Sentencing — restitution

U.S. Supreme Court

Criminal

Sentencing — restitution

In calculating restitution for bank fraud, the district court properly ordered the defendant to pay the difference between the amount lent to him and the amount the banks received in selling the houses that had served as collateral for the loans.

The phrase “any part of the property . . . returned” refers to the property the banks lost, namely, the money they lent to Robers, and not to the collateral the banks received, namely, the houses. Read naturally, the words “the property,” which appear seven times in §3663A(b)(1), refer to the property that was lost as a result of the crime, here, the money. Because “[g]enerally, ‘identical words used in different parts of the same statute are . . . presumed to have the same meaning,’ ” Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U. S. 71, 86 (quoting IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U. S. 21, 34), “the property . . . returned” must also be the property lost as a result of the crime. Any awkwardness or redundancy that comes from substituting an amount of money for the words “the property” is the linguistic price paid for having a single statutory provision that covers different kinds of property. Since valuing money is easier than valuing other types of property, the natural reading also facilitates the statute’s administration.

698 F. 3d 937, affirmed.

12-9012 Robers v. U.S.

Breyer, J.; Sotomayor, J., concurring.