions. Because we conclude the petition was not timely filed so as to give the circuit court competency to hear the petition, we affirm the dismissal order

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WI Court of Appeals – District III          

Case Name: State of Wisconsin v. Nikia Shantay Burchette

Case No.: 2015AP1648-CR

Officials: Stark, P.J., Hruz and Seidl, JJ

Focus: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Nikia Burchette appeals judgments convicting her of two offenses and an order denying postconviction relief. Burchette argues her trial attorney was ineffective in three ways. She also argues the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion by admitting other acts evidence. We reject Burchette’s arguments and affirm.

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WI Court of Appeals – District III

Case Name: Town of Grand Chute v. Shelley L. Kowalewski

Case No.: 2015AP1788

Officials: Hruz, J.

Focus: OWI – Motion to Suppress

Shelley Kowalewski appeals an order adjudging her guilty of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant (OWI) and operating a motor vehicle with a prohibited alcohol concentration (PAC), both as a first offense.  She also appeals an order denying her motion to suppress evidence. Kowalewski contends the police lacked both reasonable suspicion and probable cause to initiate a traffic stop of her vehicle, such that the stop represented an unconstitutional seizure. Because we conclude that, at the time of the stop, the police had probable cause to believe that Kowalewski had committed a traffic violation, we affirm the circuit court.

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WI Court of Appeals – District I

Case Name: State of Wisconsin v. Joel Maurice McNeal

Case No.: 2015AP2123-CR

Officials: Curley, P.J., Kessler and Brennan, JJ.

Focus: False Imprisonment – New Trial

Joel Maurice McNeal appeals a judgment of conviction entered after a jury found him guilty of one count of false imprisonment. He seeks a new trial on the ground that the circuit court erred by limiting his opening statement and by sustaining hearsay objections during his testimony. Alternatively, he claims he is entitled to discretionary reversal in the interest of justice. We reject his contentions and affirm.

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WI Court of Appeals – District III

Case Name: Elaine A. Ray v. Town of Kinnickinnic

Case No.: 2016AP186

Officials: Stark, P.J., Hruz and Seidl, JJ.

Focus: Declaratory Judgment – Ripeness

Elaine Ray appeals an order granting summary judgment to the Town of Kinnickinnic on Ray’s declaratory judgment claim. Ray asked the circuit court to declare certain portions of a Town ordinance invalid. The court granted summary judgment to the Town, concluding Ray’s claim was not justiciable because it was not ripe for adjudication. We agree with the court’s conclusion and therefore affirm.

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WI Court of Appeals – District II

Case Name: State of Wisconsin v. Walter L. Steinhardt

Case No.: 2015AP1032-CR

Officials: Neubauer, C.J., Gundrum and Hagedorn, JJ.

Focus: Court Discretion – Sufficiency of Evidence

Walter Steinhardt appeals from a judgment convicting him of incest and first-degree sexual assault of a person under thirteen years old. Steinhardt also appeals from an order denying his postconviction motion. We affirm the judgment and the order.

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WI Court of Appeals – District II

Case Name: State of Wisconsin v. Courtney L. Carney

Case No.: 2016AP175-CR; 2016AP176

Officials: Gundrum, J.

Focus: Motion to Suppress – Reasonable Suspicion

Courtney L. Carney appeals from his convictions for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant and refusing a chemical test of his blood, following the circuit court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence related to a seizure.  He argues the police officer lacked reasonable suspicion to seize/detain him—which detention led to evidence resulting in his convictions—and, therefore, the circuit court erred in denying his suppression motion. We conclude the court did not err and affirm.

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WI Court of Appeals – District IV

Case Name: Eugene Gerhartz, et al v. Town of Lomira, et al

Case No.: 2015AP243

Officials: Higginbotham, Sherman and Blanchard, JJ.

