Sentencing — national origin

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United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit

Criminal

Sentencing — national origin

Where it can’t be determined whether the defendant’s national origin factored into his sentence, the sentence must be vacated.

“In this case, we think that both the government and the sentencing court crossed the ‘very fine line of demarcation separating presentencing statements regarding a defendant’s relationship with a country or its residents who have engaged in similar criminal activity there and statements concerning the race or national origin of the defendant which would violate his due process guarantees.’ De La Cruz, 870 F.2d at 1198. The government should have forgone discussing Trujillo-Castillon’s national origin in the first place. And although the court did not expressly adopt the government’s position, it did nothing to reasonably assure the defendant that his Cuban heritage would not factor into its calculus. See id. Instead, the court exacerbated the problem by comparing the defendant’s conduct to the Mariel people who emigrated from Cuba more than thirty years ago. By lumping the defendant in with the Mariel people and expressly contrasting the values held by Americans with people, like the defendant, ‘who come[] from Cuba,’ the court arguably made Trujillo-Castillon’s national origin a factor at sentencing. A reasonable observer hearing or reading the remarks might certainly think so.”

Vacated and Remanded.

11-2646 U.S. v. Trujillo-Castillon

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin, Randa, J., Williams, J.