10-3916 Rodgers v. White

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Employment
Race discrimination

Where an employee engaged in the same conduct as his supervisor but was disciplined more harshly, a jury could reasonably infer that he was discriminated against because of his race.

“[W]e are persuaded that Rodgers presented enough evidence that he was similarly situated to Rusciolelli to prove a prima facie case under the indirect method. And on this record, his evidence establishing a prima facie case also defeats the defendants’ claim that their reasons for firing him were nonpretextual. The analysis of the prima facie case and pretext often overlap, e.g., Everroad v. Scott Truck Sys., Inc., 604 F.3d 471, 477-78 (7th Cir. 2010); Scruggs v. Garst Seed Co., 587 F.3d 832, 838 (7th Cir. 2009); Adelman-Reyes v. Saint Xavier Univ., 500 F.3d 662, 665 (7th Cir. 2007), as they do here. Rodgers, of course, needed evidence tending to show that the defendants’ proffered reasons for his termination were not just erroneous, but were ‘“factually baseless, were not the actual motivation for the discharge in question, or were insufficient to motivate the discharge.”’ Gordon v. United Airlines, Inc., 246 F.3d 878, 888-89 (7th Cir. 2001) (quoting Adreani v. First Colonial Bankshares Corp., 154 F.3d 389, 395 (7th Cir. 1998)); see Humphries, 474 F.3d at 407. Rodgers met that burden by showing that the defendants’ proffered reasons for singling him out were all disingenuous. At summary judgment Rodgers produced evidence that, except for missing a meeting, Rusciolelli engaged in the same alleged misconduct and committed the same purported recordkeeping mistakes and yet received only a demotion. The evidence also shows that the defendants hounded Rodgers, the lone black employee, about purported timekeeping errors while ignoring both Deffenbaugh, whose records were not even examined, and Rusciolelli, who admitted that timekeeping was solely his responsibility. And as for the March meeting, Fitts admitted that she had no authority to demand attendance from Rodgers or his subordinates, so that reason for his termination, like the others, is ‘unworthy of credence.’ See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000); Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981). Considering all this evidence together, a jury reasonably could conclude that the actual reason the defendants fired Rodgers was his race. See Hasan v. Foley & Lardner LLP, 552 F.3d 520, 530-31 (7th Cir. 2008); Rudin v. Lincoln Land Cmty. Coll., 420 F.3d 712, 726-27 (7th Cir. 2005); Gordon, 246 F.3d at 890-92.”

Affirmed.

10-3916 Rodgers v. White

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois, McCuskey, J., Cudahy, J.

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