Focus: Trespassing

Eugene and Catherine Gerhartz appeal summary judgment in favor of Jeff and Brenda Elsinger on the Gerhartzs’ trespass claim against the Elsingers. The Gerhartzs argue that the Elsingers trespassed by installing a manhole cover and in-ground casing within the Town of Lomira’s right-of-way across the Gerhartzs’ property. For the reasons that follow, we affirm

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WI Court of Appeals – District I

Case Name: State of Wisconsin v. Telly Bernardo Johnson

Case No.: 2015AP1514-CR

Officials: Kloppenburg, P.J., Lundsten and Blanchard, JJ.

Focus: Sufficiency of Evidence  – Modification

Telly Johnson appeals a judgment convicting him of two counts of first-degree reckless homicide by delivery of a controlled substance and one count of delivery of heroin as a repeater following a jury trial. Johnson raises three issues related to the homicide counts. First, Johnson challenges the sufficiency of the evidence related to the causation element of the homicide offense. Second, Johnson challenges the circuit court’s denial of his requested modification of the reckless homicide jury instruction. And third, Johnson challenges the circuit court’s denial of his joinder/severance motion. For the reasons discussed below, we conclude that sufficient evidence supports the verdict, and that the circuit court’s rulings with regard to the jury instruction and joinder/severance are correct. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of conviction.

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WI Court of Appeals – District I

Case Name: Margaret Bach v. Labor and Industry Review Commission

Case No.: 2015AP1657

Officials: Lundsten, Higginbotham and Sherman, JJ.

Focus: Unemployment compensation Benefits

Margaret Bach, pro se, appeals a circuit court order that affirmed the decision of the Labor and Industry Review Commission (LIRC) denying her claim for unemployment compensation benefits. LIRC determined that Margaret is not eligible for unemployment benefits because the services that she was paid to perform are excluded from the definition of employment under WIS. STAT. § 108.02(15)(km) (2011-12). For the reasons discussed below, we affirm.

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WI Court of Appeals – District IV

Case Name: State of Wisconsin v. Brandon M. Amato

Case No.: 2015AP1867-CR

Officials: Kloppenburg, P.J., Lundsten and Sherman, JJ.

Brandon Amato appeals a judgment convicting him of one felony count of exposing genitals to a child and two misdemeanor counts of lewd and lascivious behavior. He also appeals an order denying his postconviction motion for plea withdrawal. For the reasons discussed below, we reject the plea withdrawal and sentencing issues that Amato raises, and affirm.

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WI Court of Appeals – District IV

Case Name: State of Wisconsin v. Steven N. Jackson

Case No.: 2015AP2628

Officials: Kloppenburg, P.J.

Focus: Probable Cause – Refusal of Blood Test – Court Error

In January 2015, Steven Jackson was issued a notice of intent to revoke operating privilege after he was arrested for operating while under the influence (2nd) and refused to submit to a blood test.  After a refusal hearing in December 2015, the circuit court entered a judgment finding Jackson guilty of improperly refusing a blood test and revoking Jackson’s operating privilege for twelve months. Jackson appeals, arguing that: (1) the officers lacked probable cause to arrest him for operating while under the influence; and (2) the circuit court erred in admitting a squad car videotape recording at the refusal hearing as evidence that the arresting officer complied with the statutory Informing the Accused requirements and that Jackson refused to submit to a blood test. For the reasons set forth below, I conclude that probable cause did exist to arrest Jackson, and that it was not error for the circuit court to admit the squad car recording. Accordingly, I affirm the judgment

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WI Court of Appeals – District IV

Case Name: R.J.M. v. M.R.H

Case No.: 2016AP1307

Officials: Lundsten, J.

Focus: Termination of Parental Rights

M.R.H. appeals the circuit court’s order terminating his parental rights to his son, now-13-year-old C.H., after a jury found two grounds for involuntary termination: abandonment and failure to assume parental responsibility. M.R.H. argues that the circuit court erred by allowing the jury to hear evidence relating to M.R.H.’s prior willingness to voluntarily terminate his parental rights and C.H.’s wish to be adopted by his stepfather. I assume, without deciding, that the circuit court erred in allowing the jury to hear that evidence. I conclude, however, that this claimed error was harmless because there is no reason to think that it would have changed the jury’s verdict on at least one of the grounds, abandonment. The order terminating M.R.H.’s parental rights is affirmed.

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