08-1314 Williamson v. Mazda Motor of America, Inc.

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Torts
Seat belts; preemption

Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 208 does not pre-empt state tort suits claiming that manufacturers should have installed lap-and-shoulder belts, instead of lap belts, on rear inner seats.

Like the regulation in Geier, the instant regulation leaves the manufacturer with a choice, and the tort suit here would restrict that choice. But in contrast to Geier, the choice here is not a significant regulatory objective. The regulation’s history resembles the history of airbags to some degree. DOT rejected a regulation requiring lap-and-shoulder belts in rear seats in 1984. But by 1989, changed circumstances led DOT to require manufacturers to install lap-and-shoulder belts for rear outer seats but to retain a manufacturer choice for rear inner seats. Its reasons for doing so differed considerably from its 1984 reasons for permitting a choice of passive restraint. It was not concerned about consumer acceptance; it thought that lap-and-shoulder belts would increase safety and did not pose additional safety risks; and it was not seeking to use the regulation to spur development of alternative safety devices. Instead, DOT thought that the requirement would not be cost effective. That fact alone cannot show that DOT sought to forbid common-law tort suits. For one thing, DOT did not believe that costs would remain frozen. For another, many federal safety regulations embody a cost-effectiveness judgment. To infer pre-emptive intent from the mere existence of such a cost-effectiveness judgment would eliminate the possibility that the agency seeks only to set forth a minimum standard. Finally, the Solicitor General represents that DOT’s regulation does not pre-empt this tort suit. As in Geier, “the agency’s own views should make a difference,” 529 U. S., at 883, and DOT has not expressed inconsistent views on this subject.

84 Cal. Rptr. 3d 545, reversed.

08-1314 Williamson v. Mazda Motor of America, Inc.

Breyer, J.; Sotomayor, J., concurring; Thomas, J., concurring.

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