Read-ins are only indirect consequence

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The Wisconsin Court of Appeals held on Nov. 15 that, because read-in offenses are collateral, rather than direct, consequences of a guilty plea, the defendant need not understand those consequences for a guilty plea to be valid.

In 2003, then twenty-year-old Monika S. Lackershire was charged in Pepin County with two counts of sexual assault of a child, based on alleged acts of intercourse involving then fourteen-year-old Stephen G., and two counts involving Joseph C., also fourteen.

Following plea negotiations, Lackershire agreed to plead guilty to one count regarding Stephen, and the State agreed to dismiss the second count and both charges regarding Joseph. The parties did not discuss whether the charges would be read in at sentencing.

After a colloquy with Lacker-shire, the court accepted her plea and ordered a presentence investigation. The PSI treated the three dismissed charges as read-ins and discussed them as such. Lacker-shire did not object.

Judge Dane F. Morey sentenced Lackershire to three years’ initial confinement plus six years’ extended supervision.

Lackershire subsequently filed a postconviction motion seeking plea withdrawal or sentence modification. The court denied the motion and Lackershire appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed in a decision by Judge Michael W. Hoover.

Lackershire argued that her plea was not knowing, intelligent, or voluntary because she “had no knowledge or understanding that the dismissed charges were to be treated as read-ins, nor that the read-in procedure was the equivalent of an admission to criminal activity.”

Rejecting Lackershire’s argument that a defendant must have actual knowledge and understanding of the read-ins, the court agreed with the state that, because read-ins are an indirect consequence of a plea, knowledge of the read-ins is not a requirement for a valid plea.

The court first found that the trial court properly rejected Lackershire’s testimony at the postconviction hearing that she did not know the other charges would be read in.

The court noted that Lackershire never disputed the State’s assertion at sentencing that she had engaged in the conduct underlying all four charges. In addition, the presentence investigation treated the three dismissed charges as read-ins, and yet, Lackershire made no objection to the PSI.

Finally, the court noted that the plea questionnaire that Lackershire signed explained the consequence of read-ins — “they do not increase a sentence, although restitution may be ordered, and the State is prohibited from prosecuting those crimes in the future.”

The court concluded, “These factors all undercut Lackershire’s contention she did not know there would be read-ins or what read-ins were.”

Despite finding that Lackershire did know the consequences of the dismissed charges at the time of her plea, the court continued, holding that, even if she did not understand the consequences, there were no grounds for plea withdrawal.

The court cited State v. Cleaves, 181 Wis.2d 73, 80, 510 N.W.2d 143 (Ct.App.1993), in which the court held, “In the absence of any objection to the crimes being read in, the court may assume that the defendant admits them for purposes of being considered at sentencing.”

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The court also cited State v. Byrge, 2000 WI 101, 237 Wis.2d 197, 614 N.W.2d 477, in which the Wisconsin Supreme Court held, “[i]nformation about ‘collateral consequences’ of a plea … is not a prerequisite to entering a knowing and intelligent plea.” Collateral or indirect consequences of a plea are those that do not increase the range of a defendant’s potential punishment.

The court thus concluded, “Because read-ins do not increase the range of punishment, they are indirect consequences and their knowledge is not required for a defendant to enter a knowing, intelligent, or voluntary plea.”

Finally, the court found no manifest injustice as a result of the read-ins: “Lackershire received the benefit of the bargain — three of her charges were dismissed and the State is prohibited f
rom recharging them. Lackershire was not ordered to pay restitution on the dismissed charges, nor did she object to the read-ins in the PSI. Finally, even if the charges should not have been available as read-ins, the sentencing court is allowed to consider both charged and uncharged behavior. … Thus, it is likely the court would have evaluated Lackershire’s interactions with Stephen and Joseph in any event.”

After rejecting additional contentions by Lackershire that she did not understand the elements of the offense, and that her plea was the result of coercion, the court affirmed.

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David Ziemer can be reached by email.