Employment — ADA

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United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit

Civil

Employment — ADA

Where an employee’s injury only precluded her from performing her job, but not working generally, her termination did not violate the ADA.

“Povey’s situation is distinguishable from Armour. Here, none of the statements made by Calabro and Wilder are so ‘sweeping’ as to exclude Povey from a broad class of jobs. Calabro’s and Wilder’s statements were made in response to questions regarding Povey’s abilities to complete tasks specific to the Jeffersonville animal shelter. For example, Calder’s testimony that Wilder told her that Povey ‘couldn’t do a whole lot of anything’ was directly in response to a question regarding what he specifically said she could not do related to duties in the animal shelter facility. Wilder’s statement that Jeffersonville, ‘did not have a job for that’ was also in response to a specific question regarding whether Povey could continue to perform her job at the animal shelter given her permanent restrictions. It is clear that, when taken in context, the statements only refer to Povey’s abilities to work within the animal shelter. The fact that Jeffersonville viewed Povey as unable to perform the tasks required at the Jeffersonville animal shelter tells us nothing about Jeffersonville’s perception of her abilities to perform a broad range of jobs. See Squibb v. Memorial Ctr., 497 F.3d 775, 782 (7th Cir. 2002) (‘A demonstrated “inability to perform a single, particular job” does not render an individual substantially limited in the major life activity of working.’) Even viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, the statements presented do not constitute facts from which a jury can reasonably conclude that Jeffersonville regarded Povey as disabled under the ADA.”

Affirmed.

11-1896 Povey v. City of Jeffersonville, Indiana

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, Young, J., Coleman, J.