06-1014 Nunez v. U.S.

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Criminal Procedure
Waiver of appeal

A defendant has no constitutional right to have a lawyer file a notice of appeal after formally waiving that right.

"First, it would be anomalous to plead guilty and waive appeal, yet reserve by indirection a right to test the conviction later. Collateral review is not a means to undo an express waiver of an issue-that much was established even before Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1 (1992), overruled Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963)-and both the guilty plea and the waiver of appeal expressly surrender any right to upset the conviction. See, e.g., United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563 (1989). Having twice waived any objection to the conviction, it was not necessary for Nunez to waive it a third time when dealing with collateral review. Second, the waiver of collateral review contains a proviso-the reservation of a right to contest the voluntariness of the plea-that serves a function only if the waiver has the broader meaning. Third, when accepting Nunez's plea the district judge was required by Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(N) to state on the record 'the terms of any plea-agreement provision waiving' the right to appeal or collateral review. In obtaining Nunez's assent to these terms on the record, the judge stated that the waiver covers every issue other than the voluntariness of the plea. Asked whether he understood this, Nunez replied 'yes.'"

Affirmed.

06-1014 Nunez v. U.S.

On Remand from the Supreme Court of the United States, Easterbrook, J.

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