2010AP1723 Rock Tenn Co. v. LIRC

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Employment
Worker’s compensation

Section 102.18(1)(b) can be retroactively applied to award prospective treatment expenses.

“The difference between a substantive statute and a procedural statute is clear. A statute is substantive if it creates, defines or regulates rights or obligations. Betthauser v. Medical Protective Co., 172 Wis. 2d 141, 147-48, 493 N.W.2d 40 (1992). Remedial or procedural statutes are ‘those which afford a remedy, or improve or facilitate remedies already existing for the enforcement of rights and redress of injuries.’ Chappy v. LIRC, 128 Wis. 2d 318, 324, 381 N.W.2d 552 (Ct. App. 1985).”

“Under Wis. Stat. § 102.42(1), Wasmund was and remains eligible for compensation for medical treatment. This is a substantive right that existed on December 11, 2001, when she suffered a work-related injury and, under Wis. Stat. § 102.03(4), Wasmund’s ‘right to compensation and the amount of the compensation’ is determined by § 102.42(1) (1999-2000), the version in effect on the date she was injured. Contrary to Rock Tenn’s argument, § 102.03(4) is not applicable. The method prescribed for enforcing her right to compensation is found in Wis. Stat. § 102.18(1)(b), which permits an employee entitled to treatment to seek to have the cost of treatment paid prospectively. Section 102.18(1)(b) presumes the ‘right to compensation’ and does nothing more than improve or facilitate her right to compensation by moving the time of payment of treatment expense from posttreatment to pretreatment.”

Affirmed.

Recommended for publication in the official reports.

2010AP1723 Rock Tenn Co. v. LIRC

Attorneys: For Appellant: Ochowicz, Robert P., Milwaukee; Leehr, Gretchen, Milwaukee; For Respondent: Gibson, Charlotte, Madison; Bornstein, Ronald, Milwaukee

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