Discrimination; statute of limitations
Oral notice that the EEOC has issued a right-to-sue letter is insufficient to trigger the 90-day statute of limitations.
“Even if we were to adopt the Ebbert court’s rule, under which an oral communication may qualify as statutory notice if equivalent to written notice, Rollpoint would be no better off. The EEOC has identified four requirements for a proper notice of a complainant’s right to sue: ‘(1) [a]uthorization to the aggrieved person to bring a civil action under title VII . . . within 90 days from receipt of such authorization; (2) [a]dvice concerning the institution of such civil action by the person claiming to be aggrieved, where appropriate; (3) [a] copy of the charge; [and] (4) [t]he Commission’s decision, determination, or dismissal, as appropriate.’ 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28(e). There is no evidence in this case that the EEOC’s oral communication to DeTata met any of the first three requirements. Most importantly, there is nothing in the record to suggest that the EEOC ever told DeTata when her 90-day clock began to run.”
Vacated and Remanded.
10-1596 DeTata v. Rollprint Packaging Products, Inc.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Pallmeyer, J., Wood, J.