Search and Seizure — reasonable suspicion

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United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit

Criminal

Search and Seizure — reasonable suspicion

A mere suspicion of illegal activity at a particular place is not enough to transfer that suspicion to anyone who leaves that property.

“The Fourth Amendment allows officers to ‘stop and briefly detain a person for investigative purposes if the officer has a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity “may be afoot.”’ United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968)). This reasonableness standard typically requires a set of facts that we can measure against an objective standard such as ‘probable cause or a less stringent test’ such as reasonable suspicion. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 & n.11 (1979) (internal footnotes omitted). In those circumstances where we do not insist on ‘some quantum of individualized suspicion,’ we rely on other safeguards to assure that the reasonable expectation of privacy is not ‘subject to the discretion of the official in the field.’ Id. at 654-55 (quoting Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 532 (1967)). For instance, an officer with a warrant to search a place may stop anyone leaving that place without additional individualized suspicion, see Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 702-03 & n.16 (1981), but a mere suspicion of illegal activity about a place, without more, is not enough to justify stopping everyone emerging from that property, see Johnson, 170 F.3d at 720.”

Reversed and Remanded.

10-3656 U.S. v. Bohman

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin, Conley, J., Tinder, J.