06-1005 U.S. v. Santos

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Money Laundering
Sufficiency of evidence

The federal money-laundering statute, 18 U. S. C. §1956, applies only to transactions involving criminal profits, not criminal receipts.

The rule of lenity dictates adoption of the "profits" reading. The statute nowhere defines "proceeds." An undefined term is generally given its ordinary meaning. Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U. S. 179 . However, dictionaries and the Federal Criminal Code sometimes define "proceeds" to mean "receipts" and sometimes "profits." Moreover, the many provisions in the federal money-laundering statute that use the word "proceeds" make sense under either definition. The rule of lenity therefore requires the statute to be interpreted in favor of defendants, and the "profits" definition of "proceeds" is always more defendant-friendly than the "receipts" definition.

The Government's contention that the "profits" interpretation fails to give the money-laundering statute its intended scope begs the question; the Government's contention that the "profits" interpretation hinders effective enforcement of the law is exaggerated.

Neither suffices to overcome the rule of lenity.

461 F.3d 886, affirmed.

Local effect: The decision affirmed arose in the Seventh Circuit.

06-1005 U.S. v. Santos

Scalia, J.; Stevens, J., concurring; Breyer, J., dissenting; Alito, J., dissenting

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