By: dmc-admin//March 15, 2010//
Sentencing
Supervised release; internet access
A prohibition on personal access to the Internet during supervised release is reasonable, where the defendant used the Internet to commit his crimes.
"In 1997 and 1998, when the Internet was fairly new, Angle was convicted of using the Internet to solicit a minor for sex. He also used the Internet to set up a pornography trade with a distributer, and possessed an extensive amount of child pornography on computer diskettes and zip disks. Furthermore, his use of the Internet was not integrally connected to his profession as he was previously employed as a salesman and mechanic. These facts easily distinguish Angle from the defendant in Holm who was convicted of simply possessing child pornography and used the computer and Internet extensively in his occupation as a information systems technologist. Finally, unlike the district court in Holm, here the district court did not impose a complete ban on the Internet, disallowing only 'personal' access to Internet services. Under these circumstances, we cannot conclude that the district court abused its discretion in thwarting Angle from gaining personal access to the Internet during the period of his supervised release. See, e.g., United States v. Zinn, 321 F.3d 1084, 1092-93 (11th Cir. 2003); United States v. Paul, 274 F.3d 155, 166-66 (5th Cir. 2001); United States v. Crandon, 173 F.3d 122, 127-28 (3d Cir. 1999); c.f. United States v. Perazza-Mercado, 553 F.3d 65, 70 (1st Cir. 2009) (holding that total Internet ban unrelated to charged offense was impermissibly broad)."
Affirmed.
08-2087 U.S. v. Angle
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana, Moody, J., Williams, J.