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Civil Rights — deliberate indifference

By: WISCONSIN LAW JOURNAL STAFF//July 14, 2014//

Civil Rights — deliberate indifference

By: WISCONSIN LAW JOURNAL STAFF//July 14, 2014//

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U.S. Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit

Civil

Civil Rights — deliberate indifference

Even though a plaintiff was tardy in requesting that a case be tried under the objective reasonableness standard, rather than deliberate indifference, where there would be no prejudice to the defendants, it was error for the district court to deny the request.

“A party’s attempted jump-shift in legal theory on the brink of trial is certainly not a vested right. As we have stated, it is within a district court’s discretion to deny such a change where significant prejudice or harm would accrue to the non-movant, and equities in favor of the movant do not compel the change. Here, the record provides no elaboration from the district court or the Defendant-Appellees of what actual, specific prejudice would have resulted to the Defend-ant-Appellees in defending against the correct Fourth Amendment standard. And in scrutinizing the record, we are unable to find compelling equities that would have justified the district court’s decision to go to trial under the incorrect standard. In the absence of such countervailing equities, we are not convinced by the district court’s statement that going to trial under the deliberate indifference standard while ‘recogniz[ing] plaintiff’s claim under the Fourth Amendment’ was ‘the only way to allow plaintiff to proceed on her claim without unduly prejudicing defendants with a last-minute, significant shift in plaintiff’s theory of recovery at trial.’ Order at 4 (W.D. Wis. May 30, 2013), ECF No. 705. Indeed, it is unclear what it means to allow a plain-tiff to proceed with a Fourth Amendment claim, but only under an Eighth Amendment standard. The fact that more intermediate measures were available to the district court — such as granting a continuance to allow the Defendant-Appellees to retool their defense, or conditioning the grant to amend the legal theory on the Plaintiff-Appellant’s payment of any additional discovery costs — bolster our conclusion. See Estes v. Ky. Utils. Co., 636 F.2d 1131, 1134 (6th Cir. 1980) (‘This is not to say, however, that disallowance of the amendment is the only course open to a district court faced with such a motion. The scope of the district court’s discretion in this area is broad, and in a proper case conditions may be imposed on the party seeking the amendment; for example, costs of preparing for litigation could be imposed on the party who asserts a valid, but untimely, dispositive [legal theory].’); 6 Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 1486 (3d ed.) (‘If the party opposing the amendment can be protected by the use of conditions from any possible prejudice that might result from the untimeliness of the amendment, there is no justifiable reason for not allowing it.’). Had the Plaintiff-Appellant refused these or comparable ameliorating measures, perhaps the district court would have been entitled to deny leave to amend the theory. See Campania Mgmt. Co. v. Rooks, Pitts & Poust, 290 F.3d 843, 849 (7th Cir. 2002) (‘A trial court may deny leave to amend when the amendment would cause the opposing par-ty to bear additional discovery costs litigating a new issue and the moving party does not offer to reimburse the non-moving party for its expenses.’).”

Reversed and Remanded.

13-2379 King v. Kramer

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin, Conley, J., Tinder, J.

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