Another exception adopted for exclusionary rule

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The exclusionary rule does not apply if an unlawful search was permitted by binding precedent at the time it occurred.

U.S. Supreme Court Justice Samuel Alito wrote for the Court on June 16, “It is one thing for the criminal ‘to go free because the constable has blundered.’ It is quite another to set the criminal free because the constable has scrupulously adhered to governing law (cite omitted).”

The 2007 arrest of Willie Davis in Alabama was, for Fourth Amendment purposes, identical to that in Arizona v. Gant, 129 S.Ct. 1710 (2009): (http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/08pdf/07-542.pdf) Davis was arrested, handcuffed and placed in the back of a squad car; the police then searched the car and found contraband.

At the time, the search was authorized by 11th Circuit precedent.

Davis was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm, and while his appeal was pending, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Gant, holding that once a suspect is secured, a search of his vehicle is unlawful unless it is likely to lead to evidence relevant to the charge for which the suspect was arrested.

Nevertheless, the 11th Circuit affirmed Davis’ conviction, because it would not deter police misconduct to suppress evidence discovered during a search that was considered lawful at the time.

The Supreme Court affirmed, with Justice Stephen Breyer penning a dissent joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg.

Alito’s majority opinion repeatedly emphasized that the “sole purpose” of the exclusionary rule is to deter future Fourth Amendment violations. Accordingly, where police acted in compliance with binding precedent, the court concluded the rule is inapplicable.

The court cited previous cases holding that the rule does not apply when police rely in good faith on a warrant, U.S. v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1987), and on a statute, Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987).

Extending the reasoning of those cases to police reliance on case law, the court concluded, “About all that exclusion would deter in this case is conscientious police work.”

The dissent contended that the majority opinion is contrary to the rule in Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987), that newly announced rules of constitutional criminal procedure apply retroactively to all cases.

But the majority responded that the issue was not retroactivity, but remedy, and that the dissented was conflating those two distinct doctrines.

The court explained, “The retroactive application of a new rule of substantive Fourth Amendment law RAISES the question whether a suppression remedy applies; it does not answer the question (emphasis added by court).”

The dissent also contended that the majority opinion would stunt development of Fourth Amendment law, because defendants will have no incentive to challenge the lawfulness of searches.

But the majority responded that “facilitating the overruling of precedent” is not a purpose of the exclusionary rule, iterating that the purpose is to deter police misconduct.

It added that, “in a future case we could, if necessary, recognize a limited exception to the good-faith exception for a defendant who obtains a judgment overruling one of our Fourth Amendment precedents.”

What the Court Held

Case: Davis v. U.S., No. 09-11328

Issue: Does the exclusionary rule apply to searches that are unlawful, but were in accordance with binding case law at the time?

Holding: No. Application of the exclusionary rule in such cases would do nothing to deter police misconduct.

David Ziemer can be reached at [email protected].