Torts – preemption — railroads

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U.S. Supreme Court

Civil

Torts – preemption — railroads

State law claims alleging railroad parts were defectively designed, and failure to warn claims, are preempted by the Locomotive Inspection Act.

Petitioners do not argue that Napier should be overruled. Instead, petitioners contend that their claims fall outside the LIA’s pre-empted field, as it was defined in Napier. Petitioners’ arguments are unpersuasive. First, the argument that the pre-empted field does not extend to state-law claims arising from the repair or maintenance of locomotives is inconsistent with Napier’s holding that Congress, in enacting the LIA, “manifest[ed] the intention to occupy the entire field of regulating locomotive equipment.” 272 U. S., at 611. Second, the argument that petitioners’ failure-to-warn claims are not pre-empted because they do not base liability on the design or manufacture of a product ignores that a failure-to-warn claim alleges that the product itself is defective unless accompanied by sufficient warnings or instructions. Because petitioners’ failure-to-warn claims are therefore directed at the equipment of locomotives, they fall within the pre-empted field defined by Napier. Third, the argument that petitioners’ claims are not pre-empted because manufacturers were not regulated under the LIA when Corson was exposed to asbestos is inconsistent with Napier, which defined the pre-empted field on the basis of the physical elements regulated, not on the basis of the entity directly subject to regulation. Finally, contrary to petitioners’ argument, the LIA’s pre-emptive scope is not limited to state legislation or regulation but extends to state common-law duties and standards of care directed to the subject of locomotive equipment.

620 F. 3d 392, affirmed.

10-879 Kurns v. Railroad Friction Products Corp.

Thomas, J.; Kagan, J., concurring; Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.