09-4066 Luster v. IDOC

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Employment
Race discrimination

Where an employee sexually harassed a female subordinate, his suspension was not the result of racial discrimination.

“The lack of a prima facie case doomed Luster’s Title VII claim, but even if it did not, the IDOC was still entitled to summary judgment because it provided a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its adverse employment action: Luster was suspended pending termination for sexually harassing a coworker and then lying about his misconduct. To defeat the IDOC’s motion for summary judgment, it was Luster’s burden to present evidence sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to find that this reason was false (pretextual), from which a trier of fact could infer that the real reason was unlawful discrimination.

See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804; Perez v. Illinois, 488 F.3d 773, 776 (7th Cir. 2007). The district court found that Luster had failed to do so, and we agree with that conclusion.

Affirmed.

09-4066 Luster v. IDOC

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois, Mihm, J., Hamilton, J.

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