Criminal Procedure – Ex Post Facto Clause

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U.S. Supreme Court

Criminal

Criminal Procedure – Ex Post Facto Clause

The Ex Post Facto Clause is violated when a defendant is sentenced under Guidelines promulgated after he committed his criminal acts and the new version provides a higher sentencing range than the version in place at the time of the offense.

The Government’s contrary arguments are unpersuasive. Its principal claim is that the Sentencing Guidelines lack sufficient legal effect to attain the status of a “law” within the meaning of the Ex Post Facto Clause. Changes in law need not bind a sentencing authority for there to be an ex post facto violation, and “[t]he presence of discretion does not displace the protections of [that] Clause.” Garner, 529 U. S., at 253. As for contrasts between the Federal Guidelines and the Florida system in Miller, the difference between the two systems is one in degree, not in kind. The attributes of post-Booker sentencing fail to show that the Guidelines are but one among many persuasive sources a sentencing court may consult in making a decision. Recognizing an ex post facto violation here is consistent with post-Booker Sixth Amendment cases. The Court’s Sixth Amendment cases, which focus on when a given finding of fact is required to make a defendant legally eligible for a more severe penalty, are distinct from its ex post facto cases, which focus on whether a change in law creates a “significant risk” of a higher sentence. The Booker remedy was designed, and has been subsequently calibrated, to exploit precisely this distinction: promoting sentencing uniformity while avoiding a Sixth Amendment violation. Nothing in this case undoes the holdings of such cases as Booker, Rita, and Gall.

675 F.3d 736, reversed and remanded.

12-62 Peugh v. U.S.

Sotomayor, J.; Thomas, J., dissenting; Alito, J., dissenting.