Court: ‘light’ cigarette claims are not preempted by law

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Boston — In a decision that allows claims by smokers seeking billions of dollars in damages from tobacco companies to proceed, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled Dec. 15 that state law claims that tobacco companies deceptively market “light” or “low tar” cigarettes are not preempted by federal law.

The decision in Altria Group v. Good stems from a lawsuit filed under the Maine Unfair Trade Practices Act by Maine smokers of Marlboro Lights and Cambridge Lights cigarettes.

The plaintiffs allege that Philip Morris deceptively used the labels “light” and “low tar” on the products, knowing it would lead to them being used more frequently and in ways that exposed smokers to just as much nicotine and tar as in regular cigarettes. (Altria Group is the parent company of Philip Morris.)

A U.S. District Court granted summary judgment for the tobacco company, ruling that the claims were preempted by the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act (also known as the Labeling Act), which states in part that ‘no requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health shall be imposed under state law with respect to the advertising or promotion of cigarettes.”

But the 1st Circuit, reversed, finding that the Labeling Act does not preempt consumer fraud claims.

In a decision written by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Supreme Court agreed.

In dismissing Altria Group’s argument that the Labeling Act expressly preempts state statutes like the one in Maine, the Court noted the two stated purposes of the Act: to inform the public about the health risks of smoking and to protect commerce and the economy by creating uniform standards with respect to the first goal.

“Although both of the Act’s purposes are furthered by prohibiting states from supplementing the federally prescribed warning, neither would be served by limiting the states’ authority to prohibit deceptive statements in cigarette advertising,” Stevens wrote.
Then, applying the standard established by a plurality of the court in the 1992 case Cipollone v. Liggett Group, the court found that the Maine statute did not constitute a “requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health … with respect to … advertising or promotion.”

The Labeling Act “does not refer to harms related to smoking and health, Stevens wrote.

“Rather, it preempts only requirements and prohibitions — i.e. rules — that are based on smoking and health.” Claims that labeling is misleading or deceptive fall outside of this group, he wrote.

The court also distinguished the case from its decision earlier this year in Reigel v. Medtronic, which said that claims against the makers of premarket-approved drugs and devices are preempted by the Medical Device Amendments of 1976.

“The plaintiff’s product liability claims fell within the core of [that Act’s] preemption provision because they sought to impose different requirements on precisely those aspects of the device that the FDA had approved,” Stevens wrote.

In the instant case, however, the federal law preemptive language “does not encompass the more general duty not to make fraudulent statements.”

The Court also rejected the argument that the claims are impliedly preempted because of the Federal Trade Commission’s use of the Cambridge Filter Method test on tar and nicotine levels, noting that the FTC expressed no desire to regulate the safety of tobacco products. Stevens noted that the agency even rescinded its guidance concerning the test method earlier this year, stating that it was “not likely to help consumers make informed decisions.”

The opinion was joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, David Souter and Anthony Kennedy.

Justice Clarence Thomas, in a dissent joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. and Justices Antonin Scalia and Samuel Alito, Jr., blasted the majority for “adopt[ing] the methodology of the Cipollone plurality as governing law.”