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Hobbs Act — sufficiency of the evidence

By: WISCONSIN LAW JOURNAL STAFF//June 26, 2013//

Hobbs Act — sufficiency of the evidence

By: WISCONSIN LAW JOURNAL STAFF//June 26, 2013//

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U.S. Supreme Court

Criminal

Hobbs Act — sufficiency of the evidence

Attempting to compel a person to recommend that his employer approve an investment does not constitute “the obtaining of property from another” under the Hobbs Act.

Absent other indication, “Congress intends to incorporate the well-settled meaning of the common-law terms it uses.” Neder v. United States, 527 U. S. 1. As far as is known, no case predating the Hobbs Act—English, federal, or state—ever identified conduct such as that charged here as extortionate. Extortion required the obtaining of items of value, typically cash, from the victim. The Act’s text confirms that obtaining property requires “not only the deprivation but also the acquisition of property.” Scheidler v. National Organization for Women, Inc., 537 U. S. 393. The property extorted must therefore be transferable—that is, capable of passing from one person to another, a defining feature lacking in the alleged property here. The genesis of the Hobbs Act reinforces that conclusion. Congress borrowed nearly verbatim the definition of extortion from a 1909 New York statute but did not copy the coercion provision of that statute. And in 1946, the time of the borrowing, New York courts had consistently held that the sort of interference with rights that occurred here was coercion. Finally, this Court’s own precedent demands reversal of petitioner’s convictions. See id., at 404–405.

683 F. 3d 436, reversed.

12-357 Sekhar v. U.S.

Scalia, J.; Alito, J., concurring.

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