09-3946 Suh v. Pierce

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Habeas Corpus
Judicial bias

Where the trial judge in a murder trial was not aware that he was acquaintances with family members of the victim, judicial recusal was not required.

“Recusal also may be required outside of these specific instances if the probability of actual bias is high enough. See Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2263-64 (requiring recusal where ‘a person with a personal stake in a particular case had a significant and disproportionate influence in placing the judge on the case by raising funds or directing the judge’s election campaign when the case was pending or imminent’ because that situation involved ‘a serious risk of actual bias’). But the issue before us is not whether a potentially biasing influence was strong enough to be constitutionally intolerable. Rather, because Suh is not challenging the state court’s factual finding that the judge was unaware of the relationship between his acquaintances and the murder victim, the only question is whether recusal was required in the absence of any possibility of actual bias-that is, based solely on how the situation might have ‘appeared’ to an outside observer. The Supreme Court has never held, or even intimated, that the due process clause requires recusal under such circumstances, so we must answer the question in the negative.”

Affirmed.

09-3946 Suh v. Pierce

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Pallmeyer, J., Evans, J.

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