Sentencing — controlled substances – delivery — death

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U.S. Supreme Court

Criminal

Sentencing — controlled substances – delivery — death

Where use of the drug distributed by the defendant is not an independently sufficient cause of the victim’s death or serious bodily injury, a defendant cannot be liable for penalty enhancement under sec. 841(b)(1)(C) unless such use is a but-for cause of the death or injury.

Because the Controlled Substances Act does not define “results from,” the phrase should be given its ordinary meaning. See Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U. S. 179, 187. Ordinarily, that phrase imposes a requirement of actual causality, i.e., proof “ ‘that the harm would not have occurred’ in the absence of—that is, but for—the defendant’s conduct.” University of Tex. Southwestern Medical Center  v. Nassar, 570 U. S. ___, ___. Similar statutory phrases—“because of,” see id., at ___, “ ‘based on,’ ” Safeco Ins. Co. of America v. Burr, 551 U. S. 47, 63, and “ ‘by reason of,’ ” Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., 557 U. S. 167, 176—have been read to impose a but-for causation requirement. This Court declines to adopt the Government’s permissive interpretation of “results from” to mean that use of a drug distributed by the defendant need only contribute to an aggregate force, e.g., mixed-drug intoxication, that is itself a but-for cause of death. There is no need to address a special rule developed for cases in which multiple sufficient causes independently, but concurrently, produce death, since there was no evidence that Banka’s heroin use was an independently sufficient cause of his death. And though Congress could have written §841(b)(1)(C) to make an act or omission a cause-in-fact if it was a “substantial” or “contributing” factor in producing death, Congress chose instead to use language that imports but-for causality.

687 F. 3d 1015, reversed and remanded.

12-7515 Burrage v. U.S.

Scalia, J.; Ginsburg, J., concurring.