Sentencing — reasonableness

Listen to this article

U.S. Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit

Criminal

Sentencing — reasonableness

A 90-year sentence for sexually assaulting three children is not unreasonable.

“Horton has not demonstrated that his de facto life sentence is unreasonable. Although a sentence that is effectively for life ‘is not to be ordered lightly,’ we have upheld such sentences where the sentencing judge recognized ‘the likelihood of a defendant’s death in prison, but concluded that other factors warranted the particular sentence.’ United States v. Vallar, 635 F.3d 271, 280 (7th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see United States v. Noel, 581 F.3d 490, 492–93, 500–01 (7th Cir. 2009) (80-year sentence reasonable for producing child pornography where defendant did not molest victim); United States v. Chapman, 694 F.3d 908, 915–16 (7th Cir. 2012) (40-year sentence reasonable for 46-year-old defendant who produced child pornography). Here, the district court appropriately weighed Horton’s age and difficult upbringing, see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), against the ‘extremely serious nature of this crime’ and the vulnerability of the victims, see id. § 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(A); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 758–60 & n.9–10 (1982), the need to protect the public from a dangerous child molester, see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A), (C), and the availability of sex-offender treatment in prison, see id. § 3553(a)(2)(D). And though Horton would have preferred the district court to have given more weight to his dysfunctional childhood, the court had the discretion to assign it less weight than the other § 3553(a) factors. See United States v. Smith, 721 F.3d 904, 908 (7th Cir. 2013).”

Affirmed.

14-1559 U.S. v. Horton

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois, Herndon, J., Per Curiam.