Liability for teen drinking party denied

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Parents who did not provide alcohol to minors are not liable for the acts of those minors, even if they were aware that minors were consuming alcohol on their property.

In so holding, the Wisconsin Supreme Court on Mar. 25 agreed with the assessment of Judge David G. Deininger, in his dissent when the case was before the Court of Appeals: if liability is allowed in such a case, then parents of teenagers would “be well advised to never leave home, or if they must, to ensure that all underage persons go elsewhere as well.”

However, the decision suggests that such suits may proceed to trial, if the owners knew in advance that underage individuals would be drinking, or if they knew the minor who caused the injuries was intoxicated.

In the case at bar, several members of the Nichols family were injured in an automobile accident caused by Beth C. Carr, who was intoxicated and was underage.
Carr, a high school student, had been drinking alcohol earlier that night at a party on a farm managed by Edward and Julie Niesen.

The Niesens did not provide the alcohol, but, according to the allegations in the complaint, were aware that minors were on the property consuming alcohol.

The Nichols family sued the Niesens, but the circuit court dismissed the claim. A divided Court of Appeals reversed, over Deininger’s dissent, in an unpublished decision.

Public Policy

The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, in an opinion by Justice N. Patrick Crooks.

The complaint alleged that the Niesens had a duty to supervise and monitor the activities on their property, and that they failed to do so.

The court assumed, without deciding, that the Court of Appeals was correct in its conclusion that the Nichols family alleged all four elements of common law negligence — duty, breach, causation, and injury — but held dismissal was proper nonetheless on public policy grounds.

Of the six public policy factors for denying recovery, despite the allegation of all four elements of a negligence claim, the court focused its opinion on only the sixth — “allowing recovery would have no sensible or just stopping point.”

The court found that allowing liability in this case “would provide too much potential for the out of control growth of liability.”

Crooks wrote, “If the Nichols’ claim were allowed to proceed, the expansion of liability might also include liability for parents who allegedly should have known that drinking would occur on their property while they were absent, based on the proclivities of teenagers in a given area to consume alcohol.”

Because such liability would effectively impose strict liability on property owners for any underage drinking that occurs on their property, the court reversed.
Potential Liability

However, the lead opinion allowed the potential for liability in similar cases, if the property owners committed some act to further the activity.

In the lead opinion, the court observed, “it is instructive to note what is not alleged by the Nichols… that the Niesens provided alcohol to Carr, that the Niesens were aware that Carr (specifically) was consuming alcoholic beverages, that the Niesens knew or should have known that Carr was intoxicated, or that the Niesens knew or should have known that Carr was not able to drive her motor vehicle safely.”

In addition, there was no allegation that the Niesens knew in advance that any underage individuals would be drinking.

Where such facts are alleged in future cases, this case may be distinguishable.

Chief Justice Shirley S. Abrahamson wrote a concurring opinion, joined by Justice Louis B. Butler Jr., that would make property owners’ liability contingent on a violation of state law.
Abrahamson wrote: “Although a claim for common law negligence does not require a violation of the statutes, I conclude that Wis. Stat. Sec. 125.07(1)(a)4. should be read as providing a stopping point on the Niesens’ liability with respect to underage drinking on their property under the circumstances of the present case.”

Act Required

Attorney Arnold P. Anderson of Mohr & Anderson LLC, who represented the defendants, said in an interview with Wisconsin Law Journal that, under the opinion, “an affirmative act of some kind is the touchstone for liability.”

In this case, he noted, “There was no action by the parents. Simple knowledge was all that could be pleaded.”

The final noteworthy aspect of the decision is a discussion of the duty element.

The Court of Appeals’ decision read the Supreme Court’s decision in Hoida, Inc., v. M&I Midstate Bank, 2006 WI 69, 291 Wis.2d 283, 717 N.W.2d 17, as implicitly overruling earlier decisions in Gritzner v. Michael R., 2000 WI 68. 235 Wis.2d 781, 611 N.W.2d 906, and Rockweit v. Senecal, 197 Wis.2d 409, 541 N.W.2d 742 (1995).

Under those decisions, all persons have a duty to refrain from any act which will cause foreseeable harm to others, even if the identity of the harmed person is unknown.

The Court of Appeals read Hoida as limiting duty, and adding the absence of duty and foreseeable harm as reasons for limiting liability in a negligence case, in addition to the six public policy factors.

Rejecting this interpretation, the Su-preme Court reaffirmed the validity of Gritzner and Rockweit, despite its holding in Hoida that the defendant owed no duty to the plaintiff. In the “vast majority” of negligence cases, the court stated, the decision to limit liability continues to be guided by the public policy analysis.