Civil Rights — malicious prosecution

U.S. Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit

Civil

Civil Rights — malicious prosecution

A defendant released on a recognizance bond is not seized for purposes of a malicious prosecution claim.

“Moreover, even supposing we were to consider a broader scope for Fourth Amendment claims, the facts in the instant case are a poor fit for the continuing seizure approach because Welton’s freedom of movement restrictions do not rise to the level of a seizure. In fact, Welton presents no facts suggesting a restriction on his freedom of movement. Instead, he states he was arrested, processed, released on his own recognizance, and eventually criminally prosecuted. At best, these are de minimis restrictions. See Karam v. City of Burbank, 352 F.3d 1188, 1193–94 (9th Cir. 2003) (signing of own recognizance agreement which obligated woman to obtain court’s permission before leaving state and which compelled her appearance in court amounted to de minimis restrictions not constituting a Fourth Amendment seizure).”

Affirmed.

13-3336 Welton v. Anderson

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, Magnus-Stinson, J., Bauer, J.