Criminal Procedure — right to remain silent

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United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit

Criminal

Criminal Procedure — right to remain silent

Where police stopped questioning a suspect after he invoked his Miranda rights, but the suspect reinitiated the conversation, his statements need not be suppressed.

“The government is right to consider Hampton’s statement in light of the circumstances in which it was made. Whether a suspect clearly invoked his right to counsel is an objective inquiry. Davis, 512 U.S. at 458-59; United States v. Martin, 664 F.3d 684, 688 (7th Cir. 2011); United States v. Shabaz, 579 F.3d 815, 818 (7th Cir. 2009). We have emphasized that the ‘analysis does not end with words alone; . . . we also consider the circumstances in which the statement was made.’ Shabaz, 579 F.3d at 819; see also Lord v. Duckworth, 29 F.3d 1216, 1221 (7th Cir. 1994) (‘[T]he context in which [the suspect] made reference to a lawyer also supports the conclusion that any request for counsel was ambiguous . . . .’). Here, Hampton had already signed a Miranda waiver and agreed to talk to the officers without a lawyer, only to change his mind just as the interview was getting underway. The officers immediately stopped the interrogation and summoned a guard to take Hampton back to his cell. When the guard arrived, Hampton changed his mind again and reinitiated the interview, asking to talk to the officers without an attorney present. The officers paused and took the precautionary step of bringing in audiorecording equipment. When Passwater renewed the Miranda warnings, Hampton hesitated again and appeared to have another change of heart. Based on this pattern of equivocation and because Hampton’s reference to a lawyer used the hedge word ‘but,’ we agree with the government that a reasonable officer would have understood only that Hampton might want an attorney present, not that he was clearly invoking his right to deal with the officers only through counsel. See, e.g., Davis, 512 U.S. at 455 (the statement ‘[m]aybe I should talk to a lawyer’ was not an unambiguous request for counsel); Shabaz, 579 F.3d at 819 (the question ‘am I going to be able to get an attorney’ was not an unambiguous request for counsel); Lord, 29 F.3d at 1221 (the question ‘I can’t afford a lawyer but is there anyway I can get one?’ was not an unambiguous request for counsel); United States v. Buckley, 4 F.3d 552, 558-59 (7th Cir. 1993) (the statement ‘I don’t know if I need an attorney’ was not an unambiguous request for counsel).”

Affirmed in part, and Vacated in part.

10-1479 U.S. v. Hampton

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois, McCuskey, J., Sykes, J.