Criminal Procedure — appeal waiver

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United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit

Criminal

Criminal Procedure — appeal waiver

A defendant’s decision to waive his right to appeal his conviction and sentence as part of a plea agreement is not rendered involuntary by a subsequent change in the law.

“‘Disputes over plea agreements are usefully viewed through the lens of contract law.’ United States v. Bownes, 405 F.3d 634, 636 (7th Cir. 2005) (collecting cases). Vela’s position essentially requires us to ignore the clear and unambiguous language of the plea agreement. To satisfy the exception to the waiver, the change in law must have ‘been expressly made retroactive by an Act of Congress, the Supreme Court, or the United States Sentencing Commission.’ While Peugh represents a change in the law, at least in this circuit, the Supreme Court did not make the change expressly retroactive in that case. In fact, Peugh concluded that ‘failing to calculate the correct Guidelines range constitutes procedural error,’ 133 S. Ct. 2083, the kind which are generally not applied retroactively. Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 351–52 (2004); see also Hawkins v. United States, 724 F.3d 915, 917 (7th Cir. 2013) (concluding that Peugh does not apply retroactively for purposes of collateral review for the same reasons). Thus, by its plain terms, the exception does not apply.

Dismissed.

13-1494 U.S. v. Vela

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Shadur, J., Griesbach, J.