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Civil Rights – due process — suicide watch

By: WISCONSIN LAW JOURNAL STAFF//May 28, 2013//

Civil Rights – due process — suicide watch

By: WISCONSIN LAW JOURNAL STAFF//May 28, 2013//

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United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit

Civil

Civil Rights – due process — suicide watch

Placing a prisoner on suicide watch does not deprive him of any liberty interest.

“Regardless of why Earl was placed on suicide watch, the district court correctly determined that no liberty interest was implicated by his placement there. When an inmate is placed in conditions more restrictive than those in the general prison population, whether through protective segregation like suicide watch or discretionary administrative segregation, his liberty is affected only if the more restrictive conditions are particularly harsh compared to ordinary prison life or if he remains subject to those conditions for a significantly long time. See Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 223 (2005); Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484-87 (1995); Marion v. Columbia Corr. Inst., 559 F.3d 693, 697-98 & n.2 (7th Cir. 2009); Townsend v. Fuchs, 522 F.3d 765, 771-72 (7th Cir. 2008). The conditions Earl faced on suicide watch were more restrictive than ordinary prison life, but—as the district court found—they were not ‘unusually harsh.’ See Marion, 559 F.3d at 698. For example, the only changes to meals were the trays upon which food was served (Styrofoam rather than plastic) and the quick removal of the eating utensil after each meal; inmates were not denied bedding but were given a mattress (or two if available) and a ‘suicide-proof’ blanket; inmates were denied writing materials for only the first 48 hours as a precautionary measure; and rather than prohibiting human contact, deputies were assigned to closely and personally monitor the inmates to ensure their safety. Courts have deemed an inmate’s liberty interest implicated only where the conditions are far more restrictive. See, e.g., Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 223-24 (inmate denied human contact and subjected to lights during every hour of confinement); Gillis v. Litscher, 468 F.3d 488, 490-91, 493-94 (7th Cir. 2006) (inmate in “Behavioral Modification Program” denied any bedding or clothing and deprived of nearly all human contact or sensory stimulation); Westerfer v. Snyder, 422 F.3d 570, 589 (7th Cir. 2005) (inmate subjected to severe limitations on contact with others, showers, exercise, attorney visits, and access to personal property). In addition to the conditions of Earl’s suicide watch being insignificantly harsh, they also were brief: he was placed on suicide watch for only five days, which generally is too short a time to trigger due-process protection. See Marion, 559 F.3d at 697-98 & nn.2-3 (collecting cases holding that segregated confinement of 2 to 90 days does not implicate liberty interest); Lekas v. Briley, 405 F.3d 602, 612 (7th Cir. 2005) (concluding that up to 90 days in segregation does not affect liberty).”

Affirmed.

12-3900 Earl v. Racine County Jail

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin, Adelman, J., Per Curiam.

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