Civil Rights — due process — excessive force — jury instructions

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United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit

Civil

Civil Rights — due process — excessive force — jury instructions

In a claim of excessive force against a pretrial detainee, the district court did not err by instructing the jury regarding the defendants’ subjective intent.

“Our dissenting colleague believes that our cases have been ambiguous on the question of intent, but we see no serious ambiguity here. Our cases make clear that, although we employ the objective criteria of the Fourth Amendment as a touchstone by which to measure the gravity of the defendant officer’s conduct, we also recognize, quite clearly, the need for a subjective inquiry into the defendant’s state of mind in performing the activity under scrutiny. In determining whether the defendant officer had the requisite state of mind—at least recklessness—the same criteria used to measure the defendant’s lack of care are a useful benchmark. This is because, as Titran intimated, the gravity of the offense and the requisite intent are closely linked. Titran is clear that the strength of this link under a particular set of facts may mean that the inference of intent is so strong that no further inquiry need be made. See Titran, 893 F.2d at 148 (‘If the officers intentionally restrained, jolted, and roughed up Titran without physical provocation from her, their behavior was unreasonable.’). But when the inference is less strong, the cases do make clear that some examination of intent is appropriate, and that the distinction makes a mechanical application of Fourth Amendment objective standards impossible. See id. at 147 (‘Subtle differences between Fourth and [Fourteenth] Amendment standards are inevitable on account of this mental element.’ (emphasis added)).”

Affirmed.

12-3639 Kingsley v. Hendrickson

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin, Crabb, J., Ripple, J.