Supreme Court accepts five new cases

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The Wisconsin Supreme Court has voted to accept five new cases.

2009AP1505-CR State v. Thompson

The fundamental question raised in this case is whether a defendant must be given notice of a mandatory minimum penalty to make an informed decision on whether to go to trial.

The Court of Appeals deemed the defendant’s reliance on cases addressing rights associated with entering a plea to be unavailing since those cases do not address right to engage in plea bargaining, much less a right to information that might affect a decision to pursue a plea bargain. The Court of Appeals also said there was no reason to suppose that the defendant’s knowledge of the mandatory minimum sentence would have led the prosecutor to make a more favorable plea offer. The Court of Appeals specifically found that the defendant suffered no prejudice from not being informed about the mandatory minimum twenty-five-year sentence.

Thompson argues that the failure to inform him of the applicable mandatory minimum sentence of twenty-five years prior to trial is a significant constitutional question of due process which has not been previously decided by the Wisconsin Supreme Court. He notes that this court and the Court of Appeals have previously addressed due process rights in the context of providing notice of the penalties a criminal defendant faces in cases that involve presumptive minimum penalties and in cases under the repeat offender statutes. See, e.g., State v. Bons, 2006 WI 83, ¶70, 292 Wis. 2d 344, 383, 717 N.W.2d 133. From Wood County.

2009AP2549 Johnson v. Cintas Corp.

The issue raised in this case is whether a default judgment was void because the summons and complaint named the wrong corporate defendant, meaning personal jurisdiction was never obtained over the correct corporate entity.

On May 12, 2007, the plaintiff filed the original summons and complaint naming “Cintas Corporation” as the defendant. The record reveals that Cintas No. 2, the plaintiff’s employer, is an indirect, wholly-owned subsidiary of Cintas Corporation. Cintas No. 2 is a foreign corporation registered with the State of Wisconsin. Cintas Corporation is a foreign corporation not registered and not doing business in Wisconsin.

The issue before the Supreme Court is whether a default judgment entered against Cintas Corporation No. 2 was void because the summons and complaint named Cintas Corporation.

Johnson asserts that naming Cintas Corporation rather than Cintas No. 2 in the summons and complaint was merely a technical, rather than a fundamental, defect that did not deprive the circuit court of jurisdiction.

Cintas No. 2 says that the defect in the summons and complaint was a fundamental defect that deprived the circuit court of personal jurisdiction over Cintas No. 2. From Kenosha County.

2009AP2057-CR State v. Stevens

This case examines Miranda rights when a suspect in a child sexual assault case invoked his right to counsel and then initiated further discussion with police. However, before he formally waived his rights and gave an additional statement, his attorney appeared at the station asking to speak with him, at the request of the suspect’s mother. The attorney was turned away.

The circuit court concluded, Stevens did not knowingly waive his right to counsel before the second interview, because he did not know counsel had appeared at the station to see him.

The court of appeals reversed.

Stevens asks the Supreme Court to review if police violated the demands of Miranda by denying an attorney access to the suspect prior to the second waiver of his Miranda rights.

Stevens also asks the Supreme Court if its decision in Blum v. 1st Auto & Cas. Ins. Co., 2010 WI 78, 326 Wis. 2d 729, 786 N.W.2d 78, mean that the court of appeals’ decision in State v. Middleton, 135 Wis. 2d 297, 399 N.W.2d 917 (Ct. App. 1986) has no precedential value whatsoever because that case was overruled in State v. Anson, 2005 WI 96, 282 Wis. 2d 629, 698 N.W.2d 776. From Waukesha County.

2010AP826 Marquez v. Mercedes-Benz

This certification from the Court of Appeals examines whether an “ordinary burden of proof” or a “middle burden of proof” applies to an allegation of intentional bad faith on the part of a consumer under Wis. Stat. § 218.0171, the state’s “Lemon Law.”

A decision by the Supreme Court could clarify the burden of proof used to determine bad faith under the Lemon Law. From Waukesha County.

2009AP3075 State v. Ryan

This case examines the doctrine of “judicial estoppel” and results from an eminent domain seizure along the Menomonee River for the Marquette Interchange reconstruction in Milwaukee.

The doctrine of judicial estoppel prevents a party from contradicting previous declarations made during the same or an earlier proceeding, if the change in position adversely affects the proceeding or constitutes a fraud on the court.

The circuit court ultimately found that there was no dispute of fact and granted summary judgment to the State that Ryan was personally liable for the forfeitures related to the sinking of the barge. After conducting a short trial regarding damages, the circuit court entered a judgment against Ryan personally for $37,691.25.

The court further directed that $100,000 of the eminent domain payment, which had been held in the trust account of Ryan’s attorneys, be used to pay for the removal of the barge, with any remainder of that amount being returned to Ryan. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Ryan asks the Supreme Court to review:

• Can Ryan be found guilty under the forfeiture statutes on the grounds of judicial estoppel where he claims he made no statement to a prior court?
• Did the undisputed facts on the record establish that if judicial estoppel had not been applied, Ryan neither owned nor controlled the barge that sunk in a navigable waterway in order to be liable under the forfeiture statutes for violations of Wis. Stat. ch. 30?
• If judicial estoppel had not been applied, is there a dispute as to material fact[s] that precludes summary judgment as to whether Ryan owned or controlled the barge to be liable under the forfeiture statutes?
• Can the summary judgment procedure be used to find Ryan liable under the forfeiture statutes for violating Wis. Stat. ch. 30? Can a defendant be found guilty under the forfeiture statutes by summary judgment motion?

Justice David T. Prosser did not participate. From Milwaukee County.