By: dmc-admin//January 3, 2006//
By: dmc-admin//January 3, 2006//
“We recognize, of course, as do the parties, that the legislature intended for §§ 893.16 and 893.56 to work together. See Storm, 265 Wis. 2d 169, 26 (‘[l]anguage in § 893.16 and in § 893.56 . . . strongly indicates that they are meant to apply in tandem’); id., 30 (‘the exception for minors in § 893.16(1) creates symmetry between these two statutes’).
“Unfortunately, however, reading the statutes together does not supply a plain-language answer to the question of whether the legislature intended for either § 893.16 or § 893.56 to apply in a case such as this one. In Aicher, the court previously noted the apparent gap with which we are now faced: ‘Aicher correctly reads Wis. Stat. § 893.56 to exclude the developmentally disabled, and she also correctly notes that Wis. Stat. § 893.16 does not provide the developmentally disabled with an extension for filing medical malpractice actions.’ Aicher, 237 Wis. 2d 99, 73.
“Accordingly, we decline to rewrite either § 893.16 or § 893.56. We determine that by the plain language of the statutes and their legislative history, neither § 893.16 nor § 893.56 applies to a negligence claim alleging injury to a developmentally disabled child caused by a health care provider.”
Reversed and Remanded.
Bradley, J.
Attorneys:
For Appellant: David J. Pliner, Madison, and Michael B. Van Sicklen, Madison
For Respondent: Jeremi K. Young, Dallas, TX; and Richard Schulz, Milwaukee