10-CV-590 U.S. v. Luebke

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Civil Rights
Housing discrimination

A party not named in a HUD complaint can be sued under the Fair Housing Act, provided that the defendant had adequate notice of the complaint and an opportunity to participate in the conciliation process.
“The nature of the ‘charge’ in Title VII and FHA litigation differs in that the initial charge of discrimination is issued by the complainant in Title VII litigation, whereas HUD issues the charge of discrimination under the FHA. The text of the FHA indicates that the purpose of having the Department of HUD issue a charge is to ensure that ‘reasonable cause’ exists for the underlying complaint, allowing the agency to screen frivolous complaints and vigorously enforce those complaints that truly have merit. 42 U.S.C. § 3610(g); see generally United States v. Curlee, 792 F. Supp. 699, 700 (C.D. Cal. 1992) (finding that the purpose of the ‘procedural framework enacted by Congress in 1988 [was] to augment HUD’s enforcement powers and to provide effective, less costly procedures to vindicate complainants’ civil rights.’) Accordingly, the purpose of the charge of the FHA is threefold, the charge: (1) notifies a charged party of the alleged violation; (2) provides the parties an opportunity to voluntarily comply with the FHA’s mandates before having an administrative or court-based resolution to the matter; and (3) provides a means for HUD to determine whether reasonable cause exists for the underlying complaint and to take action accordingly. Just as in the context of Title VII litigation, the court, agreeing with the conclusion of two other courts, finds little reason for insisting that a party to the litigation be named in the underlying administrative charge if the underlying purposes for having such a charge have been met. Cf. Eggleston v. Chicago Journeymen Plumbers’ Local Union No. 130, 657 F.2d 890, 905 (7th Cir. 1981) (crafting the ‘adequate notice’ exception in Title VII litigation). The alternative would elevate form over substance and ignore the Supreme Court’s pronouncement that the FHA must be given a ‘generous Construction’ to carry out a ‘policy that Congress considered to be of the highest priority.’ Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209, 211-12, 34 L. Ed. 2d 415, 93 S. Ct. 364 (1972). Moreover, the court notes that limiting the Justice Department’s ability to enforce the provisions of the FHA would be diametrically opposed to the underlying rationale of the 1988 amendments to the FHA that allowed for the Attorney General to commence and maintain a civil action on behalf of an aggrieved person in federal court. See House Report at 16, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2177 (‘Existing law has been ineffective because it lacks an effective enforcement mechanism . . . [t]he Justice Department can sue, but can do so only in cases of a “pattern or practice” of discrimination.’).”

10-CV-590 U.S. v. Luebke

E.D.Wis., Stadtmueller, J.